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Abstract
In spite ofmany years of research into mechanical assistance formathematics
it is still much more difficult to construct a proof on a machine than on
paper. Of course this is partly because, unlike a proof on paper, a machine
checked proof must be formal in the strictest sense of that word, but it is
also because usually the ways of going about building proofs on a machine
are limited compared to what a mathematician is used to. This thesis looks
at some possible extensions to the range of tools available on a machine
that might lend a user more flexibility in proving theorems, complementing
whatever is already available.
In particular, it examines what is possible in a framework theorem
prover. Such a system, if it is configured to prove theorems in a particular
logic T, must have a formal description of the proof theory of T written
in the framework theory F of the system. So it should be possible to use
whatever facilities are available in F not only to prove theorems of T, but
also theorems about T that can then be used in their turn to aid the user
in building theorems of T.
The thesis is divided into three parts. The first describes the theory
FS0, which has been suggested by Feferman as a candidate for a framework
theory suitable for doing meta-theory. The second describes some experi¬
ments with FS0, provingmeta-theorems. The third describes an experiment
in extending the theory PRA, declared in FSa, with a reflection facility.
More precisely, in the second section three theories are formalised:
propositional logic, sorted predicate logic, and the lambda calculus (with
a deBruijn style binding). For the first two the deduction theorem and
the prenex normal form theorem are respectively proven. For the third, a
relational definition of beta-reduction is replaced with an explicit function.
In the third section, amethod is proposed for avoiding the work involved
in building a full Godel style proof predicate for a theory. It is suggested
that the language be extended with quotation and subsitution facilities di¬
rectly, instead of providing them as definitional extensions. With this, it
is possible to exploit an observation of Solovay's that the Lob derivabil-
ity conditions are sufficient to capture the schematic behaviour of a proof
predicate. Combining this with a reflection schema is enough to produce
a non-conservative extension of PRA, and this is demonstrated by some
experiments.
Introduction
This thesis is intended as a contribution to work in the area of mechanical theorem
proving. Specifically, it presents some experiments in the use of two particular meta-
theoretic techniques to extend a theorem prover: meta-level reasoning and reflection.
As well as this, it also considers the practical usability of the theory FS0, proposed
by Feferman as a framework suitable for this sort of work.
§1 Background
The research area of mechanical proof checking and development systems is now
several decades old. Recently this work has become interesting to people like engineers
(and so economically important) because of the problem of complex systems: our
machines are becoming more and more intricate, and are increasingly being used in
situations where unexpected behaviour could kill someone. One way that has been
proposed to help ensure the reliability of these systems is to apply methods developed
originally in mathematical logic to their analysis and construction. Unfortunately the
enormous amount ofmathematical work that is needed to do this for even the simplest
machine can overwhelm an unassisted analyst.Mechanical proof development systems
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might be a solution to this problem, since a machine is much better at reliably keeping
track of large amounts of information than a person. However we have not yet been
able to build a machine that allows formal proofs to be done on a machine as easily
as informal proofs are done on paper. This means that it has not been possible to
make proper use of methods of formal development.
Thus investigations into how proof development systems might be extended to
embrace more of the techniques that mathematicians normally use are important:
if successful they bring closer the goal of a practical mechanical proof development
system; otherwise they highlight and clarify the problems that have to be tackled.
§2 Meta-level reasoning
A common device used in presenting a formal proof of a theorem in a logic textbook
is to abbreviate it by appealing to new rules not actually defined in the theory. So
even in what is described as a formal proof there will be gaps in the places where
these new rules are used. Instead of filling these gaps with formal derivation, appeal
is made to a meta-theoretic result stating that it is possible to fill in the gaps; this
avoids the tedium of having actually to do the work, while still convincing a reader
that a full formal proof exists. Meta-theory is this different view of a theory that
is possible: not only can proofs in a formal theory be built but also, and as easily,
proofs about a theory, so that it is possible, for instance, to prove that a particular
class of gap in a proof can always be filled with a correct derivation.
Unlike textbooks most proof development systems cannot build or exploit meta-
level proofs, and the alternative, of allowing users to add new rules to the system
without formal justification, is clearly not safe. For this reason proof development
systems have in general to build proofs solely from the basic rules supplied, and this
can make them slow and cumbersome. One way that has been used to help this
problem is to provide a programming 'metalanguage' at the interface, allowing users
to automate the more repetitive parts of proof building; the same steps still have to
be taken but at least they are being taken by the machine, which is faster and more
reliable at handling details.
But why should it not be possible to have a proof development system simply
make use of formal meta-theory in the same way that a book can? It is not a
priori clear that this is can be done: the objects used to represent mathematics
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have particular properties that might make the work of reasoning about them so
great that it is not worth the effort. If this were the case it would be unfortunate:
metamathematics is as proper a part of mathematics as any other, so we would
have to conclude that there are parts of mathematics that just cannot be practically
mechanised; we would also have to conclude that formal analysis of some important
sorts of system (for instance, language interpreters) that raise the same sorts of
problems as meta-theory is not practical.
The experiments presented here try to give some indication of what is possible
by building meta-theoretic proofs for three very different theories: a proof of the
deduction theorem for a very simple presentation of propositional logic; a derivation
of a normal form theorem for a sequent calculus presentation of sorted predicate
logic; and finally the derivation of a replacement beta-reduction rule for an equational
presentation of the pure lambda calculus.
§3 Reflection
Probably the most famous result in mathematical logic is Godel's proof that in general
it is only possible to prove formally a strict subset of the true sentences of any part
of mathematics. He did this by showing how, given a formal theory that has certain
basic properties, it is possible to to formalise a description of the theory in itself, and
use this to build a 'self-referential' sentence that is recognisably both true and not a
theorem. Godel showed how formal theories are incomplete, but he also indicated,
as a corollary, how a formal theory could be extended so as to be, if not complete,
then at least less incomplete.
There is a large problem with using the approach that Godel describes though:
his mechanism for building self referential sentences uses a 'quotation mechanism'
and a 'proof predicate'; and the exercise of constructing these is so complex that it is
not practically formalisable. Since in essence the second incompleteness theorem is a
formalisation of the first, attempts to provide a proper proof have meant that a lot of
work has been done on trying to abstract the distinctive properties of the proof pred¬
icate away from any particular version as a set of derivability conditions. This work
suggests the possibility of extending a theory with a proof predicate while avoiding
the work of Godel's original approach. This immediately raises several questions.
First, is it enough to define a proof predicate in terms of the derivability conditions,
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or must it actually be instantiated with some particular concrete definition before
the non-conservativity results hold; and second, is an extended theory constructed
this way 'interesting', i.e., even given that the extension allows new theorems to be
proven, do those new theorems tell us anything useful, or do they have the same
artificial character as what Godel constructed?
The second set of experiments that are described here looks at these questions.
An extension of the language of first order predicate logic that adds a quotation
mechanism directly is described, and this is used to provide a proof predicate for
theories defined in this language directly by appealing to Lob's derivability conditions.
Primitive recursive arithmetic is defined in this system, and three example proofs are
presented: proof of a course of values induction schema, a proof of the definedness
of Ackermann's function, and finally, a proof that primitive recursive arithmetic
extended in this way contains Peano arithmetic.
§4 The theory FS0
In order to do formal meta-theory some way of formalising theories so that it is
possible both to reason in them, and to reason about them is needed. There are at
least two ways that this can be done: either for each theory construct an ad hoc ax-
iomatisation of it, or else use some system designed especially for giving descriptions
of formal theories (a Framework, in which particular theories can be defined. The
second approach is used here, of a single framework, which is used to give formal
descriptions of the theories mentioned above and prove the necessary meta-theorems
about them. The particular framework used is FS0; a conservative, second order, ex¬
tension of primitive recursive arithmetic proposed by Feferman as suitable for exactly
this. It has not previously, so far as I or Feferman [27] is aware, been implemented,
so this thesis is able for the first time to discuss the issues that are raised by doing
so, and evaluate its utility.
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§5 Structure of thesis
The structure of the rest of this thesis in chapters is as follows.
Chapter 2, 'The idea of meta-level reasoning'
This chapter is a discussion of general issues involved in metatheoretic reasoning,
how it might be done, what the advantages and disadvantages compared to other
approaches might be.
Chapter S, 'The framework theory FS0 '
This chapter describes in detail the theory FS0, its implementation and how it works
in practice. The tail end of the chapter then describes a formalisation in FS0 of a
presentation of propositional logic, and proves the deduction theorem for it.
Chapter f, 'Declaring a language'
This chapter describes how to define more complicated languages and theories; a
sequent calculus presentation of sorted first order logic is given as an example.
Chapter 5, 'Meta-level reasoning'
This chapter describes two further experiments in meta-theoretic reasoning. First
the construction of a derived rule for the theory described in chapter 4, that reduces
expressions to prenex normal form; secondly, the definition of an equational presen¬
tation of the untyped lambda calculus, and the replacement of the beta-reduction
rule with a more efficient one.
Chapter 6, 'The idea of reflection'
This chapter surveys theoretical work that has been done since Godel on the subject
of meta-level reasoning and reflection, and considers some of the implications that
this might have for mechanical theorem proving. It examines particularly the Lob
derivability conditions.
Chapter 1, 'Implementing reflection'
This chapter describes how to extend the theory defined in chapter 4 with a quotation
mechanism and how this can be used to construct reflexive extensions of a theory
defined on top of it.
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Chapter 8, 'Using reflection'
This chapter describes three experiments in using reflection in constructing proofs in
primitive recursive arithmetic. First a course of values schema is proven; then it is
shown that Ackermann's function is defined, and thirdly, it is shown that a particular
reflexive extension includes Peano arithmetic.
Chapter 9, 'Related work'
This chapter discusses related work on framework theories, meta-theoretic extension,
and reflection.
Chapter 10, 'Conclusions and further work'
This chapter, as its title suggests, discusses what has been learned, and directions
for further work.
The Idea of Meta-level Reasoning
This chapter discusses in a rigorous, but informal, manner the notion of a proof
development system, and how this can be refined and extended with a meta-level. It
does this by developing a simple theory and meta-theory for propositional logic, and
then looking at the drawbacks of the meta-theory. Using what is learned from this
exploration, the notion of a framework theory in introduced and developed.
§1 Historical background
Mathematics has traditionally been an informal enterprise where arguments have
been sketched out on paper, with the reader expected to be able to fill in the small
gaps in the proof using his own intuitions. There is a belief though, dating back to
the beginning of the Western mathematical tradition that informal mathematics-on-
paper can be translated into formal derivation; after an initial set of axioms and rules
has been agreed on there should no longer be any need to appeal to the intuition of
the reader of the proof. Euclid, in 'The Elements', made what can be regarded as one
of the first attempts to develop this idea of proof from axioms. More recently a very
determined attempt was make by Whitehead and Russell in [80]. The Principia is
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sometimes described as the definitive example of an unreadable work of genius: three
volumes of formal proof presented as a demonstration of the truth of the logicist
thesis. And genius was needed — the effort of doing so much formal mathematics by
hand was nearly superhuman and almost broke Russell.
If building large scale formal proofs by hand stretched Bertrand Russell to the
limit it is not surprising that few others have tried to emulate him. Nevertheless,
formal mathematics is now interesting for a second time, and maybe practically pos¬
sible for the first time, because of the invention of computers. Computer software is
essentially mathematical in nature, and some argue that, if mathematical techniques
can be applied to its development, it will be easier to retain intellectual control [34],
[41]. But the only reason why it is possible even to contemplate the sort of volume
of formal mathematics that this involves is that computers themselves are ideal raw
material for building the tools that are needed to do it.
§2 What is a proof development system
A proof development system (PDS) is a machine for helping a person to do formal
mathematics. It ensures that only proofs that are valid in the particular formal
system can be built. Not only that, but it should make the work of building a proof
as easy and intuitive as possible. This in effect means trying to make the work of
doing formal mathematics with the PDS resemble as closely as possible the work of
doing informal mathematics-on-paper, by trying to follow a user's intuitions about
the semantics of what the formalism describes, rather than forcing him to think in
terms of the atomic notions that the particular formalism provides.
To illustrate this idea of a PDS, this next section develops a very simple PDS for
propositional logic. Such a system is divided into three parts: The particular formal
theory that is used to describe propositional logic; the proof checker, which ensures
that only valid proofs in the formal system are allowed; and the interface between
the proof checker and the user.
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2.1 What is a formal theory
Before starting, the question of what a formal theory actually is needs to be addressed.
For the purposes of this thesis, the definition is as follows: A theory is a subset of
the objects in the language (formulae) collectively called the theorems, which are
defined to be the closure of a set of formulae (called axioms) under a set of primitive




where, given that ,..., Tn (known as the premises) are in the theory, F (the con¬
clusion) is also in the theory.
A further definition that is useful at this point is for an extension of a theory: if
T' D T then T' is an extension of T.
It is important to distinguish primitive rules (or rules of inference) from derived
and admissible rules, neither of which is primitive. A rule is said to be admissible in a
theory if, whenever the premises are theorems of the theory, then so is the conclusion.
A rule is derived if, for any extension with the same language and primitive rules, it
is admissible[77].
2.2 A theory of propositional logic
The presentation of propositional logic given here is the propositional fragment of
the presentation of predicate logic found in §2.6 of [68], which will be called SP. It
is typical of the sort of rigorous presentation that is found in logic textbooks.
First, a notational convention is defined: A, B, C are variables over formulae
of Lsp• Then the formulae of the language Csp of SP are defined by inductive
definition as follows:
• The set of atomic propositions (not defined further here) is contained in Csp.
• If A is a proposition in Csp, then ->A is a proposition in Csp.
• If A, B are propositions in Csp, then A V B is a proposition in Csp-
The theory SP is then defined as follows. The axioms are just all the formulae
that are instances of the excluded middle,
-'A V A. exmid
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2.3 A proof construction program
With the description of SP above it is possible to build a module of program code
that can be used to construct proofs (i.e., a collection of functions that implement the
necessary checking and data structures and allow proofs of particular propositions to
be built). The code module will be called PSP, and the interface (the description of
what parts of the proof constructor that other parts of a program that uses it can




functions :: mk_wff : string -> wff,
neg : wff -> wff,
or : wff -> wff wff,
left : wff -> wff,
right : wff -> wff,
interior : wff -> wff,
goal : proof -> wff,
exmid : wff -> proof,
expand : wff -> proof -» proof,
contract : proof -♦ proof,
associate : proof -» proof,
cut: proof -» proof -> proof
end module
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where the functions are programmed to behave as their names and types suggest,
wff is the sort of well formed propositions and atomic propositions are constructed
from arbitrary strings using mk_wff. Then new formulae can be built using neg
and or, and taken apart again with left, right and interior. The last three
are projection functions which, when applied to an appropriate well formed formula,
return the left or right part of a disjunction, or the interior of a negation (remember
that this is a module of program code though, so there is no guarantee apart from
the programmer's efforts that a projection function will not be applied to the wrong
sort of formula; if this happens then the code will have to indicate somehow that this
is not permitted). Then proofs can be built in the obvious way using the functions
named after the rules, and a proposition shown to be provable by some instance of
proof can be recovered using goal.
It is only fair to point out that PSP is a particularly primitive implementation
of SP, since, for instance, proofs have to be constructed 'bottom up' (i.e., the user
cannot start with the proposition he wants to prove and reduce it stepwise — from
the trunk out to the leaves — into smaller and smaller goals, but instead has to build
a proof from the smallest proofs upward— from the leaves in to the trunk).
2.4 The user interface
With the proof checker built, the user interface can be constructed. This is the
(probably much larger) part of the machine, that provides all the facilities that the
user needs, so that constructing proofs in the proof checker is as easy as possible (or
for some proof checkers, possible at all). Arbitrary facilities can be added to this
according to whatever is needed, and whatever will help a user working in the theory.
The user interface can consist of all sorts of things, but so long as, whatever else it
does, it is forced to go through the module interface of the proof checker module,
there is never any risk of building an incorrect proof.
One particular facility, common in PDSs that are used for doing real mathema¬
tics2, is what is known as a tactic language. This can be a proper (usually interactive)
programming language such as ML, Lisp, or Prolog which has been extended with
the proof checker module. This means that, instead of a user having to suffer the
demanding tedium of typing in each step of a proof by hand, he can instead write what
are known as tactics: programs that automate the operations of well understood,
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and often repeated proof steps. Such a facility of automating a lot of the proof
construction can produce a difference in scale so great that it becomes a difference in
kind, making possible formal proofs that it would simply not be humanly possible to
build unassisted. For instance in [7] a proof of a version of Ramsey's theorem, which
consisted of 64 steps entered at the interface, expanded to 17,531 primitive steps,
which is not a practical proposition for manual entry.
When using tactics, the same steps have to be taken, but they can be performed
as fast as the computer can do them, rather than as fast as the user can type them
in. This is usually faster", and certainly allows the user to think in a more abstract
way, instead of at the level of single rule applications.
There are also ways in which a tactic language offers new methods of proof that
are different by virtue of the amount of 'brute force' that a computer can apply to the
problem. So for instance a problem might yield fairly easily to analysis by cases, but
the number of cases would simply overwhelm a mathematician working with paper"1.
Consider the simple example of the commutativity of V. Imagine if a user of PSP
finds himself often having to prove propositions of the form B V A, given only that
A V B is provable. It would be possible, each time, to provide a proof by typing in
something corresponding to the derivation:
A V B -'A V A
cut
By A
(where the proof on the right is an instance of exmid). But this is time consuming,
and means that the user has to be constantly aware of the individual operations that
SP allows. A better approach is, instead, to write a program in the tactic language
supplied by the interface, of the form:
def commute_or F = cut F exmid(left F));
which could then be used to commute the goal of any proof, without the user having
to be concerned with the steps that are actually taken.
Another feature often found in PDSs is what is called a lemma facility. This
is needed in systems that are designed to concentrate on one particular derivation
at any time. Other derived formulae can be stored in a library or archive, and, if
one matches a goal that has to be proven, then instead of building a new proof, it
is enough to appeal to the fact that the goal has already been demonstrated to be
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provable. This is a slightly narrower definition of a lemma than is usually found in
mathematics-on-paper, where lemmas are not always restricted to being individual
theorems in the theory. The commutativity of V is a good example of the difference,
in fact. In [68] it is presented in §3.1 as a lemma. But it is not a lemma in the sense
here. It is stated as:
'if A V B is provable, then B V A is provable.'
But this is a relation between two derived results, not a particular derived result,
and it is schematic. It is certainly true: the tactic commute_or, is, in one view, a
proof of it, but this proof is not accessible to the PDS. There, lemmas are simply
particular provable statements in the logic; there is no way to capture, once and
for all, the fact that if it is possible to derive A V B (for any disjuncts — not just
particular instances) then it is possible to derive B V A. Instead, every time the
result is needed, the tactic has to be run.
It has to be said that using propositional logic as an example here, while good
for illustrating the limitation of a lemma facility, perhaps overstates that limitation.
For instance a foundational higher order system which blurs the distinction between
propositions and functions, such as intuitionistic type theory [57], will be able to
exploit a lemma facility much more effectively than a first order system such as the
specification language Z [41]. In the latter system obviously useful results like, e.g.,
special induction schemas, may not be provable as theorems (only every instance is).
Instead, tactics have to be constructed to emulate these schemas, and these tactics,
apart from taking time to execute, are often subtle in construction. In a higher
order system, on the other hand, since it is possible to quantify over predicates, it is
possible to prove as a theorem what in a first order theory is 'only' a schema.
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§3 A more formal notion of a proof development system
The above outline presented a proof checker as a module of program code. But
the behaviour of this module could also be presented formally, in a way that would
amount to a theory of the theory of propositional logic. In fact, there are many
ways that PSP could be formalised depending on what the formalism is for. A theory
formalising PSP is a meta-theory of SP, and can be used to prove theorems about
SP. SP in turn is called the object-theory. In what follows, a series of different
meta-theories (denoted MSP) of SP, which try to capture different parts of the
theory of SP formally, will be discussed.
3.1 Preliminary remarks: provability and proof
The implementation of SP in PSP described above is able to show that formulae in
the propositional calculus are provable, but it is not required to keep track of the
details of how a formula was actually proved. No function is available in PSP that
allows a user to find out how a formula was derived; all that he can know is that
it was, by some valid means, demonstrated to be provable. This means that proof
corresponds to what is known as a provability predicate. It would though, be easy to
extend the PSP module with functions that returned information about the top level
the proof. If this was done it would be possible to recursively extract the details of
the derivation. This version of proof, retaining details of the proof, corresponds to
what is known as a proof predicate.
A sensible question then is why a system needs to know how a formula is derived,
as opposed to that it is derivable? After all, there are certainly PDSs (Isabelle, for
instance) that do not keep track of the derivation (that is, they do not keep track of
the primitive rules that go to make up the proof— this is not the same as keeping
track of the instructions that the user gives to the PDS to construct the proof). On
the other hand, there are systems that do keep track of the derivation, and make a
good case for it; e.g., the Nuprl system, an implementation of a version of one of
Martin-Lof's type theories. It not only implements the formal theory but also keeps
track of how the derivations are constructed, so that the programs corresponding to
the proofs can be constructed. This is not only in the spirit of Martin-Lof's own
proposals, but also means that Nuprl can be used as a programming system. The
same technique could be used, with an appropriate logic, for instance to synthesize
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imperative programs, or electronic circuits [7].
Another, related, reason for keeping track of proof structure is that it is possible
to construct tactics that perform transformations on the structure of the proof itself.
Consider when a PDS is being used, as is suggested above for Nuprl, as a program
synthesis facility; the witness (that is, the program corresponding to the proof) for the
simplest proof of a goal may not correspond to a particularly efficient function. But
it may be possible to construct tactics that can convert the proof automatically into
a less intuitive one with a more efficient witness function [55]. A tactic that accesses
the structure of a derivation is called a transformation tactic [19]. Unfortunately,
a PDS that keeps track of the proof introduces complications into the relationship
between the meta-theory and the object-theory in a PDS. This problem is discussed
below.
3.2 A simple meta-theory of propositional logic
PSP is an implementation of SP in a programming language, it is not a theory. In
this it is like most PDSs that are currently in use. Now consider what a meta-theory
of SP would be like; this is what is presented next. It should be pointed out that
the purpose of the developed example theory is to illustrate points, rather than to
be paradigmatic of what might be used in practice, so it will not necessarily scale up
directly to such. However, the differences between the example and what might be
used in a real application do not affect the validity of the points made.
In the language CMSP- a meta-theory MSP~ of SP, There are two sorts of
terms: those standing for formulae of Csp, and those standing for proofs in SP. In
what follows A,B,C vary over Csp-sorted terms of MSP", D and D' vary over
'proof-in-SP'-sorted terms (denoted PdMSP-)i ancl P and P' vary over formulae in
£msp~-
• 0 isi^MSP-
• If A is in Csp, and D,D' are in CdMSp-i then {D,A) and (D,D',A) are in
Cd'"msp- ■
• If A, B are in Csp, and D, D' are in CdMSp_ , then goal((D, A), B) and
goal((D, D', A), B) are in CMSP-.
• If P is in CdMSp_ then pr(P) is in CMSP-.
• If P,P' are in CdMsp_ then P —> P' is in CMSP~.
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Then the theory MSP is as follows. There are the two predicates pr(-) and
goal(-, •). The axiom schemas for pr are
pr(«),-.A V A))
Pr((D, A V A)) —> pr(((D, A V A), A))
pr({D,A))^pr(({D,A),BW A))
pr((D, AV(BV C))) —>
pr(((D, AW (By C)), (A V B) V C))
pr((D, A V B)) -> pr((D', ->A V C)) -+
pr(((B, A V B), (£>', -A V C), B V C))
and for poa/,
pr((D, £)', A)) -> goal((D, D', A), A)
pr((£>, A)) -> goal((D, A), A)
and, finally, there is one rule
A A -► B
. detachment
B
(where —» is right associative. Notice that —> here should not really be taken as
being implication, since it is too weak, all that it is supposed to give is a theory that
corresponds to the module PSP, i.e., a 'procedural' interpretation.) It is not hard
to see that this theory fulfils the basic requirements of adequacy and faithfulness.
(Adequacy is the property that if a proposition A is provable in the original theory
SP, then it is possible using this theory to prove, for some D, that goal(D, A).
Faithfulness is the reverse of this, demanding that if it is possible to show, using the
framework, that the encoding of a proposition A is provable, then there really is a
proof in the original theory that D).
Here a proof predicate formulation (if only implicitly) of the meta-theory is being
used, since the structure of the derivation is carried around along with the derived
statement in pr. It is not very useful as yet though, since there is no way of accessing
that information in the theory; that can be done only from in the meta-level, with
the perspective it provides. Extending the theory with a predicate that gives access
to the theory is easy though: e.g., add a new predicate subproof(-, •) as follows. The
language T-msp~ extended as follows:
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Modifying the theory in the other direction instead, so that is uses provability
(call this MSPn), is simply a matter of defining a predicate pr'(-) which is like
pr(-) except that it does not keep track of the derivation at all. This means that, for
instance the axiom defining the provability of instances of the excluded middle would
be simply
pr'(A V ~1A),
and with corresponding modifications for the other axioms (this means of course
that goal{•, •) is no longer needed at all, since pr'(-) carries around the goal, instead
of the derivation). Below I will take MSP~ extended with subproof as the de¬
fault, (though, as necessary, I will point out differences that arise with a provability
predicate).
3.3 Working in the meta theory MSP~
In the presentation above, MSP~ is carefully designed to ensure that there is an
isomorphism between proofs constructed in it, and proofs constructed in PSP.
For instance, it is possible to prove an instance of the commutativity of V as
follows: given that A, B are propositions, and D = (£>', A V B) is a derivation
where pr(D) then a proof that there is some D" such that pr((D", B V A)) can be
constructed as follows
pr(D) pr(D) —> pr(((),~^A V A)) —> pr((D, ((), ->A V A),-^B V A))
pr((),-^A V A) pr(((),->A V A)) -> pr((D, {(), -^A V A), -*B V A))
pr((D, ((), ->A V A), B V A))
If this proof is examined, it is possible to see that it follows exactly the same
path as commute_or defined above, with each application of detachment in the proof
corresponding to a function application in the tactic. Unfortunately, this correspon¬
dence results in a weakest possible meta-theory; for instance not even the concept of
a variable is available, so it is not possible to construct a proof of the commutativity
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of V, which is quantified over the class of propositions, that can be instantiated later
to the propositions that are actually needed in any particular case.
Since the theory MSP~ is, itself, a formal theory, it can be implemented on
a machine. Why not implement a proof checker for it instead of building PSP, since
any proof of SP can be reconstructed in MSP"? On the other hand, why bother?
After all, implementingMSP" is going to be more difficult than implementing SP,
the resulting system will probably be slower, and it will not be able to do anything
that PSP cannot do. But, while MSP" cannot do anything that PSP cannot do, it
is easy to extend it to a theory that can.
3.4 Adding variables to the meta-theory
MSP~ is a meta-theory of SP, but it is very weak. While all the theorems that
it proves are 'meta-theorems' they are only meta-theorems in the most literal sense
of the word — they do not say anything general about the theory SP, only about
particular propositions in SP. In other words, it is possible to prove every instance
of the commutativity lemma, but it is not possible to prove a statement of the form
'for any formulae A and B, ...', which subsumes all those particular instances. In
order to get this generalisation facility, the meta-theory needs to be extended at least
with variables. The question of how to do this sensibly has to be addressed.
The theory MSP" has only one connective, an arrow, and one rule, which
allows the tail of a chain of arrows to be removed; the former suggests implication,
and the latter modus ponens. However, while this interpretation may make sense,
it is not captured in the theory — it is not possible to derive propositions that are
provable for implication in SP.
Since the theory has arrows in it already, and the idea is to add variables,
extending it to the the V, —> fragment of predicate logic would seem to be sensible,
so this can be taken as the first extension ofMSP"; call it MSPp. The first thing
that has to be done, is to extend the language to the language of MSPp, called
Cmspfi wild variables a,b,c, etc. over formulae in jCsp, and extend PdMSP~ with
variables d, d', etc. In the following P,Q vary over formulae in Cmspp, v varies
over variables of Cmspp, and t varies over terms of Cmspp .
Then an axiom schema and rule for quantification over variables can be formu-
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lated. The axiom is
\/v Q —> Q[t/v]
and the rule is
P -> Q
P ^MvQ
(where v does not occur occur free in P and [t/v] denotes the substitution of t for
the variable v in the preceding formula in the usual way — i.e., avoiding variable
capture and the like). Axiom schemas for —> are
A —> B A
(A -> B) -> (A -> B -»■ C) -> A -> C
Given these extensions (and that the axioms are extended so that they can be
used with variables), the theorem:
hmspf Va V6Vd(pr((d, a V b)) —> pr((d, ((), -ia V a), b V a))) (CL)
becomes provable. And since it is a simple theorem in the theory MSPp it can be
used as a lemma with the sort of lemma mechanism usually implemented in a PDS.
3.5 Further extensions
Even the theory MSPP is a very small extension to MSP~, it adds only the
fragment of predicate logic encompassing implication and universal quantification. It
is easy to imagine much more powerful extensions, such as induction over derivations.
But there are two problems that have to be taken into account: First, there is the
risk that a proposed meta-theory will not be conservative with respect to the pr
predicate. That is, an ill thought out extension MSP1 of MSP~ might allow
^msp1 Pr{{D,A)) even though not \~MSP- pr((D, A))
(for some D and A). On the other hand, there is no reason why, as long as the
proposed extended theory is faithful, it should not be used. And the resources that
such an extended theory could provide might make all sorts of useful results possible.
Secondly, even if the extended theory is faithful, there is the separate problem that
a lot of useful meta-level results will not be provable using any extension of this sort,
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no matter how strong. For instance, in any introductory work on proof theory, one
of the first meta-level theorems proven is the deduction theorem. This says simply
that
hr -'a V b iff 1~t[a\ b
(where T[a] means the theory T extended with the axiom a, and ht a means a
is provable in theory T). This is not provable in any obvious sensible extension of
mspf , since it states a relationship between two theories rather than a relationship
between two proofs in the one theory. This is, in a way, the next step up from the
problem illustrated by the commutativity lemma, that is common in PDSs used in
practice. But even the commutativity lemma relates different derivations in the same
theory, whereas even to state the the deduction theorem some way of dealing with
the general notion of a theory is needed. This would tend to suggest that designing a
meta-theory for a system 'bottom up', i.e., the way that ameta-theory for SP has just
been developed, by ad hoc extensions from a simple initial theory, is doomed to fail,
since there are results that need a fundamentally more general notion. The deduction
theorem is not, either, an isolated result; an examination of any proof theory text will
show that there are a lot of results like it that have obvious applications in computer
assisted theorem proving (some of these are discussed later). Thus the next section
looks at 'top down' approaches to the problem, i.e., systems that are designed to be
able to define large classes of very different logics easily.
§4 Meta-theory and frameworks
The section above shows that it is not really possible to develop a general notion of
meta-theory 'bottom up'. On the other hand it also suggests that a general facility
for meta-theory might be useful. Logicians have in the past looked at this notion of
a general meta-theory [64], [73]. More recently, computer scientists have coined the
term logical framework, or framework, to describe it [20].
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4.1 What are useful properties of an abstract theory?
The first question that has to be asked, before particular approaches to the idea of
a framework can be examined, is 'what exactly does a good framework consist in?'
Some indication of what is needed might be got by examining the deduction theorem,
and imagining what a formal expression of it would look like. For example using the
sort of formal language used above, it would look like
VdVaV6VT (pr(d, T U {a}) A goal(d, b) 3d' (pr(d' ,T) A goal(d!, ->a V 6))) (DT)
(where T is a set of axioms, and pr(-1, -2) is now a two place predicate which holds if
and only if *i is a derivation that is valid for SP extended with the set of axioms -2).
But this is still only an extension to first order theories in general. It does not take
account of more dramatically different theories such as, say, the theory of finite types
(FT). And yet, later on in this chapter a result relating a first order theory with FT
will be discussed. So extending the proof predicate to consider any first order theory
has not really solved the problem.
What is really needed is a much more general meta-theory, that is able to treat
very different theories and relate them together, and it seems that it is not going to
be possible to develop such a thing using the approach followed so far, of making
ad-hoc extensions to a simple axiomatisation of the original object theory.
Designing such a theory is not an easy task. For instance, on examination, the
notion of rule application is much more complex than it appears from the examples
above: propositional logic is very unusual in the simplicity of the rules that it uses.
In theories that are used in practice (even like MSP~), rule applications can be
arbitrarily complicated, and some way of dealing with this has to be provided. Sub¬
stitution of terms for variables in formulae is the most obvious (though not the only)
example of this.
The system should also be flexible in the way it allows proofs to be built. A
system that insists that a proof be constructed bottom up is probably not going to be
much use for practical proof construction. And, finally, but very importantly, since in
the end a framework is intended for proving theorems that are equivalent to theorems
in the object-theory, it is important that framework proofs do correspond to proofs in
the object theory, (like, for example, above, where there is no real difference between
proving an instance of the commutativity of V in PSP, or in MSP~). At the same
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time it should be possible to prove more general theorems in the framework itself,
that do things like show interesting relationships between different object theories;
thus a framework that only allowed meta-theories closely related to, for instance,
MSP~ to be defined is not what is wanted.
4.2 Foundational theories
This is a good point at which to make the distinction between foundational theories
and framework theories. Foundational theories are systems like Zermelo Frankel set
theory with choice (ZFC), the theory of Principia Mathematica (PM) or Intuition-
istic Type Theory (ITT), which are proposed as very general theories which in some
sense are able to subsume any particular piece of real mathematics. For instance, it
would be possible to do classical number theory in ZFC by constructing sets with
the properties that we expect the numbers to have, and then working with those sets
instead of with some formal system describing the integers directly.
A framework theory, on the other hand, does not do this, but rather provides a
facility for describing the formal system itself, and manipulating that. This allows,
for instance, a framework to prove theorems in an inconsistent formal theory (this
may not be an advantage). A foundational theory, on the other hand, cannot do this,
since only if the theory is consistent (assuming that the foundational theory itself is
consistent) will it be possible to build objects in it that satisfy the properties that
the formal theory stipulates^.
4.3 Post-style systems
There are two major styles of framework theory available in practice. The style
that is more familiar to computer scientists is based on theories of the typed lambda
calculus (which are discussed in the related work chapter), but there is another, older
approach. This was originally developed by Post [64] in his attempts to provide a
decision procedure for PM. This was based on recursively enumerable strings. Post's
presentation was not really intended for the notion of framework theory presented
here: for instance, it had no facilities for doing 'useful' metatheory, and using strings
as the basic data structure means that it would be difficult to implement in a practical
manner. But it contained the essential idea of presenting a theory as a recursively
enumerable class of strings of symbols, and showed that even very large theories such
as PM could be presented in this way, using only a very small collection of operators.
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Recently, a new version of Post's approach to presenting a formal theory has
been suggested by Feferman [25], in a form intendeded to be a practical, as much as
a theoretical, tool. Feferman's theory uses s-expressions rather than strings, and is
a conservative extension of PRA, which gives induction over EJ-classes (i.e., those
that are recursively enumerable). In this version, a Post-style encoding of formal
theories becomes a practical possibility, and a quite powerful generalisation facility
is available to allow useful meta-level reasoning, unlike Post's suggestion. Feferman's
system is discussed at length in the next chapter, but it is worth making some points
about his system now.
For instance, one possible problem with the Post approach even in Feferman's
version, is that operations such as substitution need to be coded up by the user
instead of being something that he can count on automatically, like in a type theory.
To counter this, though, the presentation is very close to the informal notion of what
exactly a formal system is, and it is easy to add computational facilities that make
constructing a definition of substitution (or anything else) quite easy.
§5 Using a framework
Having discussed the nature of a framework theory, the issues that meta-level results
like the deduction theorem raise can be examined. For the sake of what follows, it
will be assumed that T is a framework theory that allows theories to be declared
and reasoned about in the way that has been discussed. The notation of MSP
above will continue to be used but this should not be taken as anything more than a
convenience.
5.1 Working in two theories
In a framework system, there are two, perhaps very different, systems to be dealt
with: the framework theory itself, and the object theory (or theories) declared inside
it. This means that it becomes necessary to distinguish between two different sorts
of tactics: framework tactics, which are designed for manipulations of the framework
logic itself, and object tactics, or again just tactics, which are designed for manipu¬
lations of the declared logic. The second of these is obviously a subset of the first,
since derivations in the declared logic correspond directly to manipulations in the
framework. An example of an object tactic would be the equivalent of commute_or
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for the theory MSP (which would automate the steps described above, in §3.3, to
commute a disjunction).
5.2 Using a meta-level result
In the commutativity lemma, where the logic used only the V, —> fragment of a pred¬
icate logic, the lemma had to state the structure of the object-level proof in the
consequent of the implication, and the proof of the lemma consisted in showing that
the outline was instantiated in every instance. So whenever the commutativity lemma
was applied, the proof was constructed as a side effect.
For (DT) in §4, the situation is different; all that is available from the theorem
is a statement that some such object must exist. However, since the standard proof
of DT is constructive, it is possible, by examining it, to build a framework tactic for
that will transform any proven instance pr(D,T U {A}), where D is a proof of B
from the set of axioms T U {A}, into an instance pr(D', T), where D1 is a proof of
-iA V B from the set of axioms F. But this is not satisfactory — the reason for doing
meta-theory in the first place is to avoid having to do this at all. The situation can
be illustrated by a diagram as follows:
and the problem is with the dashed relation. All that DT does is to say that that
there exists a proof that ~<A V B from T, given only a proof that B follows from
r U {A.}, it does not say what that proof is.
One possible way to deal with this problem is to add a facility to the framework
that allows computable functions to be defined and executed. Then it might be
possible to build an appropriate function /' inside the framework using the
h? pr(D,TU{A})
}dt
hr pr(D',T) A goal(D', -A V B)
bT 3d'(pr(d', T) A goal(d', -<A V B))
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facilities supplied by the logic (given that it is suitable), that satisfies the existential
quantifier", i.e., for which it was possible to show
VdVa V6VT (pr(d, T U {a}) A goal(d, b) —» pr(f'(d), T) A goal(f'(d), ->a V 6)) (DT')
If this is done instead, the diagram looks like
\~T pr(D, T U {A}) ►- pr(D',T) A goal(D', ->A V B)
ut'idab')
hy (prr)A V B))
Since the usual proof of the deduction theorem is constructive, actually building /'
is not difficult. The problem comes when the proof of a theorem is not constructive,
and it may not be obvious how to build the function that instantiates the existential
quantifier. Since it is questionable how useful a non-constructive proof of a meta-
theorem would be, in the light of the need for some way to construct the derivation,
why not restrict the meta-theory in the first place, so that it is always possible to
retrieve a proof"2. With this restriction, the proof of the meta-theorem contains,
implicitly, details of how to construct an object which can be used to instantiate the
existential. Thus, with a constructive logic there is really no difference between DT
and DT'.
The deduction theorem is a very simple example of a meta-level theorem, but
it illustrates a common situation. Before moving on, it is worth pointing out that a
much more general schema (which subsumes the deduction theorem) would be of the
form
VdVTpr(d,T) AP^d.T) —> 3d'3r'(P2(d,T,d',T') Apr(d',T')) (GMT)
here Px is a predicate checking that the given proof is of a certain form, while P2
defines the relationship between the new and the old derivations. Notice that it is
very similar to the pre- and post- conditions that are used in some styles of program
verification.
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5.3 Other implications
One other thing that that should be pointed out about DT above, is that, once it is
proven, it is very broad in its application. It can be used with any theory that use
the rules of SP. In fact if the result is proven, as Shoenfield does (his system also
includes a rule for existential quantifiers), then the result can be used with any first
order mathematical theory.
Also, remember that the deduction theorem was chosen because it was an ex¬
ample of a result that relates two theories together, rather than two results in the
one theory. There is clearly no reason, in a framework that can prove the deduction
theorem, why it should not be possible to prove relations between radically different
theories, allowing a user constructing a formal proof to exploit the technique of map¬
ping the theory into another, and showing that the result holds in isomorphic image,
as a way of proving the goal. Again, this is discussed in the next section.
§6 Advantages that meta-level reasoning brings
Having discussed what is needed to do meta level reasoning, I now want to examine
some of the practical advantages that it might bring to a system.
6.1 Complexity advantages
In discussing the example of the deduction theorem DT above, I considered how to
construct the proof object that DT proved existed. But most of the time the user will
not actually be interested in this. All he will be interested in is that the goal -iA V B
has been reduced to B, if he is allowed instead simply to assume A as an axiom.
The structure of the proof is irrelevant, but it is building the proof that consumes
the machine time. This is why a tactic can take so long: it guarantees that an
invalid proof cannot be constructed by the simple, but time and resource consuming,
method of constructing a proof from the primitive rules. On the other hand, moving
the antecedent of the goal into the axiom set is a constant time operation. The former
operation takes a large and, to the user, arbitrary amount of time while the second
will always take the same very small amount of time.
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6.2 Intellectual control
Another problem with a tactic, apart from speed (or slowness) is that the only infor¬
mation about its behaviour is intensional — no extensional abstraction is available.
For instance an examination of the code of a tactic corresponding to the deduction
theorem will reveal only a complicated function that describes a proof transforma¬
tion. On the other hand, there will be no hint of the simple transformation that is
the end result, and, without careful documentation the user is unlikely to be able to
figure out what it does at all. Further, there is no way to guarantee that the code
does what it is supposed to do, even when it is being built. And it is a truism that
there are always bugs in software. The situation is relieved to some extent for tactics
because they have to work through a proof checker, which means that a bug cannot
result in an invalid proof, only in a failure to construct anything at all. But this
is not a great help — if complicated code fails months after it was built, tracking
down the error is difficult and time consuming work. With a meta-theorem, on the
other hand, there is the same security as there is with verified program code, so there
should be no such problem.
Further, as tactics are combined together in the way that they are supposed
to be, it becomes more and more difficult to keep track of what exactly they are
supposed to be doing. A meta-level facility means that, since there is a formal and
explicit description of what a tactic does, it is much easier to manage the system.
6.3 The reliability of the proof checker
In the description of a typical PDS above I suggested that the proof checker part of
the system is minuscule. While in the ideal this is true, in practice it is not. Usu¬
ally, while a PDS is advertised as being an implementation of a logic that can be
described on paper in a few pages, the logic that is actually programmed is much
more complex, with the basic rules supplemented with all sorts of decision procedures
and normal-form procedures. These new rules have a different character from the
sorts of new rules that are sometimes introduced into a paper discussion about a
theory. These latter are introduced in order to make an exposition clearer, whereas
the former are intended to make the exposition faster; i.e., to make certain opera¬
tions more efficient by appealing to syntactic information so that it is not necessary
to construct the rule at all. In essence they are the informal equivalents of meta-
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theorems.
There is another important difference between logics on machines and logics on
paper: while the rules of a paper description are designed, usually, to be as compre¬
hensible as possible, the design of rules such as decision procedures and the like, which
supplement the usual rules in the machine, make no concessions to comprehensibility
— they are supposed to be as efficient as possible. Unfortunately efficiency often
requires intricacy, which in turn implies difficult to find bugs. There is, in short, no
guarantee that these rules do not introduce inconsistency through an implementation
error, and unlike with the rules of the paper presentation, simply inspecting the code
is not likely to be a useful guarantee11". It is ironic that the first thing that is often
done to a PDS is to extend the logic it implements in ways that are not guaranteed
to be conservative, or even sound.
With a meta-level facility though, this is no longer a problem, since it is no
longer necessary, for the sake of speed, to build such facilities into the basic logic.
Instead, they can be verified as meta level theorems and safely implemented at that
level as lemmas (like, e.g., DT or CL).
6.4 More general reasoning facilities are possible
One particularly interesting facility that meta-level reasoning offers is in the way that
very different theories can be related. For instance, a common interest of users of
PDS systems is program verification or synthesis. Specifically interesting are proofs
of Il^-propositions (those of the form Vx3yP(x,y), where P is an open predicate
defining the relationship between the input parameters x and the result y of a function
application). Consider the following example.
It is well known that for constructive formal theories such as HA a proof asserting
the existence of an object contains sufficient information so that such an object can
be constructed given a suitable theory of recursive functions. So in an appropriate
framework theory it should be possible to construct a meta-level proof showing this
correspondence, so that functions in some (formalised) programming language, can
be built by examining proofs in HA. HA, since it is easier to reason in, could then
be thought of as a specification language/theory.
This would be an interesting relation in itself, but a further very useful step is
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possible: it is also known [61] that for Il^-propositions
\-pA Vx3yP(x,y) iff bHA\/x3y P(x,y).
Now, if this theorem is formalised properly at the meta-level, the development of a
program can proceed as follows: First show, taking advantage of all the tools that
can be used in a classical theory, that
hpa Vx3yP{x,y).
Then, using results like those just described, the proof can be transformed into an
equivalent in HA, and from that a function implementing the specification can be
recovered1"".
An examination of a good text in proof theory will show that there are plenty
of other results like this that can be exploited to make a proof easier, and that corre¬
spond to the common informal mathematical device of establishing an isomorphism
between an unsolved problem in one theory and a solved problem in another theory.
§7 Disadvantages of meta-theory
In the last section I argued for some of the possible advantages ofmeta-level reasoning
as another facility for a PDS. To be fair, this has to be balanced with a discussion of
some of the possible disadvantages that might be associated with it.
7.1 Difficulty of doing formal meta-theory
Meta-theory has a reputation for being difficult. The reason most often given for this
is that bound variables are supposed to be extremely difficult to reason about neatly
[67]; worries about variable capture constantly get in the way of the construction of
proofs to such an extent as to render the effort required impractical. In attempts to
get around this problem, new approaches have been tried that are designed especially
for meta-theory, such as de Bruijn [11] indices, and these have eased the problem
enough to get some things done. Shankar, for instance, first tried to used a standard
binding scheme in his formal proof that the lambda calculus is Church-Rosser [67], but
admitted defeat. He was eventually successful when he used a de Bruijn style binding
mechanism. The problem with approaches like that which de Bruijn suggests, is that
while they clarify the meta-theory, they obscure the object-theory. Working in, as
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opposed to working with, a theory that uses this approach is practically impossible
for people (though it is extremely easy for machines, with their different perspective).
I would not dispute that this problem with binding is, at least to an extent, a real
difficulty. There are times when a tactic is much more useful than a meta-theorem.
But it is possible to divide labour effectively between tactics and meta-theory, rather
than have one or the other do the whole.
Consider {GMT) in §5.2. This can often be split up into two subtheorems:
VdVTVdVr'pr(d,r) APi(d,T) A P2{d,V,d',V) -► pr(d',T') (<GMTx)
and
VdVTpr(d, T) A P^T) 3d13T' Pa(d, T, d', V) (GMT2)
from which (GMT) follows. It is possible to dispose of one of these for all time with
a meta-theorem, and the other, each time, with a tactic. The part that is easier
to deal with using meta-theory is (GMTi), since instead of having to instantiate
an existential (which corresponds to building a function to perform the syntactic
relation, and having to cope with the problems of avoiding capture etc.), it is only
necessary to show that, given that the syntactic transformation is possible, there is
a proof that supports it (which may be easier). Then a framework tactic, instead of
a function in the framework theory itself, can be used to construct an appropriate b'
for 6, and then go on to prove that it satisfies the relation Pa(6, T, b' ,V) (a function
in the framework would not need to do this, since the result of evaluating it would
already be guaranteed to satisfy the relation). Since this is done informally I can
hope that it will be much easier.
This achieves a satisfying balance between meta-theory and object-theory, and
it is still not necessary to construct the proof which is where most of the complexity
should lie — in fact the construction of a proof that satisfies the relation P(-, •) is
much more likely to be of the same complexity as a function embedded fully in the
language, even if with a much larger constant.
More generally though, the problem is just that proving a meta-theorem is more
time consuming, and more demanding, than constructing a tactic. Especially if the
tactic is only going to be used a few times, it will often just not make sense to
devote the time to the work (unless the meta theorem gives an enormous complexity
advantage).
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7.2 Problems with the logic
One advantage that a tactic language has over even a constructive framework logic
is that it is Turing complete, i.e., any algorithm can be expressed in it. This is
usually not the case with program logics. As a formal system, a program logic has an
upper bound on expressiveness, so there will be functions that can be programmed
in the tactic language that cannot be programmed in the logic. This is not as bad
as it sounds since, in practice, a function for any result that a user might want to
compute can be expressed in a theory only as strong as PRA1X. But, even if it is
possible to construct the function, the way that a programming logic forces a user
to express himself may be very awkward, and mean even that he has to use a less
efficient algorithm than otherwise, negating the advantage of using meta-theoryx.
It may also be the case that the complexity of the transformation of the goal that
corresponds to the meta-theorem is the same as that of the tactic it is expected to
replace. Even here though, there may still be an improvement, since with a tactic a
lot of side conditions have to be checked for each rule application that can be proven
to hold for a function implementing the meta-theorem. With a verified function, on
the other hand, none of this 'run time type checking' need be done — it will all have
been checked when the function was being verified. So a meta-theorem, even of the
same complexity, may have a worthwhile constant factor advantage.
On the other hand, it is also true to say that not every tactic is 'formal' in a
way that allows it to be expressed and proven as a theorem in mathematical logic.
The search tactics that would be needed to implement the sort ofmeta-level planning
above, for instance, would be difficult to formalise, unless the framework had access
to some concept of 'plausible'.
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§8 Conclusions
This chapter has looked at what might be possible if a PDS was able to use meta-theory
in order to extend the theories defined in it, and what a good approach to providing
meta-theory might be. It was argued that meta-theory provides advantages such
as simplicity, speed, control and flexibility. Against this it was also suggested that
that some large problems might outweigh these advantages, making the enterprise
impractical.
Also, various ways of actually providing a meta-theory facility were considered
and assessed: The naive 'bottom up' approach of directly axiomatising the object
theory of the PDS was considered and rejected, because it was was not able to cope
with important sorts of meta-theoretic results. After this, the notion of designing a
meta theory 'top down' was considered instead. To this end the idea of a framework
theory was introduced; i.e., a theory that captures a much more general idea of
meta-theory. What the useful properties of such a theory might be was discussed.
Notes
i. A tactic language was not always so common — in the AUTOMATE, system,
which is the first where 'real' mathematics was done, there was no such facility.
But AUTOMATE would no longer be considered to be a good platform for
formal proof development. There are other systems that take an approach where
a tactic language is not needed — e.g., the Boyer-Moore theorem proving system
[17], or the Otter theorem proving system [53], where, instead, there is a fairly
powerful uniform proof strategy.
ii. A tactic is not always faster than a user though — if the tactic tries to do
something very complex, it may have to perform a lot of search, where a user
can make use of experience to remove the need for much exploration. But even
then, tactics still allow the user to think at a more abstract level.
iii. An example of a proof that uses an enormous case analysis is, for example, the
first proof of the four colour problem; this consists of an exhaustive examination
of several thousand different possible cases, to check that they all have a neces¬
sary property —- it would be practically impossible for a person to carry out the
same checks, or to be sure that no cases had been ignored. Another example is
endgame theory in chess — where machines are now unchallenged, due to their
ability in 'brute force' analysis.
iv. It is possible to use foundational theories as frameworks — defining a formal
theory inside ZFC is a (theoretically) trivial operation, but it would not be very
easy to use. More interesting is the approach suggested in [10], of using the type
theory of Nuprl as a practical framework.
v. It is not actually necessary that facilities be explicitly available to do this, all
that is required is that the proof be constructive; then, if there is no function
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definition facility available, instead of normalising a function application, the
existence proof itself can be normalised in the same sort of way — though this
would be a much less economical operation.
vi. It is worth noting that the idea that meta-theory (or its equivalent) should be
constructive is actually 'classical': dating back to Hilbert [42], who proscribed
'infinitistic' methods (though he did not explicitly endorse constructivemethods)
for philosophical reasons. But it has been proposed more recently for pragmatic
reasons similar to what is given here, in, for instance, [8].
vii. For instance, bugs have been found in the decision procedures of the Nuprl
PDS, which made the logic inconsistent. Because of this, a project to modify
the system so that it is possible to replace the derivations of these extra rules
with proper derivations has been started. So that when the user is finished the
work of interactive proof construction, and the time needed to do this is not so
important, it is possible to replace the appeals to the decision procedures with
primitive derivations.
viii. In practice, one must add that this is probably not going to be a very useful
function, since unless special care is taken a function extracted from a classical
proof will be enormously inefficient.
ix. Important exceptions to this are programming language interpreters themselves,
which need Turing completeness and (perhaps more relevant here) proof normal¬
isation procedures and the like, which may need induction principles available
only in arbitrarily strong theories.
x. For example, when programming in PRA as the system is presented in, say, [47]
directly, is simply horrible; unless the structure of the intended computation is of
a very particular kind, various sorts of contortions with bounds for functions have
to be performed. (The problem of computing with primitive recursive functions
is actually discussed further on in this thesis.)
The theory FS0 as a Logical Framework
The previous chapter looked at what is necessary or desirable in a theory that is to
be used as a logical framework, especially one to be used particularly for meta-level
reasoning. This chapter describes the particular framework theory that has been used
here and how it works. Two alternatives are presented above as possible approaches
to building a framework: either type-theoretic, or Post-style. The decision has been
made to to use a Post-style theory proposed by Feferman, called FS0. This chapter
describes and explores FS0l and my implementation and support, then develops a
simple example and an initial evaluation.
FS() as a Logical Framework / 35
§1 The theory FS0
A brief description of FS0 is that it is a conservative extension of PRA. (However
there are at least two definitions of the theory of primitive recursive arithmetic in
the literature, so it is important to say exactly which one is meant: here, and in all
future discussion, PRA is the theory of arithmetic with same axioms and language
(i.e., with the functions and predicates >- (•), +, x and <) as Peano arithmetic
but with induction restricted to E)'-formulae only). Specifically, it is a theory of s-
expressions (that is, ordered pairs of objects) and classes of, and primitive recursive
functions on, s-expressions which resembles Pure Lisp, embedded in a second order
predicate logic.
The difference between FS0 and the theories proposed by Post and Smullyan is
twofold: first, Feferman has been able to learn from the practical experience of the
last thirty years that we have had, programming real machines instead of thinking
about abstract ones, and secondly, he has implicitly supplied a programming facility
built into the language. The programming language Lisp, which uses s-expressions
as its fundamental data structure, has been in use since the early nineteen sixties,
and is still by far the most popular for work in symbolic computation; this is a strong
argument in favour of using s-expressions as the foundation of a theory intended for
symbolic manipulation.
§2 A formal description of FS0
This section is a formal description of the language and theory FS0. The theory
is embedded in a sorted predicate logic with equality and membership. There are
three sorts, s-expressions, functions and classes, and the following notational conven¬
tions have been adopted: S,S^,S2 vary over s-expressions in the language of FS0.
F, F1, F2 vary over functions in the language of FS0. C, Cx, C3 vary over classes in
the language of FS0. Fm, Fm1, Fm2 vary over formulae in the language of FS0,
and H,Hx,H2 vary over lists of formulae in the language of FS0. v,v%,v2 vary
over s-expression variables, and c,c^,c2 vary over class variables.
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2.1 The language jCfs0
S-expressions are very similar to the similarly named data structure of Pure Lisp;
they are defined formally as the smallest set such that:
• 0, a constant of sort 'S-expression'.
• variables of type 'S-expression' (such as e.g., x,y,... ,z — though this should
not be taken as a 'legal' definition).
• If F is a function, and S is of sort 'S-expression', then FS is of sort 'S-expression'.
Sometimes a pair of brackets will be added to aid readability, thus F(S) is
the same as FS; this does not introduce ambiguity into expressions such as
F(SX, S2), which is an application of a function to a single s-expression, the pair
(S*,Sa).
• If SX,S2 are of sort 'S-expression', then (SX,S2) is an s-expression (here the
comma can be thought of as a binary function in infix notation).
From now on, for the sake of convenience and readability, the comma is taken as asso¬
ciating to the left, so that (Sx, S2, S3) is taken as equivalent to ({Sx, S2), S3), rather
than (Sx, (S2, S3)) (beware that this is the other way around from the abbreviation
used in Lisp).
All functions are unary, and they are defined as follows:
• J,7ri,7T2,D are all functions (to suggest 'Identity', 'Projection Left', 'Projection
Right' and 'Decide').
• variables and constants of sort 'Function'.
• If S is an s-expression, then Ks is a function (suggesting 'Constant').
• If FX,F2 are functions, then C[Fx,Fs],V[Fx,Fa], 1Z[F1, F2] are functions (to
suggest 'Compose', 'Pair' and 'Recursion').
From now on, for the sake of convenience and readability, the following abbreviations
will be used:
C[FX,..., Fn-X, Fn] = C[C[FX,... Fn-x],Fn]
V[FX,..., Fn_1? Fn] = V[P[FX,... Fn-x],Fn]
Kii-.-in = , . . . , 7Tn]
Classes (which can be thought of, intuitively, as recursively enumerable) are
defined as follows:
• {0} is a class.
• variables of sort 'Class'.
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• If Cl5 C2 are classes, then Ch U C2 and Cx fl C2 are classes.
• If F is a function, and C is a class, then F_1C is a class (for inverse image).
• If C1?C2 are classes, then I2(Ci,C2) is a class.
When it might make things clearer (especially when using multicharacter identifiers)
, the convention of marking class variables, etc., with a subscript c will be used,
similarly functions are marked with a subscript p. Further, use is often made of defi¬
nitional abbreviations of constant s-expressions, functions and classes in the language,
and the same conventions are observed for these. Another convention sometimes used
is that constant s-expressions are written as quoted strings of characters.
2.2 The theory FS0
The theory of FS0 is given here in a sequent calculus formulation, as an extension of
a presentation of a weak second order predicate logic with cut and equality for first
order terms (and a definition mechanism for ground terms), rather than the axiomatic
presentation used by Feferman, since this is more suitable for implementation as a
top down proof development system. By default the hypothesis lists of the sub-goals
will be the hypothesis list of the goal. Also, it should be pointed out that rather
than the unary negation connective, falsum (_L) is used, i.e., 'not A' is rendered as
'A —■» _L' rather than '-iA'.
The first rules define the s-expression pairing (comma) and projection (Pi and
P2) functions, so that
H, (Sj_, S2) — 0 b T error
and
Hh TVi(S^S^) = Si where i £ {1,2} pi
which simply state that no pair is equal to O, and the two projection functions
do what you imagine they do (notice that the behaviour of the projecton functions
applied to O is not defined in the theory).
The rules for the identity (J) and constant (Ksl) functions are exactly what one
would imagine:
H 1- IS = S Id
and
H F Ks± S2 = const
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The compare (D) function takes an s-expression that can be resolved into a
quadruple, and compares the first two terms; if they are equal, then it is equal to the
third term, as follows
H b Sx = S2
Dect
HhD(51,5a,53,54) = S8
if, on the other hand, they are not equal, then it returns the fourth:
H h Si / S2
Decf
HI-.D(Sx,Sa,S8,S4) = S4
The third case is when D is applied to an s-expression that cannot be resolved into
the appropriate form; i.e., the argument is 'not well formed'. In this case, it simply
returns 0:
H, S = (vx,va,v8,v4) h i
Dec_l
Hk DS = 0
(where v1,v2,v3, v4 are new variables).
Then the C and V function combinators are ways of combining functions together
in new ways; C composes functions:
H b C[F,t, F2]S = Fx(F2S) Cp
and V constructs an s-expression of the result of applying the two functions to the
argument:
iThF[Fa,F3]5 = (F15,F2S) Pr
The rules for the 7Z combinator are more complex; it is used to define primi¬
tive recursive functions on s-expressions. (In what immediately follows here F3 =
1Z[F1,F2]). At first glance the rules seem slightly asymmetrical, but this is only be¬
cause only one parameter is allowed. The left hand part of the s-expression contains a
parameter, while the left hand part contains the s-expression on which the recursion
is performed. So the base case of the function is when the right hand side of the
argument is simply a O, when the value of Fx, the function defining the behaviour
in the base case, is applied to the constant parameters on the left. The rule for this
circumstance is:
H\- F3(S,0) = FxS RecB
When, on the other hand, the left hand part can be resolved into an s-expression,
then .Fa, the step case function is applied, as the next rule describes. This is quite
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complicated, because, in general, the step case can take account of the constant
parameters, and both the two parts of the original s-expression, and the results of
the recursive call.
H k F3(SX,(S2,S3)) = F2(SX,S2,S3,F3(SX,S2),F3(SX,S3)) Recs
The third rule is like the third rule for D, it takes account of the circumstances when
a function defined using 7Z is applied to an argument that is not 'well formed', i.e.,
0:
H F30 = 0 Rec±
The rules for class membership can now be given (the double line here is simply
an abbeviation indicating a two-way rule). The first of these is for the only class that
is explicitly defined, {0}, and is obvious.
H\- s e {0}
Hk S = 0









The function inverse constructor is more interesting. It returns the domain of a
function, given the class that defines the range.
Hk s e F~1C
============= Image
H h FS e C
Finally, here are the rules for J2(•,•). This is used to define recursively enumerable
sets under the closure principles below. Given that Cx = Z2(C2,CS), the rules are
as follows:
JT, S € C2 b S G Cx IncB
Hx\- ss e cx H*hs3ec1 h3 h (sx,sa,s3) e c3
Hx, h2, HsLSxe cx
Incs
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Before giving the induction rules, Cx c C2 is defined as an abbreviation for
(vx £ Cj —* vx g C2) where vx is some variable that does not occur free in Cx
or C2. Then induction over a class Cx = T2(C2, C3) is:
Hx b C2 c C4 -Hr2, d2 g c4, g C4, (i*! , u2,173) g b Vj g C4
Classlnd
Hx, H.bC.C C4
(where vx,v2,v3 are s-expression variables that do not occur in Cx,C4). There is
also a rule of induction over all s-expressions,
Hx b OeCi iT2, v2 g Ca, d3 6 Cj b (v2,v3) g
Unilnd
fix, ff2 bl)x g Cx
where ^2,^3 are new, distinct, variables, that do not occur free in Cx.
§3 Some initial observations
The system described above is very simple, but, like the pure lambda calculus, it is
actually quite useable, once a few lemmas have been proven, and a few preliminary
definitions have been constructed. This section develops informally some lemmas
that are useful in the future, and expands on how some parts of the theory work.
lemma 1 (Feferman). To any formula in FS0, Fmx, there corresponds another
formula Fm2 with one free variable over s-expressions, where b Fm2 if and only if
b Fmx.
proof: this follows by induction on the number of free variables. If Dx and v2 are
free variables in Fmx then b Fmx if and only if b Fmx [kiVx, ^2^1/*>1, ®2], which
has one less free variable over s-expressions.
After this, the first thing to address is the notion of comprehension; for what
formulae is it possible to find a class which contains only the objects that satisfy that
formula; i.e. for which formulae Fm, with a free variable (say x), is it the case that
3C\/x(x g C <-> Fm)
and the result for this is in two parts, as follows.
lemma 2 (Feferman). Given an open formula Fm in FS0 constructed from con¬
junctions and disjunctions, equalities and inequalities, with free variables Fx, Fa,...,
then there is a closed class C such that (Fx, F2,...) g C iff Fm.
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proof: Given a formula Fm1 of the appropriate sort, by lemma 1 there is a
equiprovable formula Fm2 with one free variable, v. First, replace any s-expression
made up solely from 0 and commas, S, with Ksv, which is equiprovable. Then,




which are equiprovable. Then replace all equalities of the form
F^v = F2v or Fxv ^ Fsv
with, respectively
C[D,V[F^F2,K0,K(o,o)]]v = 0 or C[D,V[Fx,F2,K{0,0),K0]]v = 0
which are equiprovable. Then replace all equalities of the form
Fv = 0 or O = Fv
with
v e F~z{0}
which is equiprovable. Then, finally, repeatedly replace subformulae of the form
v G Cx A v € C2 or v E C% V v E C2
with, respectively,
I) G C, fl C2 or v € Ch U C2
which are equiprovable. This will result in a formula of the form v £ C which is
provable if and only if Fm^ is provable.
lemma 3 (Feferman). There is comprehension for formulae of the form
3zi,... ,xnFm,
where Fm is open.
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PROOF: The proof for n = 1 is given; this generalises obviously. If x, vx,..., vn are
the free variables of Fmx, then need to prove:
3C ((v1}..., vn) GC h 3x Fm).
First define two distinct s-expression constants, call them '0' and '1', then two classes
Cx, C2 such that:
X G Cx TTiX = '0'
{w, z, z) G C2 *-> y = On,... ,vln) A w = ('1 \y) A z = ('0 ',(x,y)) A Fm
Then
3a: Fm ^ (vlt..., vn) € V[K^, Ca)
3.1 Simple inductive sets
With the lemmas above, it is possible to explain how the Z2 (•, •) class constructor
works in general. This allows a class Cx to be defined as the closure of a class C2,
under a two place rule
G Cx v3 G Ca
Fm(vx,vs,v3)
Vx G Cx
where Fm is a Sj relation as above, with free variables nx, and u3, defining the
relationship between vx, v2 and v3. If Cs is the extension of Fm, we have
(vx,va,v8) eC3 h Fm
Then, it is clear that Cx = Z2(C2, Cg).
In any particular instance of a rule (i.e., where vx,v2,v3 = Sx, S2, S3), then S3
is said to depend on Sx and S2 since it is in the class if they are. Notice that FS0
only allows the definition of classes of objects that depend on at most two earlier
objects; this would at first glance seem to be a problem, but Feferman has shown
(quoted further on) that this is not the case.
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§4 Evaluating expressions
A lot of the work that is carried out in FS0 in practice is essentially the reduction
of function applications. And the work presented here needs regularly to make use
of the fact that a useful computation mechanism is available in the system.
However, while Feferman's presentation describes a facility for defining primitive
recursive functions, it does not discuss how it 'moves'. As the theory is described,
the only way to evaluate a function application automatically is to use a tactic that
reduces function applications by algebraic manipulation through the theory. Such an
approach is not practical, and is clearly not what Feferman intends. The theory has
been augmented therefore, with a computation rule which can evaluate a function
application in one step.
Function evaluation is defined by equality on terms, and it is possible to con¬
struct a (lazy) evaluation mechanism based on this that reduces terms in the natural
way. Furthermore, since it is possible to prove strong normalisation on terms, and
that equality between terms is Church-Rosser, the evaluation mechanism will produce
the same result as the tactic alternative described above, only a great deal faster.
Strong normalisation follows by showing that the maximum total number of reduc¬
tions possible at any stage is finite. The Church-Rosser diamond property follows by
induction on the structure of terms — the proof is much simplified by the fact that
all functions are in normal form, so making composed functions much easier to deal
with.
FS1 > S2
will sometimes be used to denote h FS^. — S2.
§5 Some simple examples of FS0 in use
Now some examples are given of the definitions of simple useful classes. Even before
this, though, it is worth defining a couple of constant s-expressions, for true and
false. In the lemma above, the constant 0 was used, for convenience' sake to stand
for 'true', while (0,O) stood for 'false' (in fact anything other than O stands for
false). So these definitions will be made explicit as
true = O
false 4 (0,0)
(where = is used to indicate definitional abbreviation).
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5.1 Equality as a function and as a class
This is a simple example that shows off the use of most of the basic functions and
combinators. In the lemma above, a function that tested for equality was constructed
from the D function, returning true if the first two parameters are equal, false oth¬
erwise. What we need is a simpler function than D that takes a pair and evaluates
appropriately on application:
equalF — C[D, 7^[/, K%rue^ KfaiseJ\
So that equalF(S1, Ss) > D(Sy., Sz,true, false) which is exactly what is needed.
This is the naive definition of 'equal,' but it is not the most useful here. A lot
of the time in FS0 the user is interested in classes, not functions, and if this is the
definition used in practice there will be a lot of class definitions of the form:
somethingc = C[equalF, V[F±, {true}
It is usually much better, therefore, to have a definition of the class of equal pairs.
This can be done directly from the function using the inverse operation on classes,
defining the class as the set of all pairs for which an application of equalF evaluates
to true:
equalc = equalF~1 {true}
And this definition keeps the useful property of equalc that it makes use only of
the operators that allow construction of (primitive) recursive sets, so membership in
equalc is decidable in the same way as equalc.
5.2 The cross product of two classes (Feferman)
A class often needed in practice is the cross product of two previously defined classes,
and this is fairly easily to construct, though not quite as easily as first impression
suggests. The intuitive definition of the cross product of classes Cx and C2 is that it
is the class of s-expressions S such that -K\ S E C% and 7r2S G C2. So a first attempt
to define it might be:
(Ch) * (Ca) = D 7r2_1Ca.
(The angle brackets here are a notation that will be used occasionally in future to
indicate that the definition is not of a constant, but instead takes arguments. Such
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a definition is not a part of the proper language, only particular instances, with
constants substituted for the parameters, are).
Unfortunately this does not take account of the undefined behaviour of 773 and
7T2 when applied to 0; it is possible that 773 0 and 7720 are equal to values in Cb
and C2, so that 0 would be in the cross product defined this way. This is not so
improbable as perhaps it might seem; imagine that the class {(0, 0)} is wanted. This
could be defined as the inverse of the function fp = C(D, [Ko, tti, ^2], Kfalse}) which
looks to see if the 773 and the 772 of an s-expression a are equal to 0. But, as was
explained above, projections of 0 are undefined in the theory. An implementation
21 of the system might have \= tt\0 = 0 and \= 772 0 = 0; if this were the case
then [= fpO — 0(7Ti0, 0,7T20, false) = 0(0, 0,0, false) = 0, so f= 0 £ /p1{0}-
Which, while perfectly reasonable, is not what was wanted. The problem can be
avoided as follows:
pairsc = V[tvi,tt2, I]"1 equalc
(Ci) x (C2) = (Ca) * (C2) fl pairsc
since
(T73 0,7720) ^ 0
5.3 The class of lists of objects of a class C.
The examples above are simple demonstrations of how to use FS0, but they are really
only preliminary to the sort of definitions that the theory is intended for. A more
substantial example, that is useable in itself, is the class of lists: here the class of
lists of members of the abstract class C is defined.
The empty list can be represented as () = 0 (in the same manner as pure Lisp),
and a list of objects of a class C as an s-expression S where 773 S is itself a list of
members of C, and 772-5 is in C (notice that the list is reversed compared to the
equivalent in Lisp); a recursive definition dependent on one previous object. But,
since in FS0 definitions of recursively enumerable classes are given using relation
triples, even though only relation pairs are needed, the easiest approach is to define
triples, and ignore one argument. The triple can be defined as the class C, which is
the solution to
(vx,v2,v3,v4) G C H 1)3 = »! A £ C
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(notice that, while v4 is mentioned on the left, it does not occur on the right so,
in effect, no constraints are placed on what goes into this 'slot' of any acceptable
s-expression). Then one possible definition is List'(•) below, which in turn allows
lists to be defined schematically.
List'(C) = 'P[7rii, 7T2]-1 equalc fl rc2i"1C fl tti~1pairsc
List(C) =X2(K{0}^l-^List!{C))
Notice how the second parameter of the relation in List(C) is ignored, and the appar¬
ently redundant extra conjunct, pairsc, in the definition of List'{•,•) — the reason
for this is discussed and explained below.
Given this definition, it is a straightforward matter to prove an induction theo¬
rem:
VCVD(0 <= D ->\/x\/y(x £ D -+y £ C -> (x,y) £ D)
(LI)
-* List(C) C D)
First, removing leading quantifiers and implications reduces the problem to
0 £ D, VzVy(x € D -> y £ C -> (x,y) <= D) h List(C) C D
at which point it is possible to apply the rule for induction over classes, Classlnd,
which produces two subgoals. The trivial base case
O € D b {0} C D
and the step case





Instantiating the hypothesis and simplifying expressions reduces this to
W D —> ^2^ G G —> (lO,7T2u) G
w e D,
(v,w) G List' (D)
\- v £ D.
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Then, by cutting in as follows,
W G D —> 7T2U G 0 —> (if, 7T2f) G -D,
w e D,
TVlV = 10 A 7T2f G 0 A V = (iTiV, 7T2f )
b u G D.
the rest of the proof is trivial. Notice that it is only possible to show that v =
(7rif,7r2f) because it is explicitly stated in the definition of List1 (•) that this is so.
The need for extra constraints beyond what are obviously needed for a definition is
a recurring feature of FS0 about which care has to be taken (I will discuss this again
when I consider the sorts of tools that I have defined for the theory). This leaves
only the cut
(v, w) G List'(D) b iriv = w A 7r2?; G C A v — (ttiv, 7t2u)
to be justified, and this follows almost directly from the definition of List'(•).
5.4 The natural numbers
Using the schematic list definition above as a skeleton, it is easy to define a class that
encodes the natural numbers, N. This can be defined as the class of lists of members




n + 1 = (n, O)
then (primitive) induction over the naturals is an instantiation, and simplification,
of LL above:
VU (O G C —» VtJj (Vj G C —■> (fx 5 0) € 0) —> natc C 0)
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5.5 List membership
So far, some trivial functions have been defined. But there has been no function
definition so far that has used recursion. A simple recursive relation that is naturally
defined as a function, rather than as a class of pairs, is list membership.
What is needed is a function that, when applied to a pair consisting of an object
and a list of objects (for convenience, on the left and right respectively), evaluates to
true iff the object occurs on the list. A set of defining equations for this is
memberp(S,0) = false
memberF(Si, (S3,S3)) = j timberF(S>, S.) ffs', # s\
Using the 7Z combinator, the function for the base case is simply the constant function
Kfalse- The step case is more messy; recursion is needed only on the tail of the list
(7Ti), so the value for the recursion on the right can be thrown away immediately, and
then it is merely a case of seeing if the a is equal to the of the list and returning
true, or if that is not the case, then the value of the recursion on the rest of the list,
which gives a definition as follows:
memberFs = C[D, U[7rim, 7r2n, Ktrue,n2i}]
memberf = 7Z[Kfaise,memberps]
which can easily be shown to satisfy the definitions as follows. For the base case
memberp(S, 0)
= 1Z[Kfalse, memberFS](S, 0)
= Kfalse(S, 0)
= false
while for the step case
memberf(Sx,(SS3))
= 1l[Kfaise,memberfs](St.,(SS3))
= memberps(S1, S^, S3,memberf(Sx, Ss), memberf(S* , S3))
= D(S1,Ss,Ktrue,memberpiS^S^))
j true if S3 = Sx
memberf(Si , Sa) if S3 7^ Sx
§6 Further observations etc.
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6.1 Mutual recursion
The example above shows how it is possible to define simple primitive recursive
functions using the 1Z combinator; it does not show how to define more complex









(given /' and /" are already defined). The problem is to construct these functions
in FS0. The solution is analogous to the solution for defining mutually dependent
general recursive functions using the fixed point operator [56]:
f = C[ir1Jg\
9 = C[ir2,fg]
It can be easily seen by induction on s-expressions that this satisfies the definition
above. In the base case
/s(S.,0) = (/SI.s'S.)
so the definitions of / and g are correct here. In the step case,
/5(51,(S2,53))
if we assume that the recursions on the two subparts of the tree return pairs
(f(Sx,Sa),g(S„Sa))
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and
(f(S,,S3),g{S„Sa))
then it will be clear, on inspection, that the result is exactly what is needed.
It should be fairly clear how to generalise this method to more complicated
definitions. However, this example still deals only with functions defined by primi¬
tive recursion. Later on, I describe more general support that I have developed for
constructing functions defined using course of values induction. Of course, what¬
ever facilities are supplied, it will still only be possible to define primitive recursive
functions.
6.2 Recursively enumerable sets
The purpose of FS0 is to enable the easy and convenient handling of general r.e. sets
of s-expressions, so in a complete description of how to use the system there should
be an example of this. One of the first things that is striking about FS0 is that
it only explicitly allows recursive definitions with two dependents, which is, at first
sight, very restricting; it turns out not to be a problem though.
Consider an r.e. set C which is defined as the closure of the the base case C±
under the rule
»i £ C ■ ■■ vn e C
Fm
v £ C
(where Fmx is a Hj-formula with free variablesvvn). But it is not possible
to define this class directly in FS0, since only classes with members dependent on at
most two previous members are allowed. The solution is as follows; given that C2 is
the class such that
(0,vx,.. ,.,vn,v) eC2 h Fm
(by the comprehension lemma) and two new distinct constants lmemberlisF and
'member' are defined, then it is possible to define the class C* as the closure of the
class C%* = {(»!, member) \ £ Ch} U {(O, lmemberlist')}, under the rules
(®i,'memberlist') £ C*
(vi,va) £ C2
(v2, 'member') £ C*
and
(memberlist') £ C* (v2,1member'') £ C*
(v1,v2,lmemberlisf) £ C*
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which, since they depend on only one or two previous members, are definable in FS0
directly. Then it is possible to define C in FS0 as
h (yx,'mem&er') E C*
This method of labeling the classes is very general in its possible applications,
so that arbitrary inductive definitions, or even sets of mutually dependent inductive
definitions, can be easily defined.
6.3 Induction on other order relations
In practice, the primitive stepwise induction facility of FS0 is not as useful as course




S^F S2 ^ S2 -< S3 5, -< S3.
For which it is possible to show that
VCVz (Vy (y F x —+ y G C) —» x E C) —> \/x (x G C).
The proof of this is really too long to present here, but it is given in the appendices.
6.4 Decidable suhtheories
While function applications have a normal form, so that equality between ground s-
expressions is decidable, the membership relation between a ground s-expression and
a ground class is not (membership in recursively enumerable classes is not decidable
in general). However, if a certain subset of FS0 is used instead, then class definitions
become decidable. In fact, membership is decidable for any FS0 class definition that
does not use a •) construct. The simple proof is by induction on the structure of
the definition. Given that C is a ground class definition of the appropriate sort, and
S is a ground s-expression, then there is only one base case: S E {0} if and only if
S > 0. For the step case, there are three possibilities:
c = cx u c2
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In the first two cases, given that S £ C, S £ Ca are decidable by hypothesis, the
conjunction or disjunction is decidable. In the last case, FS £ Cx is decidable by
hypothesis, and is true if and only if S £ F~1C1.
Unfortunately, this result is not really as useful as it at first appears, since often
it is much more convenient to define a class using X2O, •), even if it could be defined
in the decidable subtheory of FS0.
6.5 Class complement operations
One operation that is noticeable by its absence in the description of FS0 above is a
complement operator; i.e., a constructor that, given a class Ch returns a class C2,
where
b £ C3 <-> ^ C!
If such an operation was available, it would be possible to define many more classes
(at least Sn-relations, for arbitrary n, or any relation definable in Peano arithmetic).
But the interesting classes here are the recursive and the recursively enumerable ones
(i.e. Sj), which are already available2.
§7 FS0 as a framework
The above discussion has been about mathematical properties of FS0 and basic
facilities that it offers for list processing and inductive closure. The question of how
it can be used as a framework theory however, has not been addressed. The next
section looks at how FS0 behaves in practice, when used in a system supplying proper
support.
It seems that FS0 is good at handling lists and recursively enumerable sets,
and for demonstrating facts about them. It would seem to be able to handle syntax
well, and have adequate facilities for proving meta-level assertions about an encoded
theory. The place where it seems to be weakest is in what it offers to deal with the
peculiarities of logics over other inductively defined sets. That is, it does not directly
treat bound variables; rather it is necessary for the user to define what is needed to do
that himself. The question is, 'how well the first two properties work to balance the
disadvantage of the third?'; but this can only be answered in the light of experience.
The rest of this thesis, among other things, describes such experience, which allows
some conclusions to be drawn.
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§8 An implementation of FS0
In this section I describe the extensions to the theory and the supporting facilities
available in my implementation of FS0. Then, to complement this, in the next section
I discuss the concrete details of the implementation.
8.1 Extensions to the basic logic
The initial set of rules of the system are the standard set for predicate logic with
cut, along with the rules listed above which define FS0. This, though, is not really
enough to do real work, so I have extended the basic rule set in various ways simply
for convenience sake.
The first of these extensions is to the rules that define FS0. So that reasoning
about assertions in the context of a goal is easier, I have added various 'left' rules.
For instance, there is a rule
Hi, S G Cj h Fmx H2, S G C3 b Fra,
Hx, H2, S e Ca UC2 b Fm1
which allows analysis by cases for a class disjunction to be carried out directly, in
a way similar to how disjunction in the context is treated by the rules for predicate
logic.
The second set of extensions are the substitution rules for formulae and terms.
Unlike those mentioned above, which are convenient, but could be replaced with
tactics, the substitution rules really are necessary in practice: since they are derived
there are tactics corresponding to them, but these are unpractically inefficient. The
rule for s-expression substitution resembles
Hx b = S2 H2 b Fm, [Sa/Sx]
Hi, H2 b Frrii
The word 'resembles' is used here, since the implemented rule is actually more com¬
plex than this. It allows a user to mark distinguished instances of the term Sx to be
replaced, ignoring the others. For instance, given a goal
hFS0 (a, a) er
it would be possible to invoke a pseudo-rule
3ubstitute(([sub(Sx)\,a) G T)
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which would result in two subgoals being introduced:
i~fs0 (si,a) e r
and
b FSo Si = a
Another version of the same rule allows substitution of formulae, requiring logical
equivalence instead.
Following this, the other set of important derived rules is for reducing s-expressions
to some sort of normal form (these are collectively known as 'compute' rules). Like
the substitution rules described above, these allow particular parts of a formula to
be marked so that only that part is normalised. Various options are possible, such
as reducing a function application only until it has a particular form (e.g., until it
is in a state where -K\ or 7T2 can be applied to it), or until it has been completely
normalised, (i.e., with no function applications at all in it). These rules are complex,
since to make them efficient, they have, for example, built in heuristics; and also
various facilities that try to make them more useful for when they are applied to
non-ground terms. The evaluation mechanism is also 'lazy', i.e., it always reduces
the outermost possible redex first, while trying to arrange things so that no extra
work is done (there is a risk with a naive outermost redex reduction algorithm, that
if, say, a term is substituted into another in several places, then each of the identical
copies will have to be reduced in identical manner).
The last of the rule extensions is not really a rule, but better thought of as a
syntactic convenience, or an extension of the compute rule. In order to make the
system useable a definition mechanism that allows s-expression, function, and class
constants to be abbreviated to names proposed by the user has been added (In fact
this device has already been used implicitly above, when definitional equality was
distinguished from logical equality by the use of the symbol '=' instead of '='). A
definition facility like this also needs a facility that can fold ground terms in a formula
into constant names, or expand constant names into ground terms in situ, and this
is what the so-called 'fold' and 'unfold' rules do.
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8.2 Simple support facilities
The description above describes the rules of my PDS, but does not discuss the in¬
terface. The first important thing to realise here is that Oyster [13] is designed as
an extension of a Prolog interpreter, rather than just programmed in Prolog, so
the instructions for building derivations are given through the Prolog command line.
This means that Prolog itself is immediately available as a language for automat¬
ing derivations, i.e., as a tactic language. So it is possible, simply using Prolog, to
connect together simple rule applications in arbitrary ways.
Unfortunately, simply automatically stringing command line rule applications
together means that the only structure in the proof is at the level of primitive rule
applications, since these are the only steps that are actually used to build proofs.
This means first that the proof is extremely large, and second, that it has lost the
structure that the user had in mind in constructing it.
This problem is solved by a combinator for tactics, called a tactical [33]. There
are several of these, which can be used to build a tactic from others, so that it can
be thought of as a sort of compound rule (that is, the system can keep track of its
application in the same way as a single rule application). This makes it possible both
to keep the size of the derivation down, and to record the 'high level' structure of
the proof. The tacticals that Oyster supplies are such things as 'repeat', 'or', 'then',
etc. which have the obvious meaning. This is more important here, since Prolog is
relentlessly first order and so building general combinators for procedures is messy and
fairly difficult (it involves programming with so-called meta-level predicates, which
have few nice properties"). To compensate for this though, the pattern matching
facilities of the language are perfectly designed for the sort of symbolic manipulation
needed.
8.3 More sophisticated support
The description above leaves one problem with FS0 unanswered: the directly supplied
mechanisms for defining classes and functions in the theory are painfully primitive,
in the same sort of way as the mechanisms supplied directly by a computer for use
in building software (i.e., the machine code) are painfully primitive. But as with
machine code, it is possible to write a compiler and other support software, so that it
is not necessary to work directly with the primitive facilities. This is what has been
FSo as a Logical Framework / 56
done, by writing a suite of compilers and cross referencing programs that allow the
user to define classes and functions at a higher level without having to worry so much
(unlike a compiler for a high level language though, it is not possible to escape the
primitive mechanisms completely since in order to work with a definition, its internal
structure is needed — though given various tools this need not be a great problem
either).
The relation compiler
The first of these support tools is the relation and tuple compiler, which is essentially
an implementation of the comprehension lemma presented above. This allows a class
that is to be used as a relation in an inductive definition, or as a class itself, to be
described in a fairly natural way.
A class is defined by writing a 'stencil' for the sort of s-expressions that it should
contain, along with a declaration about what classes the slots in the stencil come
from, and what their relation is to one another. Various abbreviations are allowed,
such as declaring constants and functions in place, as well as slots that correspond
to conjunctions and disjunctions of classes. For instance, a declaration
fooc 4 tup ((vx,v2)J,(v1,v2))
where vx G Ch
u2 G C2
declares a class foo c which comprehends all s-expressions where the left hand part
is a pair of objects from the classes Ch and C2, and the right hand part is the result
of applying / to the left. This would result in a definition which, in primitive form,
would have been typed in:




Notice how the compiler inserts all the extra declarations (the intersection of various
parts of the class with the class of pairs) needed to make sure that the tuple really
does have the proper structure.
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The relations used to define inductive classes are specified in a similar way, but
to emphasise that they are to be used to represent rules depending on two previous
cases. A typical definition would be written in the form equivalent (though intended
for input to a computer) to
(«!,«□)
where (v3,v3) € C1
If the compiler merely took the description of the class and turned it into a
proper FS0 specification it would not really be a great deal of use, since in order to
reason about the structure of the class, the user has to know how it is built. In fact,
inconvenient and difficult though class descriptions are to build by hand, they could
be argued to have the advantage that the user, having built them, knows how they
are put together, and so can easily take them apart. On the other hand, he will have
no idea about the structure that has been generated by the compiler (the situation
may even be made worse by the several 'optimising' features that have been installed
to try to reduce the size of the resulting term). So that this is not a problem, the
compiler is also able to remember details of the class definition itself, and how it
relates to the structure of the constructed term, and it is possible for tactics to use
this information automatically.
The function compiler
The other compiler is for primitive recursive functions. This is needed because the
primitive facilities of FS0 only allow a function f% to be built directly if it can be de¬
fined using recursion equations that define a value in terms of direct subcomponents;
i.e., an application f^v x is has to be defined in terms of /jO, fifaiVj.) and fx (^«j).
The functions that are needed in practice though are rarely, if ever, sensibly definable
this way.
It is a well known fact due to Ackermann [28] that it is not possible to define
arbitrary recursive functions using just a primitive recursive combinator. However
a far greater range of functions are definable than first impressions suggest; for ex¬
ample, simple course of values recursion, using the ordering relation -< (or subterm)
which was discussed earlier. This is a much more useful facility for defining recursive
functions than the simple structural recursion operator allows. If it is used, the only
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requirement placed on the function definition is that the result of a function applied
to an object must be computable in terms of the function applied to smaller terms,
when smaller is defined in terms of Also, because there is already a course of
values induction theorem proven for exactly this ordering, reasoning about functions
based on such an order is easy.
The compiler allows precisely these functions to be defined: it takes as input a set
of recursion equations which are well founded according to the subterm relationship,
and constructs an function automatically out of the available structural recursion
facilities.
The function applied to S is defined in terms of the usual language for function
constructions, only extended with a special term recurse{l) which stands for the value
of applying the function to that subterm.
For example, a function (or set of functions) defined by the equations:
/ (x,0) = bx
f (®, (a, lfoo')) = /</00> (.x, / (x, a))
/ (®, ((a, b),'bar')) = f<bar> (x, (/ (x, a), f (x, b)))
would be given to the compiler in essentially that form. Termination is guaranteed by
the restriction on what the function can be applied to: for a function f(x, a) the only
applications of / allowed on the right hand side are of the form f(x, a') where a1 -< a.
This is certainly an improvement on the primitive facility, but it is still restricting—
for instance not all recursion equations that have a primitive recursive solution are
naturally expressed in this way (as will be seen later).
One possible criticism of the compiler, which is really common to all functions
implemented using a primitive recursive combinator, is that it can generate very
inefficient code. But given the lazy evaluation mechanism that has been implemented
in the compute rules, this is not a problem in practice.
§9 The implementation of FS0
This section describes the details of the implementation and how well it works, and
its effectiveness.
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9.1 Oyster and Nuprl
The implementation is a modified version of a proof development system called Oyster
designed and built by Christian Horn. This was initially intended to resemble Nuprl,
and we will briefly describe Nuprl and the unmodified form of Oyster first, before
discussing the modified system used here.
Like Nuprl, Oyster is a PDS for a sequent calculus presentation of Martin-Lof
type theory, and while it is intended to have the same 'feel', it is very different in a lot
of ways. The distinguishing features of Nuprl are that it is a system for developing
proofs in a sequent calculus presentation of Martin-Lof type theory and that the
tactic language is ML(the implementation language is Lisp, but this is hidden from
the user). Because of the safe and flexible typing of ML, the implementors have
been able to present the system to the user in very pure terms, as a collection of
abstract data-types. There are also good facilities for building and structuring large
collections of theorems. All this makes for a very secure, professional system; however
it also makes for a very large system — for instance it has to include a complete ML
interpreter written in Lisp — that is measured in megabytes of code, and can run
only on fast workstation computers with large memories.
Oyster, on the other hand, is a small system designed to run on personal com¬
puters that are not able even to run modern dialects of Lisp, never mind ML. Its
characteristic features, after the logic that it works with, are that it is implemented
simply as an extension to a Prolog interpreter and that it is a great deal smaller
(the source code runs to 7139 lines, or 280 kilobytes). In exchange for this reduction
in size, the system is very different; for instance it does not have the same tools
for structuring large developments. Much more important than this though is that
the data abstraction enforced in Nuprl is no longer possible: since the system is an
extension of the Prolog system, the implementation of the various data types cannot
be effectively hidden from the user, and there is thus no way that the same security
can be enforced. On the other hand, as a result of this the underlying Prolog system
can be used directly as the tactic language, and while there may be dispute about the
relative merits of Prolog and ML, there is no denying that Prolog is, absolutely, an
effective tactic language for a proof development system. A corollary of the smallness
of the system is that it is much more easily understandable and modifiable, and this
is the reason that it was chosen. Since the system was only intended as an experiment
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to be used by one person, issues like security were not seen as important (while it is
not difficult to subvert the system, this is unlikely to happen accidentally, especially
since the the proofs that it is used to build here are not so subtle that they would
hide such a problem if it did arise).
9.2 The patched form of Oyster
The modifications to Oyster can be divided up into three parts: there are the patches
to the code of Oyster, there are what might be thought of as 'fundamental' tactics
(i.e., code that is essentially part of the basic system, but working through the tactic
interface) and, finally, there are ordinary tactics.
Patching the system
While it might seem that modifying the system is a matter of replacing the rules for
Martin-Lof type theory with rules for FS0, in practice it is not that simple. The basic
patches amount, in total, to over 3000 lines of code. Beyond the rules, subsystems
for rewriting and the lemma mechanism and the the like had to be built or heavily
modified. There are also problems with the fact that the system was originally
designed to support a very different theory (Martin-Lof type theory), and the special
facilities for this, particularly the machinery for keeping track of the witness term
of a proof, are not relevant to FS0, and make every rule application much more
complicated than it really needs to be, and certainly slows down the implementation
a lot and takes up enormous amounts of room (see below). In a more general way,
while the machinery of Oyster did not slow things down, it did make impossible, or
very difficult to implement, various ideas for improving the speed and space efficiency.
Fundamental tactics
Apart from the patches to the system itself there are also extensions that, while they
are technically tactics, are really part of the basic system in that it is practically
unusable without them. These are the various compilers for functions, tuples and
classes described above. They consist of another approximately 1000 lines of (very
dense) code.
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Tactics
Finally, another 5000 lines of tactics was written to support the various developments,
most of which were reused with each of the various developments in turn.
9.3 Supporting software and hardware
The software used was versions 2 and 3 of the Quintus Prolog interpreter/compiler
system running on a various Sun or Sun compatible systems — starting with on a
Sun-3 with approximately 20 megabytes of memory, and moving first to a Sun-4 with
about 30 megabytes, and finally to a large Solbourne system with 512 Megabytes
(although in practice only about 100 Megabytes of this last machine was ever used,
even in extremis). The runtime size of proof developments usually ranged between 5
and 60 megabytes, though we believe — it is not possible really to say — that part of
this size may have been due to leakages in the memory management of Oyster, and
some of it was certainly due to unsuitability of Oyster for the application. Certainly,
like a lot of software of this sort, it is very vulnerable to paging, and large physical
address spaces really are needed.
The question of the run-time performance of the system is tricky to answer since
this varied — the performance towards the end of the work was much better than
the performance at the beginning (ironically considering the much more powerful ma¬
chines available later). This was not because the performance of the implementation
improved— this was an area where, as was said above, it was difficult to do anything
much — but because a lot was learned about how to use the system more efficiently.
However the implementation could never be described as fast.
The worst performance was for the development of the prenex normal form
theorem: it was usual to wait a couple of minutes after even a simple instruction had
been entered before the prompt returned (in fact this theorem was first developed in
three or four pieces, since it it would not fit into the physical memory of the machine
used to develop it).
The best performance was for the last development that was done — the de¬
duction theorem for propositional logic, where the work was much better structured
and as a consequence, for instance, the user never had to wait for single steps of the
derivation. Also, tactics were designed so that when a lot of work was needed, it
tended to happen in very large chunks, so that the user had time to do something
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else instead of passively waiting on the machine.
9.4 The various developments
There are four developments in the text, but they really divide into three parts, since
the prenex normal form theorem and the reflection discussion are closely related. I
will outline each one separately.
The deduction theorem,
This was the last, even if it was the simplest, development, and made use of all
the experience of doing the others, and the various supporting software that had
been built. The specification of the theory was very short: 81 lines. Most of the
development consisted in building up a small hierarchy of meta-theorems with trivial
tactics to support them, and then writing one large tactic that built the central part
of the proof automatically.
The normal form theorem and reflection
These two are closely related, since most of the work that was done for the normal
form theorem could easily be carried over for use with reflection. Since this was the
first work done, there was a lot more emphasis on getting things done with tactics
instead of meta-theorems. While this made things slower than it would otherwise
have been, it also meant that almost all of the development work for the prenex form
theorem was directly useable with the reflection work. If greater emphasis had been
put on developing useful metatheorems rather than tactics then a lot of theorems
would have had to be reproven almost from scratch (this is an example of one of the
larger holes in the system: it would in fact have been possible to use the lemmas from
the old system in the new system, even though they had not reproved for the new
definitions, because they have the same form, even though the underlying definitions
have changed).
The lengths of the definitions of the original and the modified systems are about
the same. The definition itself is split into several parts: the language of sorted
predicate logic, the sequent calculus, and the definition of the rules and axioms. In
total, about 1200 lines (in fact because the specification for the reflective form of the
system was written much later, and we were able to make use ofmany extra features
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of the compilers to tidy up the original in places, it is actually about 50 lines shorter
than its ancestor).
It is more difficult than above to say how long the development for the prenex
form theorem took, because at the same time as developing the proof the system itself
was was continuously being developed and modified. However, we would estimate
that a couple ofmonths was taken up by debugging the specification and then building
the proof. However rebuilding the proof (on a responsive machine) took about a
working week, given all the various tactics in place. The central proof and the
function take a day of hard work each (this is partly because, even on a fast machine,
the system is slow enough to break up the user's concentration).
The reflection examples, unlike the prenex form in that they are object level
deductions that do not involve any complicated meta-level work (i.e., inductions over
proofs or formulae), go through very quickly, once the machinery for the theory has
been built.
The lambda calculus
The lambda calculus development took place between the normal form theorem and
the deduction theorem. The length of the specification is 170 lines, and took only a
couple of hours to write. However developing the function again took several weeks
of work, since it was necessary to build new tools to work with the more complicated
functions that were needed here than elsewhere.
9.5 Conclusions
While the system is not suitable for real use as a practical framework PDS, this is
not because FS0 itself is unsuitable but because of the implementation, which is an
experiment built on top of a system intended for other purposes that here which make
it insecure, slow, and sometimes inconvenient. Speed particularly is an issue: even in
this implementation, every effort was made to ensure that (e.g.) function evaluation
is as fast as possible. This is an argument against an implementation of FS0 on top
of another generic, or framework, theory such as Isabelle, since there such facilities
would be even more difficult to supply than here1".
On the other hand, there is no reason why it should not be possible to build a
very efficient implementation easily on top of Lisp or ML (or even Prolog).
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§10 The theory SP in FS0
As an example of FS0 in practice, at this point I will discuss an encoding of the
theory SP, which was disussed in §2.2 of the earlier chapter on meta-level reasoning
(which can be referred back to for details). This will be in several parts. First I
look at how to encode Csp in FS0, then how to describe the theory SP in FS0, and
finally I describe a proof of the deduction theorem.
10.1 The language Csp
The first thing that has to be done is to define some distinct constant s-expressions,
which I will call 'prop', 'V' and
'prop' = O
'V' — ('prop', O)
4(<V',0)
Then the encoding of the expressions can be done as follows. First, atomic proposi¬
tions are defined to be of the form
OV:prop')
(which means that any expression in FS0 can be made into a proposition, simply by
labeling it with 'prop'). The encoding of the language SP is
(Ax VAa) = ({Sx,Sayv>)
-A = (S,'-')
(where S, 5a and S2 are the encodings of A,AX and Aa). This definition can be
given in FS0 using the I2O, •) constructor. First the base case is defined
prsPc — tuP (A,'ProP')
then the step cases are
x y
orgensPC = 77 TTTT((®,y)> v)
X
neggenspc = 7 T77
\xi )
so that the class of encoded terms of Csp is defined as:
langspc — ^(prsPci orgenSpc U neggenSPc)
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10.2 The theory SP
With the language encoded, the theory SP itself can be encoded. SP has the advan¬
tage of having only rules dependent on two previous members, so it is not necessary
to resort to any extra coding to make them work here in a definition using the X2(-, •)
rule. The first thing that has to be defined is the base class of axioms
exmidspc — tup (((x,x),'V')
where x E langspc




where y € langspc









then the encoding of the theory T in FS0 is
rulesspc — expandsp c U contractspc U associates? c U cutspc
T = l2(exmidspc, rulesspc)
and it is then possible to associate the encoding with the original theory™ as
1~sp A iff hFSo S eT
(where A is encoded as S).
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10.3 Basic tactics, etc.
Now I have a formal description of the theory SP, but not in a very useable state.
The next thing that has to be done is the construction of a collection of meta-level
tactics that allow me to work more easily in the theory. The first of these that should
be constructed are some that will allow me to apply rules directly. For example I
might want a set of tactics that allow me to reason in a 'top down' fashion; in other
words, so that given a goal of the form
bfs0 SeT
and a rule instance
S*
Si
the appropriate tactic can then be called, to perform a reduction equivalent to
SnT if kFSo S2eT
without having to go through the intermediate stages manually.
In fact the components of these tactics themselves consist mostly of meta-theory.
Consider as an example the tactic for contractspc\ if would be easy to write a tactic
which performed all the primitive reductions necessary to get the effect of
hFs0SxCT if t-FS0 (SxVSOeT
but it is much more efficient first to prove the lemma
Vs(((s,x),'V')eT->seT);
so that all the actual tactic, as implemented, has to do is cut in the lemma and
instantiate its universal quantifier. Then, if a top down proof is being constructed,
the consequent of the instance of the lemma will be the goal, so by eliminating the
implication in the lemma, the goal can be reduced to the antecedent; if, on the other
hand, a bottom up proof is being constructed, the antecedent will already be on
the hypothesis list, and the lemma can again be eliminated, only this time leaving
the consequent on the hypothesis list, and the goal untouched. Notice that the
rules exmidspc an(i expandspc both have side conditions on them, requiring that,
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respectively, A, and, B be shown to be well formed, i.e., members of langspc• This
does not produce difficulties when dealing with ground terms; a tactic to do the work
is easy to construct, however there are cases where it is a problem, as will be seen.
Five tactics in all have to be built initially: expand, contract, associate, cut
and exmid. But these can be expanded with others. The first obvious extension is
commutativity, and this can be implemented in the same way as the basic tactics
that have just been defined, using a lemma. The form that the lemma should take
is a problem though. The simplest form has extra information in the antecedent, so
that the statement is
VxVy(((x, y), 'V') € T -+ x € langSpc -»■ ((y,®),'V') € T).
But the explicit statement that x is in langspc was n°t in the original statement of
the lemma, and, intuitively is not needed. Remove this extra information though,
and the problem of proving it separately arises. If this was just a simple deduction,
then there would be no problem, since x would be a ground term, and it would
be possible to apply a tactic, like was mentioned above, to prove it is a well formed
term. Unfortunately though, here a tactic will not do, since x is simply a free variable;
something the tactic cannot cope with. Instead it is necessary to do some further





x £ C tt2x = 'prop' V
(7T2X = i' A -K\x G langspc) V
(7r2a: = 'V' A irn € langSpc A tt2i € langSPc),
which both follow easily from applications of Classlnd. After these results have
been obtained, it is easy to show that, since \~ps0 ((x, y), 'V') € T, it follows that
k Fsa x G langspc■ The effort of proving these two lemmas is not wasted either, since
they are ubiquitous in proofs of meta-theorems about SP, as it is here defined.
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10.4 The deduction theorem
The final theorem discussed in the chapter about meta-level reasoning was the de¬
duction theorem. I am now in a position to present a proof of it for the FS0 imple¬
mentation I have just described. Consider the informal statement again:
by -iA V B iff bT[A] B
This is an if and only if statement, but in one direction it is quite trivial to prove.
What is interesting, both as a proof in itself, and a meta-theorem that can be used
to aid real work, is the right to left implication. A simple formalisation of this in
FS0, for the theory SP would be
Vcc (x G langspc
Vy (y G l2(exmidspc U {a;}, rulesSpc) —»•
((0> <-,')> y), 'V') G I2(exmidSpc, rulesSpc)))■
Notice that this insists that whatever is added as a new axiom is actually a statement
in the language. This formulation states the deduction theorem to be an admissible
rule of SP. However, it is possible state it in the more general form of a derived rule,
which is correspondingly more useful. First a new (schematic) class is defined:
T'(C) = Z2(exmidspc U (langspc C C), rulesspc);
then the deduction theorem for SP can be stated as
VCVa:(a: G langspc
Vy(yGT'(C U {*}> ^
(((x,'V),y),'v')GT'(C))).
As is, this is not directly provable, but it follows directly from
WCWx(x G langspc ~>
T'{CU{x}) C V[[KX,K^], I,K^T'iC))
And this follows, after stripping off the two outside universal quantifiers, by structural
induction (i.e., applying the rule Classlnd).
Before outlining the proof itself though, I should say that it is heavily automated,
depending crucially on an object-level tactic subdis (for 'sub-disjunction'), which
needs to be explained. Given a goal
kFSo ((S,, • • • ((Swx, Sm),'V') • • •), 'v') G T
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which the user wants to reduce to a goal of the form
l-FS, ((Si,. • • • , 'V').. 'V') € T
(where if x in then 1 < x < n), subdis called with a description of
the desired subgoal reduces the current goal to that. The code to do this is not
trivial, but neither is it interesting; it is actually a fairly direct implementation of
an algorithm given in the proof of a theorem stating something very similar in §3.1
[68] (where details can be found). An important detail that has to be dealt with in
constructing the tactic is what to do with the enormous numbers of side conditions
that are generated at every invocation of contract or exmid, when it is necessary
to show that something is a well formed formula. Since here the intention is that
the tactic be used for work at the meta-level (i.e., dealing with schematic formulae
containing meta-variables) the same problem as with the lemma used in commute
arises: that a tactic will not be able to cope with the non-ground terms. Again, the
solution is to make use of the two lemmas originally proven above to assist in proving
the commutativity lemma, only this time due to the volume of different goals that
will have to be constructed, it is better to write tactics so that the actual work can
be carried out automatically.
Now the proof can be presented. Having stripped off the two quantifiers and the
implication, the goal is
* e langsPc Hfs0 T'{C U {x}) C V[KX, I, IW]^T'(C)
(In future, for the sake of conciseness, x £ FrigsPc will not be shown in the hypothesis
list, but taken as implicit). On application of Classlnd this goal reduces to two
subgoals: a base case
w e exmidspc U ((C U {m}) fl langspc) ^~fs0 w £ V[[KX, I, K<V']~1T'(C)




Hfs0 w e V[Kx,K.-,>,I,K<v>]-*T'(C) (DTS)
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The base case
Take the base case DTb first. This can be simplified to
w £ exmidspc U ((C2 U {x}) Pi langSpc) ^ (((x, *->'), to),<v') £ T'(C)
and then the context can be broken up into three subcases
w £ exmidspc \~FS0 (((z,u>),'V') € T'(C) (Bx)
w £C,w £ langspc ^fs„ (((x, w), 'V') £ T'(C) (B2)
w £ {x}, w £ langspc ^FSa (((x,w),'V') £ T'(C) (B3)
The first case, B\ follows, since if w is in exmidspc then it is in T'(C). By this,
we have
w £ T'(C), x £ langspc ^fs0 (((x,^'),w),'V>) £ T'(C)
and an application of expand is enough to finish off the goal.
The second case B2 follows in almost exactly the same way as the first. B3, on
the other hand, demands a different technique. Since w £ {x}, w — x, so the goal
reduces to
bFSo (((x^WV) £T'(C)
Which follows immediately, since this is an axiom, and a member of exmidspc-
The step case
Again, the first step is to simplify the goal DT5 to
(((x,'v),s),v)6r'{C),
(((x.'v),2),'V')eT'(C),
(w, y, z) £ rulesspc
l~FS0 (((x,^),W),^)£T'(C)
This goal too can be reduced (by expanding the definition of rulesspc, and some





FSo as a Logical Framework / 71
except that associatespc is replaced with cutspci contractspc or expandspc-
The proofs of these, using the subdis tactic, are quite similar. The example
here can be paraphrased as:
'Show that, if (((x, y), 'V') G T'(C), and (((x, z), 'V') G T'(C) and
w follows from y,z by associate, then (((x, w), 'V') G T'(C).'
If the details of the relationship between w and y, z are expanded, this goal becomes,
formally (since, for instance, z is seen to be not relevant)
(((®> '-•')» (Ornish (famw, TT2U;),'V')),'V')),'V') G T'(C)
\-fs0 (({xi ((((7rnnu;5 ^2111^), 'V'), tt2\w), 'V'))? 'V') G T'(C)
Moving away from the PDS for a moment, given the equivalences x = A4,
Trimw = A2, -1T2111W — A3 and %2\w = A4 it is possible plan a proof for this as
follows:
kps0 (-•Ai V (A2 V (A3 V A4)))
• subdis
I~fs0 (A2 V (A3 V (A4 V -■Ai)))
associate
^fs, ((A2 V A3) V (A4 V ->Ai))
associate
hps0 (((A2 V A3) V A4) V ->Ai)
• commute
hi?5o ("'Ai V ((A2 V A3) V A4))
With this proof-in-AP in hand, the proof can be constructed automatically on re¬
turning to the PDS again. And the other cases are dealt with in pretty much the
same manner. With this result in hand as a lemma of FS0 it can then be invoked as
a lemma, instantiated and reduced, at no more cost than a basic rule^".
§11 Summary and conclusions
This has been a long chapter. Feferman's theory FS0 has been discussed, along with
some of its more important properties. Also the tools that have been implemented
in order to improve its usability have been mentioned. And finally a small example,
of an encoding of a system of propositional logic, has been presented.
In the light of this it is possible to say that certainly FS0 is effective as a
framework for working with a very simple logic such as SP, and that it supplies
sufficient facilities that it is possible to prove and use meta-theorems to make the
system much more flexible. However, SP is an artificial example, in that it is unlikely
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to be encountered in practice. The next chapter considers the problem of how one
would go about encoding a theory that has bound variables, which is a much more
demanding test.
Notes
i. However, the availability of larger classes would make it possible to work with
semi-formal theories, e.g., using an cu-rule; but this possibility is not investigated
here.
ii. The 'meta-level' facilities in Prolog should not be confused with the idea ofmeta-
theory here. The two have much in common (in fact, the meta-level facilities in
Prolog even offer something like the reflection facilities discussed later, but they
are distinctive not so much for allowing safe formally analysable extensions to
the theory, as for allowing unsafe and unanalysable extensions.
iii. Another argument against implementing FS0 ona framework system is of course
simply that it is a framework itself, so by the time it is being used for work in
a declared logic the user has to work through two levels of implementation: the
framework, and FS0 itself.
iv. There are issues of faithfulness and adequacy that there is not room to address
here.
v. It is worth pointing out that the tactic subdis consumes an enormous amount
of time: it is used six or seven times in this derivation, and each time it is used
it generates several tens, to, sometimes, well over a hundred proof steps. If it
really were used in a tactic that aped the deduction theorem, the derivation,
which is after all trivial, would consume impossibly large amounts of time and
space resources.
Declaring a Language and a Theory
There are two parts to the presentation of a logic in a framework; first is the presen¬
tation of the set of all the sentences of a language; then a theory of this language can
be defined as a subset of this language that is the smallest subset defined as a class
of axioms closed under a given set of rules. This chapter describes the way that FS0
can be used as a framework for declaring a general first order language (and that
will be a useful base for theories used in future chapters of this work), along with a
general description of how sequent calculus theories can be defined on top of it.
§1 The abstract form of a language
As an example of a typical and flexible language, this section presents a notation
that is suitable for first order sorted logic. Not only does this give an idea of how
FSo works on a real logic, but it also describes a language that will be useful in the
rest of this thesis.
Having settled on the language of sorted predicate logic, the first thing to do is
give a description of it, and such a description breaks up into two parts: the language
of terms and the language of formulae, each of which can be dealt with separately.
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1.1 Conventions
The same conventions are adopted here as in the last chapter, where possible. One
addition is that s-expression constants in FS0 are sometimes represented as quoted
strings, i.e., 'constant'. A, B, C vary over formulae in the language to be encoded, v
varies over variables in the language to be encoded, t varies over terms in the language
to be encoded, Q varies over quantifiers, and T, A,E vary over sets of hypotheses.
1.2 The language of terms Ct
• Variables are terms. Each variable has a sort s and an index i which together
uniquely define it, so that ivs is the ith of sort s (this does not preclude there
also being variables itv8 and ivs,). s and i are not further defined except as
varying over some countable sets.
• Function applications are terms. A function has a sort s, an index i and a
parameter sort list p which uniquely define it. A function application is written
where I* is a list of terms and p and I* agree. Agreement is defined as
follows:
• If p is the empty list then it agrees with I* if and only if I* is an empty list.
• If p is not the empty list then p agrees with I* if and only if the head of p
is the sort of the head of I* and the tail of p agrees with the tail of I*.
• Nothing else is a term8.
1.3 The language of formulae C
• Atomic predicate applications are formulae. A predicate has an index i and
a argument sort list p which uniquely define it, and a predicate application is
written {ppl*, where I* is a list of terms and p and I* agree.
• A is a formula.
• If A and B are formulae, then (A o B) is a formula, where o is one of V, A or
• If A is a formula and v is a variable then QvA is a formula, where Q is either
3 or V.
• Nothing else is a formula.
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1.4 Commentary
The first thing to notice is that there is no negation sign; instead, there is the symbol
-L, which can be used to fulfil the same purpose (that is, A —> T instead of ~|A).
This is probably more common in constructive mathematics, but is also sometimes
used in descriptions of classical systems. Also it is fair criticism to remark that this
is not a very readable language and, as will be seen, the way it is actually written
in FS0 it is even more unreadable. But though this is the form of the language that
the machine has to deal with, it is not to be expected that the user actually see it in
this form. The implementation should (and does) provide ways to hide this messiness
from the user.
§2 The syntax of C in FS0
The description of C given above is not enough to allow its implementation in FS0;
before that can be done, a mapping to s-expressions has to be defined. There is a
great deal of flexibility in what is possible, but at the same time the representation
is unlikely to be very readable by a person. The language is divided into terms and
formulae, and in top down fashion formulae will be treated first (because they are
simpler).
The definition of C distinguishes four types of formulae: atomic predicates, ab¬
surdity, propositional formulae, and predicate formulae. These are all represented by
s-expressions which are distinguished by constants on the left (essentially trees with
nodes which consist of labels on the left and branches on the right). So with the
appropriate distinct constants defined a translation (indicated by ~) can be defined
I = (0,'T')
P = (p/apred')
AoB = ((A,B),'o') o £ {—>, A, V}
QvA = ((A,v),'Q>) Qe{3,V}
where v is a variable, P is an atomic predicate p is some way of encoding the structure
of P (defined below), A and B are formulae, and '_L','—j-', etc. are defined to be
distinct constants. Notice that the the absurd formula is not a 'leaf,' so much as a
tree branch with no descendents which is labeled with the absurd constant.
The structure of terms (and the internals of atomic predicates, which will be
grouped with terms here) is more complex, because when dealing with terms it is
necessary to take account of the sort, and possibly the index and the sorts of the
Declaring a Language / 76
arguments as well. The same idea of a tree labeled on the left still holds though, only
the structure of the label is more complex.
The general form of a term is:
(-1, ("2, -3))
where -3 contains a constant label, -2 contains information on the index, the sort of
the term, and the sorts of the arguments, and -i contains the argument list. For a
variable it becomes simply:
{vs = (0, ((§, i), 'var'))
where s varies over the sorts, and i varies over the indexes, and 0 is the empty
argument list (since variables do not have arguments). We do not define further
the sorts or the index, simply requiring that there is some way to map them into
the s-expressions, so that they can be encoded. For functions and atomic predicate
applications this becomes, not quite so simply:
= (Is, ((3, (p, ?)),'&'))
= (r,((p,<),4pr'))
where s and i are as before, while I* is a list of arguments and p is a list of argument
sorts. Notice that the position of s is the same for both function applications and
variables (at 7(112), so that it is easy to check a list of terms against a argument
typing without having to bother about distinguishing the two (this is simply to make
implementation easier).
§3 Implementing C in FS0
Now, finally, it is possible to give a definition in FS0 of C. The definition below is
described top down, though in fact it has to be given to the machine bottom up.
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3.1 DeGning the formulae
First there are the two base classes of formulae, the atomic predicates and the class
containing only the void sentence. Definition of the former is deferred to the next
section (along with varc), so for the moment it will be left simply as rpredc, the
other is defined simply as:
absurdsc — [I, Fqo.'X')]-1 equalc
i.e., the class containing only the sentence 'absurd'. Notice that this is not the symbol
which is a connective (albeit a miliary one), but rather a tree node labeled with
'_L' which has no subtrees.
On examining the recursive definitions for the formulae one can see that no
possibility is dependent on more than two other formulae for its definition; this
is convenient since it means that I can make direct use of the Z2O, •) constructor
for classes. But before this, the definitions of propconc and predconc (the binary
connectives and the quantifiers) have to be supplied; which is trivial
conj c — [I,K<A']~1equalc
forallc = [J, If<v']-1 equalc
propconc = conjc U implies c U disj c
predconc = existsc U forallc








where q £ predconc
v £ varc
So that the definition of £ (written wffc) is simply:
Wjifc — 1i(rpredc U absurdsc, propgc U predgc)
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3.2 Defining the terms
The definition of the class of terms is more complex than that of the class of formulae.
In fact three classes are defined together: the class of terms, the class of lists of terms,
and the class of atomic propositions. Each is labeled appropriately, so that the class
of terms can be projected out afterwards (as can the class of atomic predicates).
The superclass containing the terms is called rpredsetcc. It is defined in terms
of J2(v) and its members are labeled, as usual, on the right.
The base class is the set containing the empty list and the class of labeled
variables. From these it is possible to define the other objects in the class, so they
are dealt with first.
varc -tup (O, ((s, i), 'var'))
btc =tup (uj'term')
where v G varc
emptytlc = tup (0, 'terml')
Then come the various relations for the recursive definitions. The easiest, and
the first one dealt with is for extending a list of terms—given a term list, it can be
extended by adding another term at the head:
A (/, 'terml') (t, 'term')
extlc =
((/, t), 'terml')
Function and predicate applications are almost the same, except that function appli¬
cations are typed, a property that predicate applications do not need, and of course
they are labeled differently:
(/, 'terml')
, A ^ ' '
termgc
((/,/),' term')
where / G fnldc




where p G prldc
(/7Tn,p) G wtc
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(where wtc is the class defining the relation between the list of sorts of the arguments
to a function or predicate, and a list of terms) at which point it is possible to define
the class rpredsetcc, and from it the class rpredc as:
rpredsetcc = X2(btc U emptytlc, extlc U termgc U rpredgc)
apredc =tup (a, 'rpred')
where (a,'rpred') £ rpredsetcc
termc — tup a
where (a,'term') £ rpredsetcc
This leaves the classes wtc> fnldc and prldc to be defined. The second two of these
are easy (they are just the classes of predicate and function identifiers):
fnldc = tup ((a, (p, »)),'■fn')
prldc - tuP ((P>*VPr')
Notice that there are no restrictions on the index, the arguments or the typing of
either of these. This might seem slightly strange in the case of the argument list,
since that is explicitly a list, but (like in Pure Lisp) any s-expression is a list if the 112
and 7riare regarded as the head and tail, and O as the null list (since O is the only
atom, it is pressed into service to stand for the empty list, which is also the tail).
Checking well-typedness is a matter of extracting the sorts from the list of terms
and comparing the resulting list with the argument sort list. To this end a function
wtrp is defined:
wtrp(0) = O
wtrp(t,h) = (wtr p(t), tsortp(h))
Where tsortp is the function extracting the sort of a term, defined by
tsortp = 7Th2.
Thus the definition of wtc (the well-typedness relation) is:
wtc — V[C[wtrp, 7Ti], 7T2] 1equalc
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§4 Substitution for £
Substitution is an issue that it could be argued is not quite part of the syntax, and
not quite part of the theory. Different people have located it differently (e.g., Church,
or de Bruijn). But wherever it is located, it is an important and substantial issue.
First, the history of the problem shows that it has to be treated carefully (even
Hilbert and Ackermann together are reputed to have got the definitions wrong in a
book they once wrote together), even now that issues are well understood. Also, in
the particular circumstances here, the usual treatments are not quite satisfactory.
4.1 The usual treatments
A good discussion of the issues, and a typical way of dealing with them, is provided
by Barendregt in chapter 2.1 of [6]. The central problem is with confusion between
the bound variables of the term to be substituted into and the free variables of the
term that is substituted in. In other, less abstract, words, a formal definition of
substitution which rules out the following is needed:
(p(v) V 3v'q(v,v')) [f(v')/v\ -w p(f(v')) V 3v' ?(/(«'),v')
Here the bound v' on the right of the initial disjunct should have been renamed to a
new variable; it is not the same as the instance of v' in f(v'). This is called 'confusion
of variables': the bound v' has accidentally 'captured' the v' in f(y').
INTERLUDE: «-congruence. Before going any further, the concept of «-congruence
needs to be explained. First, from §2.1.11 of [6]:
'A change of bound variable in an expression is the replacement of a part
QvA of B by Qv'A[v'/v], where v' does not occur (at all) in A'
Then two terms are «-congruent if one can be constructed, by a series of changes of
variable, from the other.
The approach that Barendregt takes in [6] is simply to suppress the problem at
the beginning, by declaring that two «-congruent terms are identified at the syntactic
level, so QvP(v) is syntactically identified with Qv'P(v'). Further, he insists that
in any expression the names of the bound variables are chosen to be distinct from
the names of the free variables.
In contrast with this, Church [14], places «-convertibility firmly in the theory,
having an explicit «-conversion rule. This means that during a substitution operation
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it might be necessary to perform some changes of bound variable in the background.
It is the treatment of these changes of bound variable that have traditionally produced
the problems.
Yet another approach, used in practice in computer science, is that suggested
by de Bruijn [11], of nameless variables. Instead of having a binding operator bind
a variable name that can be used in the expression, each binding operator marks a
scope boundary. Then variables are indicated simply by having them hold the number
of nested scopes that separate them from their bindings. This approach is favoured
in computer science, since it allows very efficient substitution algorithms (mostly
because it removes any need to take account of «-congruence or «-convertibility at
all), but has the problem that it is not very effective in dealing with open terms:
contexts must be carried around so that free variables can be distinguished. One
way to avoid this problem is to have a separate syntactic class of unbound variables,
with a different method of dealing with substitution. However, then we would have to
reason in parallel about two separate binding mechanisms, which can only complicate
matters.
4.2 Problems with the usual treatments
For what is required here, unfortunately, the usual treatments are not quite enough.
Neither Barendregt's own approach, nor those of the others that he outlines, take
any account of intentional information in the bound variables that I would like to
keep here. Consider for instance the general shape of a program specification:
Minput (pre ..cond (input) —> 3output (post-cond(input, output)))
Barendregt identifies «-congruent terms, so this can be thought of as:
V* (pre-Cond(*) —* 3 *' post-cond (*,*'))
Where the only thing that can be said about * and *' is that they are not the same.
This is sometimes known as an abstract syntax; abstract because it differs from the
usual idea, that syntax is strings of symbols. However now, inconveniently and unin-
tuitively, it is not necessarily the case that A is represented (in an implementation)
by exactly the same object as A[v/v\. Imagine:
(p(y) A \/vq(v)) [v/v\ ^ (p(y) A Vu' q(v')) [w/u]
p(y) AW q(v')
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then it follows that
'p(y) A Vu q(v)' lp(y) A Vu' q(v')\
De Bruijn's approach to formalising the the specification might be written as:
3 • (pre-cond(-o) —» V • post-cond(-i, -o))
Notice that here two instances of what would normally be thought of as one variable
have apparently different 'names', and that no explicit variable is attached to the
quantifiers. This is because -i in the consequent has to pass through one scope
boundary to get to its binding, while -o in the antecedent does not have to pass
through any scope boundaries to get to the same binding.
Both of these suffer at least from the loss of the name of the bound variable.
The former is easy to reason about and the latter is easy to compute with—neither is
really suitable (for people) to reason with (users find the information that the name
of the quantifier contains very useful to tell them where they are). For this reason a
definition of substitution with which, where possible, names are retained as they are,
would be preferable, and the following section supplies one.
4.3 Implementation
With this problem in mind, the substitution mechanism is not difficult to specify as
a four place relation subinc of all instances of the schema:
(A[t/v],A,t,v)
The top level of the definition is simply
subinc — tup (&', ai t,v)
where a' = subp(t,v,a)
A functional definition like this has useful properties especially from the perspective
of meta-theory; specifically it means that there is guaranteed to be a unique value
for any particular substitution a\t/v\.
The rest of this subsection describes how to define subp.
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Naive substitution
The first thing to do is define a function that simply substitutes all occurrences of v
with t in a, without worrying about capture. The naisubp function is the solution of
the set of equations
naisubp(t, v, (O, 'T')) = (0,'_L')
naisubp(t, v, ((a, b), 'V')) = ((naisubp(t, v, a), naisubp(t, v, &)), 'V')
naisubp{t, v, ((a, b), 'A')) = ((naisubp{t, v, a), naisubp(t, v, &)), 'A')
naisubp(t, v, ((a, b), '—*')) = ((naisubp{t, u, a), naisubp(t, u, 6)),
naisubp(t, v, (p, 'rpred')) = (naisubp(t, v,p), 'rpred')
• 7 /1 / i f(a, u','3') if v = v'3 )) = \ •>,<.),»','3')
• 7 /, / i (w,nx f(a,v','V') if v — v'na,subF(t, v, (a, v , V )) = | .y.j ,y „ ^
• 7 /. //->/• t m\ f t if v = (O, (vi,'var'))naisubF(t,v,(0,(vi,var ))) = ( m ., ,}„ } ■ i m( (U, (vi, var J) if v (O, (vi, var ))
naisubp(t,v,(l,(fi,1fn'))) = (naisublistp(t,v,l),(fi,1fn'))
naisubp(t, u, (7, (pi, 'pr'))) = (naisublistp(t, u, /), (pi, 'pr'))
naisublistp(t, v,0) = O
naisublistp(t,v,(r, /)) = (naisublistF(t,v,r),naisubp(t,v, /))
And these are solvable automatically by the function compiler described in the pre¬
vious chapter. Now it is possible to prove a basic sort preserving property of naive
substitution:
Vu (u £ fare —» Vi (if £ termc —»■ Vto (w £ wffc —» naisubp(t, u, a) £ wffc)))
which follows by induction on the structure of u> and the lemma
Vu(u £ •yarc —> Vf (t € termc —> Vp(p £ rpredsetcc —»■
((f2p = 'rpred' A naisubp(t,v,p) £ rpredsetcc) V
(7r2p = 'term' A (naisubp(t, v, nip), 'term') £ rpredsetcc) V
(-7T2P = 'terml' A (naisublistp(t, v, Trip), 'terml') £ rpredsetcc))))),
which follows by induction on the structure of rpredsetcc.
Of course, naisubp is not a sound substitution algorithm, since it does not take
account of the possibility of free variables in t being captured by variables of the same
name that are bound in a.
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Renaming bound variables
As a first step towards rectifying this problem, the next thing defined is a function
that renames all bound instances of a variable v to a new variable v' (that is assumed
not to occur in the term at all).
renamep{v' ,v, (a, v", '3')
renamep{v', v, (a, v", 'V')
renamef{v\ v, (p, 'rpred')
renamef(v' , u, (O,' _L')
renamep{v',v, ((a, b), 'V')
renamep{v',v, ((a, b), 'A')
renamep{v\ v, ((a, 6),»')
f (naisubp(v',v,renamep{v',v,a)),v','3') if v = v"
\ {renamef(y'a), v"SB') if v ^ v
J {naisubp{v',v,renamep{v',v,a)),v','V') if v — v
( (renamep(v', u, a), t>", 'V') if v ^ v
= (p, 'rpred')
= (0,'±')
= {{renamep{v' ,v, a), rename f{v', v, b)), 'V')
= {{renamep{v', u, a), renamep{v', u, 6)), 'A')
= {{renamep{v',v, a), renamep{v', r>, 6)), '—>•')
Again, like for naisubp, a basic sort preserving property of the system has to be
proven:
Vu (u G «src —> W (u' G ware —> Viw (u> G wffc —» renamep{v,u', a) G wffc)))
which again follows by a simple induction on the structure of wffc and appeal to the
sort preserving properties of naisubp.
Free variables in the term
Another function necessary for the substitution implementation is one that returns
the variables occuring in the term. This is easily defined as
freevarsF{{0, (5, i), 'var')) = (0, (0, ((5, i), 'var')))
freevars F{{1, f) = freevarslist F{1)
freevarslistF{0) = 0
freevarslistF{{r, h)) = appendF{freevarsF{r), freevarslistF{h))
(notice the dummy variable / in the second equation) and it is easy to show that
Vf {t G termc —> freevarslistF{t) G List{termc))
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(this follows directly from a proof that
Vp(p G rpredsetcc —>■
((tt2P = 'term' A freevarsp(irip) G List(termc)) V
(tt2p = 'terml' A freevarslistp(irip) G List(termc)) V
TT2P = 'rpred')
Simplifying the free variable list
In order to cut down the size of the free variable list, and so as to make the substitution
algorithm easier to program, more efficient, and have slightly better properties, a
function is then defined which removes duplicates from the list of free variables as
well as the target variable itself.
An alpha conversion function
A function which alpha converts all bound instances of a variable (y, 'var') in a
formula a can be defined as
svlp(v, O) = O
Then the sort preserving property is that
VCVZ(/ G List(C) ->• svlF(l) G List(C))
a-cnvF(v,a) = renameF(noip{tsortpv,a),v,a)
where noiF(s,a) is a function (discussed below) which returns a variable of sort s
that does not occur in a term a.
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The substitution function
It is now possible to construct the substitution function. But before continuing
doing this, it is worth introducing a notational convenience which, supplies some of
the facilities traditionally associated with programming languages that allow higher
order functions.
INTERLUDE: 'Higher order functions' Higher order functions (or functionals) are not
available in FS0 since it is a strictly second order system. However, it is possible
to think of classes of functions that can defined in terms of one schema, (like the
equivalent to the cross product defined in the last chapter) and it is possible to prove
statements about the schema, quantified over the functions and the classes. This
allows the same sorts of facilities that higher order functionals allow such as general
theorems about all instantiations of the schema. The functional, 'map' (which is used
further on in this work) is given by the definition:
map(f)(a,0) = O
map(f)(a,(t,h)) = (map(f)(a,t),f(a,h))
which is solvable for any case where / is already defined. It can, for instance be
shown, in FS0, to have the sort preserving property:
VAV5VCV/
(\/a(a£A-+\/b(beB^f(a,b) £ C)) —►
Va (a £ A —» V/(/ £ List(B) —> map(f)(a, /) £ List(C))))
Another example is 'inject,' which is defined:
inject (f)(a,c,0) = c
inject(f)(a,c,(t,h)) = f(a, h, inject (f)(a,c,t))
with the sort preserving property:
VAV5VCV/
(Va (a £ A —>■ \/b (6 £ B —> Vc (c £ C —> /(a, b, c) £ C))) —>
Va(a £ A —> V6(c £ C —> VZ(/ £ List(B) —> inject(f)(a,c, I) £ C))))
Other general properties of these schemas can be proven in the same way.
Then a definition of subp is as follows.
subpft, v, a) = naisubp(t, v, inject(f)(0, a, (svlf(v, freevarsF(t)))))
where f(d,v,a) = a-cnvp(v,a)
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(notice that the function used to instantiate inject(•) takes a dummy parameter d).
So subF constructs a list of the free variables in t, removes duplicates, using inject(■),
alpha converts in turn all bound instances of variables in a, and then subsitutes the
t for each each unbound instance of the variable in the resulting formula.
The final sort preserving property is then
A 6 Wjffc v G varc —> t G termc —> A[f/u] £ wffc
which follows easily from the properties of inject(•).
Properties of substitution
At this point it is possible to verify that the substitution function has the properities
that are required it.
The first of these is that the identity substitution is an identity operation:
VaVa' Vr (a G wffc —> a' G wffc ->i£ varc
(a',a,x,x) G subinc —> a = a')
This follows from the facts that
Va (a G wffc —* Vu (y G varc naisubp(v, v, a) = a))
(by induction on the structure of formulae and terms), and
Va (a £ wffc —>Vv(vG varc subp(v, v, a) = naisubp(v, v, a)))
(by 'partial evaluation' of the definition of subp).
The second useful fact is that subsitution is unique. This follows trivially from
the fact that substitution is defined using a function.
We can also easily define a class of substitution instance relations, using the fact
that comprehension for Sj formulae is available, i.e.,
(a',a,v) G subinstc 3t(a',a,t,v) G subinc
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4.4 not-free-in
Finally here is the definition of the class nfic which defines the relation of a variable
not being free in a formula or list of formulae (with the pairs labeled appropriately.
The definition does not itself illuminate any new point, so it is omitted here. It is
enough to say that
(tl, v, 'termlst') £ nfic
(t, v, 'termvar') £ nfic
if tl is a list of terms or t is a term in which v does not occur free. It is then possible
using this to define a function noip which has the behaviour that
\/sVvVw(v £ varc —> w £ wffc —» naisubp(noiF(s,w),v:w) — w)
and as a corollary of this, that
\/w Vs (w £ wffc —»
Vce ((a: = 'termlst' V x = 'termvar') —» (id, noip(s, w), x) £ nfic)).
§5 The presentation of the theory
With a language in place, the next stage is to present a logical theory for that
language. There are several well known ways to present a logic though, and they are
not equally suitable for all tasks. In what follows several styles of presentations are
considered for their suitability here.
What properties of a presentation influence its suitability for working in, or rea¬
soning about? First, and most importantly, the presentation has to be easy to use;
sometimes presentations are designed to be easy to reason about, with no considera¬
tion about reasoning in. Having said that, since what is of interest here is meta-level
reasoning, a formalism that is easy to reason about is also useful (this is, of course, a
requirement that need not apply in general). Finally, and pragmatically, the system
should be easy to implement in FS0.
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5.1 Hilbert presentations
Hilbert style presentations are one of the oldest ways of presenting logics, and rely
heavily on axiom schemas trying to make do with as few rules as possible; for instance
detachment (modus ponens) is the only rule needed to define propositional logic, and
classical predicate logic requires only one more. This can be a considerable advantage;
a small number of rules simplifies the proof theory considerably in some respects.
Another advantage is that perhaps subtle rules are easier to add to the logic — most
presentations of modal logics are in a Hilbert style for this reason.
The problem with Hilbert presentations is that they are unuseable in practice.
Proofs tend to be unintuitive and roundabout. It is significant that one of the first
things generally proven about such systems is the deduction theorem, or else (as is
the case with modal logics) a remark to the effect that there is no deduction theorem.
5.2 Natural deduction
Natural deduction is a theory that was designed with the opposite intention to Hilbert
presentations above: to be easy to use at the object level. It is no coincidence
that the first rule usually derived for Hilbert presentations, the deduction theorem,
corresponds to a primitive rule in natural deduction (implication introduction).
Various criticisms can be made of natural deduction at the meta-level though,
especially for the V, 3, J_ fragment". It would be possible to live with these problems
to get the object level ease of use, but I decided against this presentation in the end
for pragmatic reasons: the discharge mechanism is quite difficult to implement. And,
anyway, why build all this machinery when the next alternative (sequent calculus)
comes with equivalent carefully thought out facilities for doing just that?
5.3 Sequent calculus
Sequent calculus seems to offer the best of both the above worlds. Like Natural
deduction it is easy to use in practice — successful formal reasoning systems like
Nuprl show that it is useable in practice. And it has good meta theoretic properties,
like Hilbert systems; after all it was developed specifically for proof theory.
A final point about sequent calculus is that it avoids the problems mentioned for
natural deduction. There is no 'non-locality' in the application of the rules; the notion
of a sequent already supplies explicit facilities for taking care of the hypotheses. For
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instance the rule in sequent calculus corresponding to implication introduction in
natural deduction is the implication right rule:
T, A b B
which is pretty much identical to the way implication introduction would actually be
defined in an implementation of natural deduction8".
§6 The implementation of the theory
Having settled on a particular presentation (sequent calculus) for theories, it is nec¬
essary to settle on a representation of that presentation in FS0.
6.1 Sequents
The general notion of sequent is something of the form81':
f h A where T, A £ F(£)
(where F(-) indicates a finite powerset). This could easily be implemented in FS0 as
a pair
seqc — tup (a, b)
where a £ List(C)
b £ List(C)
but here I will give a definition for sequents that have only one consequent, i.e., of
the form:
T b 7 where T £ P(£), 7 € £
where the consequent is a single formula, rather than a set. So sequents are repre¬
sented simply as lists of formulae, where the head of the list is the consequent, and
the tail is the collection of hypotheses. The actual definition of the labeled form is
written, slightly redundantly:
seqc — tup (Iw, w, 'seq')
where Iw £ List(C)
w £ C
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6.2 Rules
Rules are relations between lists of sequents and sequents of the form:
At~a-"f fi/)
flhw
where the list of sequents above the line are called the subgoals, and the sequent
below is called the goal. The obvious way of representing them is simply as non¬
empty lists of sequents, where the head of the list is the goal, and the tail is the
subgoals, thus
rulebc — tup (si, s)
where si £ List(seqc)
s £ seqc
is the class of all possible rules, and particular classes of rules rulesc will be defined
as subsets of this.
6.3 Proofs
Finally, there is the matter, discussed earlier, in chapter 2, of whether or not to
retain the proof object. The spirit of Smullyan's original thesis [73] and Feferman's
presentation [25] argue for derivability alone. On the other hand, many modern proof
development systems proving systems (such as Lego and Nuprl) do keep track.
In the example described here I have decided to keep the structure of the proofs
in the derivation, since the structure of the proof could be useful in various types of
reflected or meta level reasoning. In general then, a formal proof is of the form:
Aba • • • 'k b
0 b w
where
A b a,... ,fl> b if)
are themselves proofs, and
((0,Aba,...,$b i/>), 0 b u>) £ rulesc
So a proof is actually represented as a pair of a list of proofs on the left and a sequent
on the right.
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Since a proof is actually constructed out of a list of proofs, the classes of proofs
and lists of proofs are defined together in the definition of prfsEtclc, labeled respec¬
tively 'prfl' and 'prf'.
The base class of lists of proofs is simply the class of the tuple containing only
the appropriately labeled empty list:
eprflc ~ [b -^(0,'prfl')]-1 cqualc
and the relation extending it is:
(I, 'prfl') (p, 'prf')
Prfl9r =
(7,p,'prfP)
Proofs can then be built using the definition:
(pf,<prfl') (p, 'prf')
prf9c = 71—(pl,p, prf )
where p G seqc
(gleftF,pl,p) G rulesc
where gleftF is a function that takes a list of proofs and returns a list of the corre¬
sponding root sequents for checking against the class of sound rules that satisfies
gleftF = map(f)
where f(a, b) = 7r2
and the definition of the class is
prfsEtclc = l2(eprflc,prflgc U prfgc)
The above definition is for (among other things) the class of provable sequents,
but this is not quite enough to be useful. As it stands so far, what has been defined
is a completely bottom up system; to prove a theorem it is necessary to have all the
subproofs constructed beforehand. One possibility would be to do what is described
in the presentation of SP, and prove a suitable lemma for each rule. That approach
is not so suitable here, since the set of rules has not been completely defined yet, and
anyway, there are a great many more of them. However, a single lemma can do a lot
of the preliminary work:
3pl [(pi, 'prfl') G prfsEtclc A (gleftp of pi, thru) G rulesc] —*■
[(p, 'prf') G prfsEtclc A ir2 of p — thru],
which can be paraphrased in English as 'If there exist proofs of the subgoals of an
instance of a rule, then there exists a proof of the goal of the rule'. This provides a
facility for top down reasoning.
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§7 Logical rules
With a general framework for a sequent calculus system sketched out it is possible to
define the rules for a particular theory, instead of talking about them in the abstract,
and the following section discusses how to do that.
One of the interesting things about this section is the slightly non-standard form
(and presentation) of the rules; collections of hypotheses are represented as lists and
a principle formula to the left of the sequent has to be at the head of that list, but
the usual structural rules for exchange, weakening and contraction are merged in to
the other rules (in particular the left weakening rule is sufficient by itself, as it is
described here) in a way that more resembles presentations that use sets to hold the
hypothesis collection (e.g., for two lists a,b, (a,b) 6 subsetc if every member of a is
a member of b).
7.1 Propositional rules
Two rules that are ubiquitous in sequent calculus presentations are the cut and basic




while the cut rule schema is




A C EU {A}
This slightly unusual formulation is another small intrusion of pragmatism: it is just
easier to add a formula to E than to remove it from A. The concrete formulations
are:
basicc — tup (0, (a, b, 'seq'))
where (b, a) £ memberc
(0, (a, b, 'seq')) £ rulebc
and
cute = tup (0, (g, a, 'seq'), (d, 6, 'seq'), (e, 6, 'seq'))
where (g,e) € subsetc
(d, (e, a)) £ subsetc
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The general scheme for rules that deal with the right-hand side of the sequent is
also simple. Consider one of the rules for V on the right:
T I-A
V-iq where fC A
AhAVB
which is defined
disjRRc = tup (0, (<7, a, 'seq'), (d, ((a, 6), 'V'), 'seq'))
where (g,d) € subsetc
The rules that deal with the left-hand side of the sequent are not quite so simple,
since it is here that the unusual features mentioned above appear. The formulation
of the rule for V on the left is:
T h C A h C
V-l where T C {A} U E
E, A V B h C
A C {B} U E
Here the principal formula A V B occurs at the head of the hypothesis list in the
goal. It would be possible (and, some might argue, cleaner) to use the definition:
ThC Ah C
V-l where 3A 3B
Eh C
AVBeEA
r C E U {A} A
A C EU {B}
But the existential only makes the definition more complex in practice and there is
no real gain.
7.2 Predicate rules
The predicate rules are actually even easier than the propositional rules once the
work (described in the section on defining the language) of defining the substitution
relations has been done. For instance the rule for existential quantification right is:
T h A[t/v]
A h 3v A
This is implemented as:
3-r r C A
exiRc = tup (0, (g, b, 'seq'), (d, ({v, a), '3'), 'seq'))
where (b,a,v) G subinstc
(g,d) G subsetc
The other rules follow the same pattern, and are equally easy.
Declaring a Language / 95
§8 The definition of the theory
Now it is possible to give the definition of a theory schematic in C. First the basic
rule set has to be defined.
logicalrules c = cute U
disjRRc U
exiRc
And the theory T, with the extra rules R can be defined as
T(R) = X2(basicc, logicalrulesc U (R fl rulebc))
(Notice the side condition that any new rules must also fit the conditions imposed
by rulebc — this ensures that rules cannot accidentally introduce non wellformed
formulae). So, for instance the theory of sorted predicate logic itself is simply
AK 4 T({0})
§9 Summary and conclusions
From the presentation above it is clear that the task of formalising a theory in FS0 is
essentially a job of careful programming and specification. The actual specification
here consists of about a thousand lines in all. However a substantial part of that is
'support' and could be factored out since it would be equally useful in very different
theories (e.g., the facilities developed for substitution, which make up a large part
of the specification, could be reused). Also, the work was the first large experience
of using FS0 and like any such trailblazing if it were done again it would be much
improved: some parts of the implementation are frankly badly designed.
Comparing the formalisation here with what would have to be done in a lambda
calculus implementation (such as Isabelle, or the LF), the obvious disadvantage of the
presentation here is that substitution has to be defined, instead of being available as
a primitive. However, designing a substitution mechanism that could be generalised
over different languages that followed the same 'style' of presentation should not be
difficult, and once this was done the disadvantage would disappear. The advantage of
FS0, as we have said, is that the presentation is much closer to the natural intuition
of what a theory is.
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Notes
i. Constants in Ct are treated as functions of arity zero.
ii. Girard does a thorough job of criticising the V, 3, _L fragment of natural de¬
duction in §2 and §10 of [30] — his point is that, for doing meta-theory, the
elimination rules for these connectives introduce 'parasitic' formulae. This is es¬
sentially a complaint that natural deduction does not have the subterm property
that is found in the cut-free sequent calculus
iii. Other hand natural deduction is the 'natural' way to present a logic with an
LF style framework; all the necessary machinery being available already. For
instance implication introduction would be defined simply as something like
• (to i)-TO/0) - -> vo
iv. In fact for full generality (c.f. Avron's discussion in [4]) the definition of a sequent
would be
f h A where T, A £ M(£)
i.e., multisets. Or, if even this definition is generalised:
r b A where r, A G C*
i.e., lists.
Meta level reasoning and extension
The last chapter described a general framework for first order logic defined in FS0.
The first part of this chapter extends that work by showing how to prove interesting
metatheorems about the declared theory. The particular example chosen is the prenex
form theorem for AK. the theory formalised in the last chapter.
The second part of this chapter looks, as a contrast, at another formal theory
defined in FS0. The example is chosen to be as different as possible, both in the
sort of theory, and in the way it is encoded. So a version of the lambda calculus (A),
which uses a 'de Bruijn' style of binding mechanism, instead of the more common
'Church' style is presented; then a version of the theory with the same behaviour,
but with a much more efficient implementation of substitution, is built and shown to
be equivalent.
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§1 Prenex normal form
A good example of a meta level result, since it is fairly practical, and also because
of the particular issues that formalising its proof raises, is the prenex normal form
theorem [68] for classical predicate logic. Reduction of wffs to various normal forms is
one of the preparatory techniques of automated theorem proving, and prenex normal
form is an initial stage on the way to several of these, such as skolemisation and
disjunctive or conjunctive normal form; it is even an end in itself.
DEFINITION 1. Prenex normal form. A wff is in prenex normal form if it is quantifier
free, or if it is of the form QvA where A is in prenex normal form.
THEOREM 1. For every wff A there exists a wff B such that B is in prenex normal
form, and B A is provable (in AK). The proof here is not for for the full set
of connectives, but only a minimal manageable set: V, 3, V, -> (defined as the set
wffminc).
1.1 Overview of the proof
Having stated the theorem, it has to be proven. More, it has to be proven of the
representation given in FS0, and using only the facilities that FS0 supplies. There
are several ways that this can be done, depending on what is wanted from the proof.
Here what is wanted is a derived rule for AK so that it is possible to make a single








Even now, whether the intention is to add a tactic or a rule, there is already an
informal idea of what the final result will be, i.e., what A' will look like for any given
A. And no more than this is needed since, at first anyway, what is wanted is an
assurance that A can be derived from A'. The usual way of getting this assurance
is actually to build the proof, but this precisely the work that we want to avoid.
INTERLUDE: Syntactic sugar. At this point some syntactic sugar is defined in order
to make the presentation clearer. From now on, instead of writing ((a, b), we
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will sometimes (adopting the notation defined in the last chapter) write [a] —> |6|,
where the translation into the actual s-expression form is mechanical; the brackets [•]
imply that the translation of the term should stop at this point and take the contents
as already translated. This allows us to treat terms of FS0 that are schematic over
formulae in the object logic in a clear and intuitive way.
For a new rule, what is needed is a function such that f~(A) = A' where A'
agrees with the informal notion of a prenex normal form of A, and that also satisfies
the formal requirement:
Fs0 Va (a € wffminc « € AK
It would be possible to define directly, and prove all that is required of it
at once, but dealing directly with functions is not very satisfactory: the proofs are
much more complex than they need to be.
The alternative is to proceed in two stages; first define a relation which describes
the effect that is wanted, and then construct a function which satisfies this relation.
This has the advantage that a lot of the information about the function is formalised
at a more abstract level, in a way that will make proofs of other properties much
easier.
Following this approach, the proof will be presented in two main sections. First
a class that relates wffs to equivalent prenex normal forms in a way that suggests
how to construct /A will be constructed, along with a proof that wffs related this way
are logically equivalent. Secondly, a function will be constructed, using the structure
of the relation as a guide, and we will show that it satisfies the relation.
1.2 The prenex normal form relation
The first thing to do is describe the prenex normal form relation, which is written as
~, and defined by recursive enumeration using the I2 (■, •) construct of FS0. A relation
is needed such that if a and b are in wffmtncand a ~ b then b [a] <-» [bj £ AK.
For the sake of legibility in the definition that follows a ~ b will be written
instead of (a, b) £ ~c — the way the relation is actually represented in the class.
The enumeration is based on the structure of the wffs of the minimal subset, so
the following should be read as an analysis by cases of that set. It should also be
born in mind that the eventual idea is to prove a theorem saying that if A ~ B then
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A <-* B, so a note will be provided after each rule, if necessary to say what has to
be proven.
The simplest case is for atomic propositions, which since they are quantifier free,
are already in prenex normal form. So this can be given as a base case of the relation:
61 A .
~ = tup a ~ a
where a G apredc
Now each of the possible outermost connectives has to be considered in turn,
each generating one or more step cases.
The first, and simplest, case is when the outermost connective is a quantifier.
Here just reducing the interior to prenex normal form will be enough, leaving the




where Q = Q'
Q G predconc
v G varc
The second possible connective is negation, which divides again into the four
possible cases for the interior. If the interior is an atomic predicate then again, since
the expression is quantifier free, it is already in prenex normal form:
£ 4 tup (a, (O, '!')> ~ (a, (O, 'T'),
where a G apredc
If the interior again is a negation then the two cancel out and the prenex normal form
of what is left can be taken instead (this is not actually necessary, but it prevents




The third case is negation of a quantifier; in this case the (logical) identity:
-tQvA Qv-^A
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can be used to push the negation through the quantifier, then the interior can be
replaced with the prenex normal form of its negated self:
(a,(0,'-LV-*')~6 -
((a,t>,Q),(0,U'),(f>, v,Q')




The final branch of negation is for a disjunction, which is more complex. First get the
prenex normal form of the interior, then get the prenex normal form of the negation of
this. This is done simply by pushing the negation through the quantifiers like above
in the definition of To do this, it is first necessary to define a side class
which helps describe how a negation can be pushed through the outer quantifiers of
a wff. This has the property that if A B then -»A «-> B, and performs the
transformation
Q i«i ■ • • QnVnA Qxv1... Qnvn-iA
where A is either a disjunction or a negation — i.e., does not start with a quantifier.
The definition is as follows:
tup a (a, (O, 'T'),










Then the rule defining negated disjunctions is given as:
-v A ((a,6),'V')~c
where c
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All the above are fairly simple and direct. The problem, and the interest, of the
prenex normal form theorem comes from the third case: disjunction. Getting the
prenex normal form of the component wffs of a disjunction is easy, but getting from
them the prenex normal form of the disjunction itself is not. A side condition, like
for ~~,v above, but more complex, is needed, which defines how the two expressions
can be merged.
The relation is written « and is between a pair of wffs and a wff, rather than
two wffs, so that (A, B) « C if, when A and B are in prenex normal form, then C
is in prenex normal form and C AM B. The transformation that it performs is
(QlVi • • • ••• Qn^nB^ R3 Q\V i ... QnV n(A V B )
or
(QiV\ ... QmvmA, ... QnvnB^ Rj Q\V % ... Qnv n(B V J3)
(where A' and B' are versions of A and B, alpha converted so as to avoid variable
capture) i.e., we include the possibility that A and B may be switched. It is defined
by case analysis: there is one base case and two step cases.
The first is where neither of the wffs has a quantifier as its outermost connective,
in which case the disjunction of the two is itself in prenex normal form and can be
returned immediately
= tup (a, b) & ((a, b), 'V')





The second case is where the part of the pair on the left does not have a quantifier




(a, b) & c
The third case is where the complexity lies; the outermost quantifier of the left
hand component of the pair is moved out so that it encompasses both. The trick
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is to ensure that in doing this it does not capture any variables that are free in the
right hand component. So, in the definition below, a substitution for the variable is
carried out to make sure that this cannot happen—but the specification is written
in such a way that it takes makes sure that the intentional information discussed in





where ((O, (a, v, Q), b), u', 'termlst') £ nfic
(a' ,a,v' ,v) £ subinc
Then the definition of is simply
~C = F2(~6, ~com U ~q)
This finally allows definition of the last case of ~, for disjunction: get the prenex
normal forms of the two disjuncts, then merge them together carefully, moving the
quantifiers out as defined in ru
v A a ~ a b ~ b1_A
((a,6),'V') ~ c
where (a', b') « c
With all these definitions in place, finally, the relation can be defined in FS0 as:
A <-r /bl 1 - b2 Q 1 1 , , ~"Q , - ""V - - v \\
r^(j — ±2 U ~ U ~ U ^ U ^ U
1.3 Verifying the relation
Having defined how wffs are related to their prenex normal forms, it is now necessary
to prove that one is the logical equivalent of the other; i.e., (informally) that if a ~ b
then a 6, or formally, where the framework is FS0:
bFS0 a ~ b -> rb [a] [6]n £ AK
This can be done by induction on the definition of ~.
INTERLUDE: More Syntactic Sugar. Again, in order to make what follows easier
to read, some further syntactic sugar is introduced. Instead of writing, for instance,
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[a| *-*• |fr| G AK, where a and b are free FS0 variables, we will simply write b a 6;
it is important to point out that this is not a ground formula in the language of AK.
Moreover we will abbreviate presentations of proofs in the encoded language in the
same way; presenting them directly, rather than via manipulations in FS0.
The same sort of convention will be used for the specifications of proofs, so that,
for instance, instead of we write just f(Qva), which should be read as
/(((a, v), Q)), where Q is the encoding of the quantifier Q.
The base case
The base case is trivial, at least for the definition of AK used here; since in the base
case the two sides of the relation are equal; all that is needed is a proof that:
ha h a
and this follows almost immediately from the basic rules in the definition.
The step cases
The step case is not trivial. The FS0 induction axiom gives two hypotheses,
b a <-» a b 6 6'
for proving the goal
be h c'
Like this, the hypotheses do not appear to be of much use; however, the relation
defining the details of the structure of a, a', 6, b', c and c' is a five way branch that,
when expanded, gives the information necessary for the proof.
Before breaking up the union into its possible cases though, it makes sense to
break the hypotheses into more useful pieces, so that even in the beginning there are
four subcases:
aba' a b a b b b' b' b b
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The first step case
First, and simplest, is the proof of the branch. The definition of this only needs
the a hypothesis, and expanding and examining the definition of the branch adds
detail to the structure of c and c' in the goal to give:
b Qva Qva!
Four variations need to be proven, but they are all essentially similar, so just one is





\/v a b Vt> a'
b Vb a —> Vu a'
(the / at the top of the proof simply indicates that this subgoal follows from the
induction hypothesis, in this case [a] b |a'| G AK). The syntactic sugar here is
perhaps slightly misleading in that this seems to be a simple proof in the declared
logic. However this is not the case: remember that a and variable v are actually
unquoted variables in FSa. This means that some of the side conditions on the
proofs cannot be taken care of automatically. For instance in the applications of V-r
and V-l it is necessary to show that a'[v/v] = a', which in the notation of the system
is
bfs0 (a!,a,v,v) G subinc —> a = a',
and
bfs0 (V[u] [aj, v, 'termvar') G nfic
The second of these can still be disposed of automatically by the system since the
tactic used for object level proofs will immediately encounter the quantifier binding v
and stop, without having to speculate on the structure of a. For the first, there is no
such conveniently isolating quantifier, and the object level tactic will be inadequate
to prove the condition. It is necessary instead to appeal to the fact (stated in the
last chapter) that the identity substitution is an identity.
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The second step case
The next case that has to be proven is but that is similar to the case that has
just been described, and so is left in in favour of
The definition of ~~'Q is more subtle than for ~Q in that instead of the structure
of the goal simply making use of components of the hypothesis, the relationship goes
both ways (this is a problem later, when the function is defined). Only one, the
a hypothesis is needed, and it is refined to show that a = ->a" while the goal refines
to:
I—<Qva" «-» Qva'
Again, just one of the the four parts of the goal is outlined (right implication where
Q is 3):
-ia" b a!/
\/v ->a" b Vu a'
■ Iqi
->3v a" b Vu a'
I—o" —> Wv a'
The upper section of this proof is an instance of the proof schema presented for the
proof of the branch, the lower part is an invocation of the tactic Iqi (or left-
quantifier-invert) which pushes the negation through the existential quantifier in the
hypothesis, and again uses the identity of substitution.
The third step case
The third branch of the proof is negation of a disjunction, and is proved:
c b a V b/
■ cp
->(a V h) I—<c -ic b c1 ?
cut
-i(a V h) b c'
where the goal marked with a '?' is still unproven, and cp is a tactic that reduces a
sequent to its contrapositive (if this is possible). In fact it is dependent on the fact
that:
c c' —> I—i[c] fc'l G AK (LT)
The final proof of the relation is not direct, since, like above, it has to take
account of a side condition, in this case the fa relationship; but apart from that it is
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easy.
b b b'/ a b a'/
V-r V-r
b h a' V V a h a' V b'
V-l
a V b h a' V 6' a' V 6' h c?
cut
a V b h c
Here the goal marked with a '?' is still unproven. All that is known about the
relationship between a' and b' on one hand, and c on the other, is that:
(a', b') pa c
Now, all that is needed is to prove that:
\~FS0 (a, b) ps c -> rb [a] V 161 <-> [c]n G AA
from which the remaining subgoal quickly follows.
Two of the cases are trivial, the base case is
b a V 6 <-*• a V 6




The forth step case
The final case is most complex. Given the hypotheses:
a[v'/v] V b b c c b a[v'/v] V b
the proof in one direction is (for the case of universal quantification):
basic
a\v' Iv] b a\v' lv\l-—— V-l — basic
\/v a b a\v' lv] b b b
V-r V-r
Vva b a[v'/v] V b b b a[v'/v\ V bLjLJ L_LJ v-l
Vf a V b b a[u'/u] V b a[v'/v\ V 6 b cJ
cut
Vra V 6 b c
■V-r
Vu a V b b Vi>' c
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There are two places in this proof where quantifier rules are used, but in fact only one
of them is a problem. The V-l rule does not require anything since the substitution
does not need to be evaluated. The V-r rule, on the other hand, needs to prove that
c[v'/v'] = c, which follows from the identity of identity substitution, and
\~FS0 (Vua V b, v', 'termvar') £ nfic
which follows from the side condition on the rule and the fact (easily demonstrated)
that:
f~FS0 v £ varc -> v' £ varc -> a £ wffc —> b £ wffc —>
(H V [6], v', 'termvar') £ nfic ->
(V[v] H V [6J, v', 'termvar') £ nfic
The proof in the other direction raises only the same problems.
1.4 Defining and verifying the function
Having defined the relation, a function that satisfies it has to be produced so that
suitable prenex normal forms can actually be generated. The equations that define
the function can be read off directly from the definition of the relation ~ as:
/~((a,w,'V')) = (/~(°), vi 'V')
/4(a,t,,'3')) = (/~(*W3')
/„(((a, (O, 'T'),'-')> (0. = /-(«)
/.(((a, u,'V'),(0,'!'),'->')) - (/~((a, (0, 'X'), '—>')), u, '3') (*)
/.(((a, <3'),(0,'l'),'^')) = (/~((a,(0,«T'),'->')),<V) (*)
/~(((a V b), (0, 'T'),'-')) = /—(/-(((«, 6), 'V')))
/~(((o,6),'V')) = /«(/~(a),/.(6))
/~(a) = a otherwise
Where, at the moment it is enough to say of /~ and that the following hold:
hFSo Va(a £ wffminc -> (a,/—(a)) £ ~~c) (T2)
bF5o Va V6(a £ wffminc -> 6 £ wffminc -> ((a, 6),/«(a, 6)) £ «c) (L3).
The problem is to define a function that satisfies these equations. The equations
above are not immediately suitable, since they are not automatically solvable in
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my implementation of FS0 (the equations marked (*) de not have the necessary
subformula property). However a simple rewrite, introducing a secondary function
fZ, remedies this:
/~((a,u,Q)) = (f~(a),v,Q)
/~((a) (O, '-L'), '—*■')) = /~(a)
/~(((a> b), 'V')) = /»(/~(a),/~(&))




fZ(a) — (<b (0, £—*■') otherwise
Now all that need be done is prove that:
vewffminc^(v,U(v))e~c
Which is done by induction on the structure of wffminc. This follows assuming (L2)
and (T3).
Having given necessary properties of /« and / they now need to be defined
so as to satisfy those properties. First, the equations read off from the relation
definition:
/—(a,v,Q) = (/—(a),u,Q)
/~^(a) = (a, (0,' JL'), '—>■') otherwise
are directly solvable, and the function they produce is equally simply verified to
satisfy (LI) — the proof is similar to the main proof here, of the prenex normal form
relation. The other function, /~, is more interesting; it needs to make use of the
function noip. One possible candidate can be outlined with the following equations:
/«((a, v, Q), b) = (subF(noiF(tsortF(v), ((a, b), 'V')), v, /~(a, 6))
noip(tsortp(v), ((a, 6), 'V')),
Q)
/~(a, (6, v, Q)) = /«((6, v, Q), a)
/«(o, &) = ((a, 6),'V') otherwise
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Again, these are, as they stand, not solvable with the available machinery. But in
this case more than a rewrite is needed; another possibility for the function is:
/«((a, v, Q), b) = (subF(noiF(tsortF(v), ((a, 6), 'V')), v, /~(a, &)),
n<hF(((a,&),'V')),
Q)
/«(a, &) = /~(a> &) otherwise
where
f~(ai (6, u, Q)) = (subF(noiF(tsortF(v), ((a, 6), 'V')), v, /~(a, 6)),
(noiF(tsortF(v), ((a, 6), 'V'))),
Q)
/h(a, 6) = ((a, 6),'V') otherwise
And again this rewritten version is solvable, and the resultant function can be shown
to satisfy lemma (A3).
§2 De Bruijn indices for the lambda calculus
Above is presented a description in FS0 of a language and theory for sorted first
order logic. As a contrast, in this section is a presentation of the theory of the
lambda calculus, A, with de Bruijn indices.
In this section the following conventions hold. L,M,N,Z (or decorated vari¬
ants) are variables over terms in the language A; i,j,k are variables over N.
2.1 The specification of the language A, and the theory A
The language A is very simple, being made up only of variables, abstractions and
applications, and is defined as follows.
1. A variable is of the form V{ where i is a natural number. All variables are in A.
2. If N is in A, then the abstraction AN is in A.
3. If M and N are in A, then the application of M to N, written (M,N), is in
A.
An equivalence relation is defined for objects in this language. Most of the rules
are simple, defining equivalence on parts to imply equivalence on the whole and are
defined as follows:
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M = M (I. 1)
M = N ^ N — M (1.2)
M = N-*N = L->M = L (1.3)
M = N ->(M,Z) = (N,Z) (1.4)
M = N (Z,M) — (Z, N) (1.5)
M = N -> AM = AiV (!.£)
The last of these (I.£), is also known as the rule of weak extensionality. The other
rule is /3-conversion, which deals with the way that terms are reduced:
(AM, N) = sub(M, N, 0) (I.j3)
where the definitions of of sub(-, •, ■) and lift(-, •, •) are:
sub(i;i, N,j) = | ?-rv •' J> \ hft(iV,j,0) if i=j
sub(AM, N,j) = \(sub(M,N,j + 1)) (*)
sub((M,N), Z,j) = (sub(M, Z,i),sub(JV, Z,j))
and
iift(«x,;,*) = {";+.
lift(AMJ,k) = A(lift (M,j,k + 1)) (*)
lift((M, N),j, k) = (lift (AT, j, k), lift (AT, j, jfe))
i.e., the lift function increments the index of all free variables in the substituted term
by the number of new scopes that it is inside at the place it is substituted in, so that,
for substitution purposes, it remains the same.
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2.2 Comparision
The most interesting difference between this and the theory above is the binding
mechanism. In the earlier theory, this is defined in the classical way, that preserves
the intentional information of the names of bound variables. Here, on the other hand,
that information has been thrown away. The argument for doing this is that this
makes possible faster implementation of substitution and comparision on machines.
This is expoited later to allow the definition of substitution to be modified so that it
uses a function instead of an r.e. class.
The other differences are obvious: the syntax is much less intricate, and instead of
a consequence relation, all that is needed is equality between objects in the language.
2.3 Describing the language
In this section we will try to use the same variable names in the FS0 definitions
as in the description above, i.e, N, M, N, Z are variables that are intended to vary
over terms, and i,j,k are varibles that are supposed to vary over encoded natural
numbers.
The definition of the language in FS0 makes use of the class natc defined in
the chapter that introduced FS0, and constant labels for variables, abstraction and
applications. The first thing to do is define the distinct constants 'var', 'A' and 'app'
so that the syntax can be encoded as follows:
Vi = ('var', i)
XN = ('A', IV)
(M^N) = ('app', (M, IV))
where i is the encoding of the integer i (using the version of the natural numbers,
natc-, defined earlier), and M and N are the encodings ofN and M. Then the class
of variables is:
varc — tup ('var',a:)
where x 6 natc
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so that the class A of terms can be defined in FS0 as:
l2(varc, absc U appc)
2.4 Describing equality in the theory
In A there is only one type of proposition: the equation. This simplifies the de¬
scription, since equations can be implemented simply as pairs of objects, so that
M = N = (M,N). The equivalence rules, J.l to I.£, are easily dealt with, and so
are dealt with first.
The base case of the equivalences is 1.1
I.lc =tup (IV,IV)
where IV € A










(('app', (('A', M), IV)), ('app', (('A',M'), IV)))
where IV 6 A
WW)
(Op1, (('A', AO, N)), ('app', (('A', AO, ■»')))
where M G A
(('A',M), ('A',IV))
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2.5 Describing reduction as an r.e. relation
The simplest way to describe the (3—cnv rule is to define an r.e. class describing the
relationship. And this can be done easily by reading off the definition of the class
from the definition of sub above:
P-cnv = tup (('app', (('A', M), N)), Z)
where Me A
N e A
(M, N, 0, Z) e subc
The definition of subc is;
subc — ^(basesubl c U basesub2 c, stepsubl c U stepsub2c)
basesublc — tup (('var', i), _,j, ('var', i))
where i ^ j
basesub2 c — tup (('var', i), y, i, x)







(('app', (N, M)), Z, i, ('app', (JV',M')))
and the definition of liftc is
where
Uftc = Z2{baseliftl c U baselift2c, stepliftl c U steplift2c)
baseliftl c = tup (('var', i), j, k, ('var', i))
where i < j
baselift2c = tup (('var', i), j, k, ('var', i + j))





(where i < j and i+j are abbreviations for lessp(i,j) = true and plusF(i,j), which
are defined in the obvious way for natc)•
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2.6 A first de£nition of the class A
It is now possible to give a definition of the theory A in FS0 as:
A = ^2(1.1 c U I-Pci (licUJJcU/.^U/icU 14C))
This definition corresponds almost exactly to the definition that might be given
in books on A, and is nicely declarative, but for practical use it is awkward: the
rule of beta reduction is not a single step operation — the class Ff3c is not defined
using the decidable subset of the operations of FS0, so it is necessary to derive each
substitution by hand to its conclusion.
§3 A recursive solution to substitution in A
The definition of A above is easy to understand, but difficult to work with. The
major problem is that beta-reduction is not a one step rule application: each beta
reduction in a derivation must itself be proven to be valid, by working through the
definition of substitution. A much more satisfactory solution would be to define a
theory A', where beta-reduction has been modified so as to be explicitly recursive (so
that it can be done automatically), which has the property that
hFSo (N,M) g A iff hFSo (N, M) e A'
The way A' is constructed is simply by replacing the class F/3C in the definition
with
/./V = tup ((('A \M),N),Z)
where M £ A
N e A
//?, (M,N) = Z
and prove that \/x(x £ A' x £ A)- This follows from the lemma
bFSo VAVJ5VCVC'(C C C"-> 12{AUC,B) C 12(AUC',B))
and the definition of the class, given that \/x(x £ Ff3c <-» x 6 L/3C'). So the problem
is reduced to proving this, which in turn reduces to the problem of finding a function
subp such that
bFs0 (^VjM, O, Z) G subc Z = subF(N,M)
The rest of this section derives such a function.
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3.1 Constructing subF
First the right to left implication is discussed (using this to construct a definition of
subp)', i.e., showing that
INTERLUDE: Useful lemmas. The following definitions and lemmas describe various
properties of operations are used in the following section. They are listed here, but
they are probably best referred back to when necessary.
First is the function definition superscF
which is written simply as a superscript for the sake of legibility, i.e, superscF(a, i) =
a\ Then there is the definition of subscp,
subscF((b, a), 0) = a
subscF((b,a),(r,0)) = subscF(b,r)
And again this is abbreviated to a subscript, so that subscF(a,i) = oq.
The definitions lenF and count are quickly given using 'functionals' as
lenF = map (Ko)
count! = inject (f)
where f — map([J, 0])
count = C[count, [z, Ko]]
Which make the necessary lemmas trivial to prove. These are
(IV,M, 0, Z) e subc -*Z = subF(N,M) 51
D1
/enJp(map(/)(A:, I)) = lenF(l) D2
and
lenF{count{lenp{l))) — lenF(l) D3
The following, which describe the behaviour of subscp, are also useful:
i < lenF{l) ->■ map(/)(/, k)i = f(h, k) DA
i < y —> count(y)i = i D5
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Given the above properties, a first step in the refinement of the definition of
subp is to set
subp(x) = subp\x)°
where subp' satisfies the properties
subp'((lX\M),Ny = ('A \(aii&F'(M,i\0(o,i))) p2
subp'((lapp', (M, N)), Zy = ('app', crop(subp'(M, Z), subp'(M, Z))1) p3
and crop amd liftp satisfy the properties
croF(x,yy = (xl,yl) p4
and
(y,w, 0, y') e liftc -> y' = HftF(y, w) p5
Then SI follows from
(JV,M, j, Z) e subc -» z = subp'(N,M)J 52
which is provable by induction on the structure of subc as follows. For the base case
there are two possibilities, corresponding to basesublc and basesub2c-
i y j —> ('var', i) = subp'((lva,r\i),My
which follows from pi, and
i = j A (M,j,0,M') £ liftc —> M' = subp'((lvax\i),My
which follows since, by p5
M' = liftp(j,M)
There are also two step cases, corresponding to stepsub 1 c and stepsub2c. For the
first, only one hypothesis is needed
subF'(N,M)(0,i) = Z
and the proof that
subp'((lX\N),My = ('A', Z)
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is immediate from p2. While for the second, both
N' = subp'(N, Zy and, M' = subF'(M, Z)1
are needed to prove that
5f/6jp'(('app', (TV, M)), Zy = ('app', croF(subF'(N, Z), subF'(M, Z))J) by p3
= ('app', (subF'(N, Zy,subF'(M, Z)4)) p4
= ('app',(iV',M'))
The properties that are listed for subF' are not in a form that is automatically
solvable with my system, so the next step of refinement is to provide a definition of
subF' that can be solved. This can be done by refining the definition of subF' itself
to the properties
f'p((£var\i),JV) = ((lvaT\i),list(i,yvar\i),liftF(N,0)))
/£(('app', (M, JV)), Z) = Z), Z))
and the properties p\-p3 can be verified against this definition, given that the com¬




Then, finally, the hd, tl and list functions can be verified against the following defi¬
nitions, which are automatically solvable:
. J/ N A / X if y = O») = (,, = (*,*<)
ti(x,y)±iyy 'f,y=° ,,■ y) \(a,*) tfy = (z,z')
list(X,y,z)±y(Ust{.<y^y)
h((x,y)) - (('A',®),/i(y))
this leaves only croF and liftF to be dealt with (the development of this is found in
the appendices).
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The other direction
The proof of the inverse of Si
Z = subF(N, M) -► (IV,M, 0, Z) 6 su&c
is then a strightforward matter, since it is logically equivalent to
Z ^ subF(N,M) V (Z = subF(N,M) A (iV,M, 0, Z) € subc)
which can be tackled by (course of values) induction.
§4 Conclusion
Two metatheoretic proofs are presented in this chapter. In one sense they are quite
similar — they both are theorems about the manipulation of bound variables; but
in another they are very different — one is a theorem about a sequent calculus
presentation of sorted predicate logic while the other is for an equational presentation
of the lambda calculus, one uses a traditional binding mechanism while the other uses
an very different binding mechanism proposed by de Bruijn.
We can now evaluate the usability of FS0 as a theory in which it is possible to
do 'practical' meta-theory for a variety of systems. Of the two examples, the prenex
normal form theorem clearly requires the less work: it went through without many
problems, and in fact a lot of the work was very similar to reasoning at the object
level; and even when properly meta-theoretic reasoning was required, it was possible
by careful selection of the names of the bound variables, to avoid many problems
that could have arisen. (This approach of 'stepping round' the problems with bound
variables is not unique to this example either — it is usefully employed in the next
part of this thesis.)
On the other hand the development of the substitution algorithm for the lambda
calculus required a great deal of careful work in order to build the necessary function.
However, a lot of this work was simply because the facilities for defining functions
that are available in FS0 are quite difficult to use, so we would argue that this is not
a argument against the practicality of the approach, but an argument for a better
function facility in FS0. In fact the initial formalisation of the theory of the lambda
calculus was very simple, and the problem was in showing that the equations defining
the substitution function had a primitive recursive solution: given easier ways to do
this the development would have been much shorter.
The Idea of Reflection
The chapters above discuss in detail the notion of a framework, and the ways that a
particular framework logic (FS0) can be used to exploit meta-level theorems about
a particular theory, so that the work of constructing theorems is made easier. To do
this, they describe how to formalise the structure of a theory in a 'framework' MT
so that it is possible to reason about that theory, and construct meta-theorems for
it. This is done by defining a predicate Pr(-) in MT, which has the property that
for any formula A in the theory, for which A is the encoding in the framework, then
bT A iff Hjwt Pr(A)
One point that is implicit in what has been described is that a theory does not
need to be very powerful to allow such a predicate to be defined for an arbitrary
theory (after all, the theory (MT) used in this thesis for defining theories is FSa, a
conservative extension of PRA). This suggests some interesting possible extensions
of the notion of meta-theory by 'closing the circle'. For even quite simple theories
then, it is possible to set T = MT and if the encoding mechanism is internalised
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(indicated by r-~l), and a predicate Pr( ) can be defined such that
bT A iff hT Pr(rAn).
A predicate that has this property will be called a proofpredicate [72], where the left
to right implication is called completeness, and the right to left, soundness (which
correspond to faithfulness and adequacy in a framework).
This chapter outlines some of the theoretical results that are associated with
proof predicates and this idea of self reference, or 'reflection', and points out how
some of them might be exploited in a PDS, especially one based on a framework
theory such as FS0. These results may have interesting practical implications; but,
in the form they appear in this chapter, they are difficult to exploit. However, other
work on isolating some of the properties of such proof predicates has been done, and
this suggests possible ways that some of the effects of self-reference could be produced
without all the work that makes the original form so impractical.
§1 Vocabulary and concepts
The first thing to do is to clear up the vocabulary that is to be used in the future,
and introduce some of the new basic concepts.
Facilities that allow an object theory to express certain aspects its metatheory via
such a proof-predicate are grouped together under the word reflection (since a proof
predicate, it can be argued, supplies a facility for a theory to reason 'introspectively'
about itself). The idea of reflection has been investigated at length by logicians, and
some of the results of that investigation that might be useful in practical theorem
proving are discussed in this chapter. While doing this, the second issue discussed is
how it is possible to make the facilities of a proof predicate available, without having
to go to the (enormous) effort of building the facilities needed to encode the theory
inside itself each time.
It is not particularly meaningful to talk about 'meta-' and an 'object-' theories
in the context of reflection, but there is an analogous distinction between when the
theory is being used to prove theorems about itself, and when it is being used simply
to prove theorems in itself. Some new vocabulary is needed for the purposes of
making this distinction. Instead of referring to the 'place' where reasoning takes
place, it seems easier to refer to a step that marks the transition from one to the
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other, i.e., from outside quotation marks to inside, or from inside to outside. These
are known as reflection up (pfi) and reflection down(Ri) [37]; so a proof predicate is
any predicate that satisfies the two reflection rules:
A Pr(rAA
(j?t) (iyPrrA'
When the word 'reflection' is used here it normally means relating quoted and un¬
quoted formulae in this way1.
The reflective properties of a predicate satisfying these rules are very weak. The
only connection between quoted and unquoted terms is via an admissible rule. It is
possible to imagine a stronger form of the above though; one example is the schema
Pr(rAn) -> A
(which subsumes the the rule (Pj,) mentioned above). This asserts the simple propo¬
sition (given that the proof predicate corresponds to a true theory) that if a formula
is provable, then it is true. Such a connection between the 'inside' and the 'outside'
of quotation is referred to here as a reflection principle, after the definition used by
Feferman[23] who says
'By a reflection principle we understand a description of a procedure for
adding to any set of axioms A certain new axioms whose validity follow
from the validity of the axioms A and which formally express, within the
language of A, evident consequences of the assumption that all the theorems
of A are valid.'
§2 Work on self reference
Results about self reference are normally given for theories that contain PRA, e.g.,
[68], [47], [72]. This is one of the smallest theories for which a lot of the results
can be obtained, since it provides sufficient resources to build the needed quotation
mechanisms and diagonalisation lemma". However, since part of the purpose of
this chapter is to consider the properties of such quotation mechanisms apart from
particular implementation facilities, the necessary operations are discussed directly,
instead of in terms of encoding in a theory like PRA.
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For quotation and diagonalisation to be possible, a theory needs some way of
treating the syntax of formulae of the language as itself a class of terms in the
language, and a substitution mechanism, allowing substitution into quoted formulae.
The notation used earlier for terms in the object language declared in a frame¬
work is here adapted to denote quoted terms and formulae of the language. So in
any T that supports quotation, for every formula A and term t, there are distinct
constants in the language of T, written rAn and rf1 which are the quoted forms.
In order to substitute into a quoted formula it is also necessary to have a function
that substitutes the value of terms for variables (a subclass of the terms) in quoted
formulae. Thus it is also convenient to have distinguished variables in the language;
so if v is a variable of the language of T then there is a constant written rv~> which
is the quoted form. With this,
sub(rAn, ""i?"1, t)
is a function in the theory that takes a quoted formula rAn, a quoted variable run,
and a term £, and is equal to the quoted formula corresponding to rAn, only with
the encoding of the normal form of t substituted for v in A.
By a ground term being in 'normal form' here we mean that it is in a special
subclass of the terms which are provably pairwise distinct. The normal form of a
term is the unique term in that subclass to which it is provably equivalent.
Given such quotation and substitution mechanisms, it becomes possible to prove
the diagonalisation lemma [47], which says that, for any formula A with one free
variable v, there exists a formula B for which
htBh A[rBn/v]
Given a theory supplied with at least this property, the first result that follows
from this is the Tarski 'no truth definition' theorem [75]. This states that there is no
predicate Tr definable in a consistent theory T, having the property
\~T A <r-> Tr(rAn)
(known as the Tarski truth schema) since, by the diagonalisation lemma, if Tr(-) is
definable, then there is a formula B in T, such that
hT B ^ (Tr(rBn) -+ _L)
Tr(rJ3n)
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i.e., T is inconsistent.
The second result is from Godel [36], and depends on the further property of T:
that it supplies enough facilities so that not only quotation8", but a proof predicate
is defined for the theory, i.e., a predicate, written 93ero(-), for which
hT ®etn(rBn) iff bT B.
His result says that there is a sentence A in T for which neither bp A nor by
A —» -L is provable (given that T is consistent). Given a proof predicate satisfying
the definition above, the result follows by taking A to be the solution for B in
bp B <-> (Q3etu(rjEP) —> J_). Furthermore, as a corollary, he provided a particular
example of such a formula: a statement of the consistency of the theory, i.e.,
®ero(r-L"1) —> -L.
These are historic results, but they are more destructive than constructive.
Tarski's result means that the simplest way of connecting a theory and its meta-
theory (i.e., as an 'if and only if' inside the theory) is not possible. Godel's result
says that while it may be possible to 'connect' the theory to itself at the meta-level,
this connection is 'weak'. In fact the second part of Godel's theorem provides as an
example of such an unprovable formula, an instance of the example reflection princi¬
ple cited above. In fact the second incompleteness theorem shows the unprovability
in PA of
53etDpA(rl = 0n) —*■ T. (RconpA )
That it is not possible to derive a contradiction is the most basic property that a
theory is expected to have, so this is an instance of a reflection principle that PA
will not support. However, a lot of work has been done on what the extent and
implications of Godel's result, and possible ways to circumvent this incompleteness.
§3 Developments of the work of Tarski and Godel
The work above discusses what happens when a proof predicate for a theory is em¬
bedded in the theory itself: even the simplest reflection principles are not provable.
However, this only rules out one approach to reflection. There is at least one way
forward.
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3.1 The work of Turing
The first person to produce an interesting result in this area was Turing [78], who
considered what the effect of repeatedly adding simply a formal statement of consis¬
tency to a theory such as PA, to which Godel's results applied. He considered the
sequence of theories PAcn, where
PAC0 = PA
PAi,= PAH<SmpAi(rl ) - X]
pa: = u PA:
d-^K
(where k is a limit ordinal and ' indicates ordinal successor) and proved that every
true n?-formula of arithmetic is provable on a recursive progression of theories based
on this principle (in fact going no further than PA^+1).
This is an impressive result, but it is not the result that he wanted. As a proto-
computer scientist, he was looking for some form of completeness for n[J-formulae
(i.e., the sentences that specify functions), but he did not manage that. In his paper
he also conjectured that the schema,
<8eraT(rAn) -> A (R^)
(known as local reflection) was a stronger extension than simply the particular in¬
stance where A is X, but he did not manage to show this either.
3.2 The work of Feferman
Turing's work was enormously extended by Feferman[23], who also looked at more
general transfinite extensions, using reflection principles.
His first result was a disproof of Turing's conjecture mentioned at the end of
the last section. The second result was much more interesting; he considered a
generalisation of local reflection to
Vv(53emT(sub(rAn, rv_l, v)) —» A(v)) (Rt)
known as uniform reflection, and what happened when it was used to extend a system
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(where k is a limit ordinal). This defines a progression of theories Tj, where d, £ 0,
i.e., d is a notation for a (Church-Kleene) constructive ordinal. He showed that
every true sentence of arithmetic is provable in Td for some d £ O and moreover
that it is possible to select a path through O along which all these theorems are
provable. Unfortunately, due to the intensional nature of these progressions, it is
possible to have two different representations of the same ordinal producing different
sets of theorems, and the proof that some paths have the completeness property is
not constructive. However this is a substantial result, and does indicate that the area
is worth pursuing™.
3.3 The work of Kreisel and Levy
A different result is available from work done by Kreisel and Levy. While the work
above tells what happens at the limit of various reflection schemas, in [50] they ex¬
amine what happens even after a single iteration of uniform reflection. For current
purposes, the interesting results are quantification of the increase in proof-theoretic
strength of PRA and PA that are achieved with a single instance of uniform reflec¬
tion. (Using the notation of the last subsection) PRAf is equivalent to PA and PAf
is equivalent to PA with transfinite induction for eo.
3.4 The work of Godel
Another possible benefit that such non-conservative extensions might provide is men¬
tioned by Godel himself, in a short note [35], which is developed further by Ehren-
feucht in [22]. Given an arbitrary recursive function /(•), and functions It(') and
It[a\ (") which return measures of the length of the shortest proof of a provable propo¬
sition in T and T[A], and T[-iA] is undecidable, there exists a formula B such that
\~T B where
f(lT[A](B))<
The same sorts of questions apply to this result of course: since this is an existen¬
tial theorem, are there any useful formulae for which this 'speed-up' occurs, or does
it only apply to special formulae constructed with prior knowledge of the particular
/(•)> ?t(") and It1 (•) that are to be used"?
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3.5 Conclusions
These results are very interesting to a logician, but this thesis is concerned with
practical theorem proving, and the question then is, what do these results offer that
might be used in practice, and what are the possible problems.
The facilities that reflection might offer are then: a stronger system, which means
that results that were unprovable before might now be easily accessible, and more
readable (or even shorter) proofs. Further, these effects are available after single
instances of reflection, it is not necessary to reflect infinite numbers of times in order
to get useful strengthenings.
The problems, however, are equally obvious, and it is not clear that they do not
outweigh the possible gains. The difficulty in making use of reflection would seem to
be that defining a suitable predicate 53ett)(-) is a technically complex task, and even
after it is finished, how could it be checked so that it actually does what it is supposed
to do: given a definition of a supposed 'proof predicate' supplied by a user, how could
the system check that it really has the properties that define a proof predicate. The
next section looks at how it might be possible to circumvent these problems.
§4 Analysing the proof predicate
The last section described some of the results associated with self-referential sentences
in theories, but also pointed out that actually constructing a proof predicate was an
intricate task; so intricate that it is not clear that it is practically possible, or at least
sufficiently possible that the gains that would result are worth the effort.
However, parallel with the work on the effects of reflective extension that is
described above, there has been a lot of work on the abstract properties that any
proper proof predicate will have to have. There are several reasons for doing this:
the first is simply that the abstract behaviour of something so important in logic
is interesting for its own sake. The second is more pragmatic: even theoreticians
working on paper (such as Hilbert and Bernays, discussed below) encountered exactly
the problems with formalising 53era that have just been described. For instance some
results in the theory of self reference (such as the second incompleteness theorem
itself) are practically impossible to construct if it is necessary to work with a complete,
messy, definition of the predicate.
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4.1 The Hilbert-Bernays derivability conditions
The first abstraction, of a proof predicate away from a concrete definition based
on recursively enumerable classes of terms, formulae, and proofs, was presented in
Hilbert and Bernays' book [43]. The justification for doing this was to present a
proper proof of the second of Godel's incompleteness theorems. This result is usually
described as a formalisation of the first, but this is not how Hilbert and Bernays
proved it (this would have been an enormous effort). Instead they showed how the
second incompleteness theorem could be reduced to the first, given only a short list of
properties (derivability conditions) for their predicate (which will be denoted 23(-))
and which they show any Godel style proof predicate must satisfy. Their list of
derivability conditions is
(where / is a primitive recursive function, and t is a ground term). As Smorynski
points out in the introduction of [72], these are effective for their intended purpose—
a proof of the second incompleteness theorem — but they are not really satisfactory
as an analysis of the properties of the proof predicate itself (in fact he describes
((D®)) and ((D®)) as 'moderately bizarre').
4.2 The Lob derivability conditions
Another set of derivability conditions (from now on, simply the derivability conditions
and defined for the predicate Pr(-)) was presented by Lob in [51]. They are simpler,
and arguably much more intuitive:
The first of these says simply that the proof predicate is complete; the second that
the predicate is closed under modus ponens, and the third is a formalisation of the
first™.
if b A -> B then b Q3(rAn) -+ <B(rBn)
if b ©(rA(t;) —» J_n) then b 23(rA(£) —> J_n)




if b A then b Pr(rAn)
b Pr(rAn) A Pr(rA -> Bn) Pr(rBn)
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These properties, plus substitution, are enough to get Lob's theorem, which was
given alongside them, and which says
b Pr(rAn) —► A iff b A (LT)
or, in its formalised (and equivalent) form,
b Pr(rPr(rAn) -> A'1) Pr(rA"1) (.FLT)
These derivability conditions are clearly simpler and more intuitive than those
proposed by Hilbert and Bernays, and have been analysed in detail, to the extent
that it is possible to say that, to quote Smorynski again,
'the [Lob] Derivability Conditions and Lob's Theorem (formalised or not)
tell the complete story of [the schematic behaviour of] Pr(-).'
The next section discusses what this means and describes some of the results of the
analysis.
§5 The analysis of the Lob conditions
The simple propositional nature of the derivability conditions makes an analysis of
them using modal logic particularly attractive, and this has been done in [74] and
[72]. If the proof predicate is read as the 'necessary' unary connective (□), in the
traditional modal style, then the derivability conditions can be read as the rule of
necessitation and the axioms of the modal logic JT4. If this is extended with the modal
translation of (LT) or (FLT), the logic PRL is defined, which has been studied in
detail.
5.1 The logic PRL, and its relationship to PRA
If the language is taken simply as the language of propositional logic augmented with
a new unary connective □, the theory is as follows.
• If A is a propositional tautology in the language of PRL, then A is provable in
PRL.
• Every instance of the schema OA —> □(A —» B) —» OB (the modal equivalent
of (Z?2)) is provable in PRL.
• Every instance of the schema DA —> □□A (the modal equivalent of (D3)) is
provable in PRL.
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• Every instance of the schema □(□A —»• A) —> DA (the modal equivalent of
(FLT) — it would, equally, be possible to have (LT) as a rule instead) is provable
in PRL.




A A -> B
B
Solovay, in [74], has given a detailed analysis of PRL, which allows, for instance,
the equivalent of soundness for Pr(-):
DA
A
to be demonstrated (as an admissible rule). From this it follows that
bppL A iff \-PRL DA
which is very suggestive of the definition of a proof predicate given above. Of course,
a result like this is no more than suggestive, unless a much closer relationship between
PRL and PRA can be demonstrated, but this is what Solovay has done. Let * be
defined to be any translation of sentences of PRL into PRA, such that
(DA)* = PrffA*'1)
(A o B)* = A* o B*
1* EE J_
A (atomic) = a sentence in the language of arithmetic
(where Pr(-) is some predicate in PRA satisfying the derivability conditions, and
(LT), o is any binary propositional connective). Then the first Solovay completeness
theorem is
'For any proposition A in the language of PRL, bppp A if and only if for
every interpretation *, bpra A*'
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§6 Practical implications
The work described above has interesting implications for practical proof development
systems. I have said that a concrete proof predicate such as Q3eto(-) is impractically
messy to implement, even for the benefits that would result. The work of Lob and
Solovay though, implies that there might be a way to avoid having to implement
the predicate, by appealing just to what is known about its characteristic behaviour;
e.g., by using just the derivability conditions, so that it is not necessary to worry
about the practical details of definition. Simply extend the logic with quotation,
substitution, and then a new predicate for which the defining axioms are (perhaps a
slightly modified, or extended version of) the second and third derivability conditions
together with a new rule implementing (Z?i) for the predicate (Lob's theorem does
not have to be added explicitly, since it follows from substitution, quotation and
(AHft) P2]).
That this approach works (i.e., produces the appropriate non-conservativity re¬
sults) does not necessarily follow; for instance the non-conservativity results could
depend on the fact that some particular proof predicate has actually been imple¬
mented. In fact Simpson [69] has shown that this approach does not work for local
reflection. Since the proof is not published, it is reproduced here.
6.1 The conservativity of 'schematic' local reflection
THEOREM 1. PRA extended with a local reflection schema, where the proofpredicate
of the schema is defined only using the derivability conditions and Lob's theorem, is
conservative w.r.t. the original theory.
PROOF: First, define PRA' = PRA + (Di) + (£>2) + (£>3) + (FLT). Then the proof is
by showing that any model of PRA! can be expanded to a model of PRA' extended
with all instances of Pr(rA-1) —» A. The proof is easily modifiable to the case of PA.
Let 971 = (D,0,5,+, x) be any model of PRA. This can be expanded to a model
SOT' = (D, 0, s, +, x, Pr) by letting
[[Prflajt/ — {v E D I u = bPRA! A}
(where r-n is some Godel numbering scheme, and [fjoji is the interpretation of t in
the model 9Jt).
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First it is necessary to show that 971' |= (Di)-(FLT); however before this, one
fact about PRA' is needed: the soundness of Pr(-); i.e., hpRA> A iff bppA> Pr[rAn),
which was mentioned where I discuss Solovay's work. With this in hand the proof is
as follows, proving each of (Di)-(FLT) in turn.
(Di) Proving 971' |= (D\) amounts to showing that if hppA> A then 971' |= Pr(rAn),
which follows directly from the definition of 971'.
(D2) To prove 971' f= Pr(rAn) —> Pr(rPr(rAn)n), assume 971' |= Pr(rA~l). Then, by
definition of 971' it follows that ppAi A, so by (Di), \~ppAi Pr(rAn), and so
971' \= Pr(rPr(rAn)n).
(D3) To prove 971' (= Pr(rAn) —> Pr(rA —> FF) —> Pr(rJF) assume 971' |= Pr(rAn)
and 971' |= Pr(rA —> IF). Then, by definition of 971', it follows that bppA' A
and \~ppA! A —> B, so, by modus ponens, hppA> B and so 971' (= Pr(rBn).
(FLT) To prove 971' |= Pr(rPr(rAn —> A)"1) —> Pr(rAn) assume 971' (= Pr(rPr>(rA"1 —>
A)"1). Then bPRA' Pr(rAn) » A, and so by (P^i) and (FTP), it follows that
I-PRA1 Pr(rA'1) and so, by the soundness of Pr(-), bPRAi A which gives, by the
definition, that 97V |= Pr,(rA"1).
Since any model of PRA can be expanded to a model of PRA', it is only
necessary to show that 971' |= Pr(rAn) —* A to complete the proof. Suppose
971' |= Pr(rAn). Then bppA A (by definition of 971') so 971' |= A, as required.
6.2 Uniform refection
Simpson's proof does not generalise to the case of uniform reflection though, which
is anyway a more interesting rule. And it is possible to show non-conservativity, for
uniform reflection, at least for simple theories. The next section addresses some of
the more practical issues involved in implementing such a schematic reflection rule
as an extension.
§7 Implementing an abstract proof predicate
Unfortunately, the discussion above does not treat of some of the practical aspects of
implementing such a proof predicate. Two points are particularly important: there is
no discussion of how to deal with the problem of what to do in quoted contexts, and
the exact form of the rules as they should be found in the system is not given. This
section discusses these issues, especially how the first question affects the answer to
the second.
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7.1 Variables in quoted formulae
Since uniform reflection is to be exploited here, it is necessary to be able to deal with
applications of proof predicates to quoted formulae which have unquoted components.
The antecedent of the uniform reflection schema is of the form:
Pr(sub(rAVyn,<0)-
In order to reason about this we will want to be able to do things such as instantiate
it with arbitrary terms, and it is important to be careful about how this is done.
Remember that the sub(rAn, rvn,t) function substitutes the encoding of the normal
form of t for v in A. So if the meaning of t is some number n. its normal form is
s(- • • s(0) • • •), so that
sub(rAn, run, t) = rA[s(---s(0) ■••)/»]"'
(note that it is not necessarily the case that rA[s(-• • s(0) • •-)/?;]n = rA[s(f)/i;]~l).
The question then is what sort of definition should sub(-, •, •) be given in the theory,
since it will have to be used with non-ground terms. The approach that has been
discussed so far, of making use of only the necessary properties of a function can
again be exploited here to give a set of axioms defining the behaviour. The idea is
to allow only that outer part of a term that will not change its structure, no matter
what further substitution and normalisation operations are performed on it, to be
moved into the quoted term, in a substitution operation; i.e., given a term s(t) for
instance, the outer s(-) can be 'stripped off', and substituted into a quoted term; for
natural numbers only for outer constructors of the form s(-) can this be done, t + t'
is not, as it stands, substitutable, since a substitution into it might make it reducable
to 0. The first axiom treats the case where v does not occur free in A:
sub(rAn,rt;n,*) = rAn
if v does not occur free in A; then the axioms for terms that are in head-normal form
can be defined (for natural numbers) as:
sub(rAn, rv~i,s(t)) = sub(rA[,s(i;)/t?p, rrn, t)
sub(rAn, rvn, 0) = rA[0/®p
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In the same way, the behaviour when the third argument is a quoted object, can be
defined, since these are in normal form, as:
sub(rAVt>VBn) = rA[rB^/v}'1.
However, since there is no sensible way of reducing a term such as v' -ft where v' is a
variable, using the standard definition of +, it is not possible to define the behaviour
of
sub(rAn, run, v' + t)
However some way still has to be found so that it is possible to treat these terms in
a derivation. This is dealt with below, in the discussion about the rules.
7.2 Rules and axioms for an implementation
It is not possible to add the derivability conditions directly to the theory as a collec¬
tion of axioms for two reasons: First, one of them is a rule; and secondly the section
above shows that we have to be able to treat instances of the proof predicate that
contain free variables. Thus it is necessary to parametrise over possible instantiations
of a substitution, so here are described the slightly modified versions of the conditions
that actually do this (the important question of the safety of such an operation is
addressed later in this section).
The second derivability condition
This is the simplest of the derivability conditions to modify, and shows how the others
will follow. It is simply:
Pr{sub(rA'1,rv~',v')) —» Pr(sub(rA —> Bn,rvn,v')) —> Pr(sub(rPP, rvn, i?'))
The third derivability condition
Following this, the third derivability condition has to keep track of a substituted term
through two levels of quotation, so the parametrised version of it works as follows:
Pr(sub(rA~l, h»1, v')) —> Pr(sub(rPr(sub(rA"', f'))n, ra'n, v'))
(where v' is a variable).
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The first derivability condition
This condition is a rule, rather than an axiom schema and the problem is how to get
a version of the rule that allows the introduction of instances of the proof predicate
parametrised over terms. The form of the rule here is:
b A
b Pr(sub(rAV^,*))
(for any variable v, notice that the hypothesis set is empty for the goal and the sub-
goal). This form of the rule is perhaps not as pleasing as might be for a sequent
calculus presentation, where it would be obviously be preferable to have more 'uni¬
form' treatment of Pr(-), with left and right elimination rules for arbitrary contexts.
But at the moment we are not investigating the proof theory of the predicate, and this
presentation has the advantage of simplicity (and is taken directly from the standard
form of the derivability condition, above).
7.3 The soundness of the method
Notably absent from the discussion above is any detailed discussion of whether the
method we have suggested is actually sound or not, since we are interested here in the
applications of the operation rather than the theory in this thesis. The question of
soundness is crucially important though, and as an informal argument for soundness
we point out that it is possible to define a quotation and substitution mechanism,
and proof predicate in a definitional extension of PRA in such a way that the axioms
and rules we have given follow.
This does not give a guarantee of soundness for theories weaker than PRA
however, and we would have to exercise caution in applying the method in such a
case.
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§8 Summary and conclusions
In this chapter I have examined the idea of self-reference in a theory, then the related
notion of reflection principles, and how they can be used to strengthen a theory.
In doing this I have outlined two complementary bodies of work: that by Turing,
Feferman, Kreisel and Levy, which shows the way that reflection principles strengthen
theories in useful ways, and that of Hilbert and Bernays, Lob and Solovay, which
examines how it is possible to abstract the properties of a suitable proof predicate
away from particular implementational details. Finally, with this work in mind, I
have described how it would be possible to modify these ideas so that they can be
implemented. This actually requires slight extensions of the work of Lob and Solovay,
such as parametrising the derivability conditions for the proof predicate.
The result of doing this is a theory extended in a way that does not make use
of dramatically new concepts, but simply on a confidence that the initial theory is
true. However, the question of whether this actually makes new theorems provable
or not is still not answered; we have pointed out that the form of reflection that is
suggested here is not as strong as the form discussed by Turing and Feferman, but
hopes to achieve some of the same results without having to resort to that sort of
amount of work.
The following chapters discuss the actual implementation of a quotation mech¬
anism, and a proof predicate, and shows how it can be applied to a simple theory in
order to get some useful non-conservative results.
Notes
i. The concept of reflection here should not be confused with the reflection princi¬
ples of set theory. These latter correspond to what are known as strong axioms
of strong infinity— i.e., they allow the universe defined by a set theory to be en¬
larged for a particular purpose so as to be a sufficiently accurate approximation
to the informal classical universe of sets. [29].
ii. The most important exception to this generalisation is that Godel presented his
original work in the much more powerful theory PA.
iii. Not quotation as it is described here either (as a syntactic extension of the
theory), but rather as a definitional extension.
iv. Feferman also managed to get the result Turing was looking for: if A is a true
11"-formula of arithmetic, then an upper bound for a progression for which A is
provable is u>2 + to + 1.
v. Since uniform reflection implements a form of the w-rule, it could be thought of
as effecting a speed up from a proof of infinite length to one of finite length.
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vi. It is worth pointing out that provability is not the only predicate that is satisfied
by the Lob derivability conditions, a version of the property of being a well
formed formula, for instance, will also satisfy them.
Implementing Reflection
The last chapter discussed various theoretical results about reflective extensions of
formal theories. This chapter discusses the machinery that is needed so that reflection
can be used to extend a formal theory implemented in a framework proof development
system to a new one, and what problems arise in doing it.
§1 Extending the definition of C
A project to add self-reference to a theory presupposes that a quotation facility
is available, so that the theory can manipulate strings corresponding to its own
formulae. But even this requires thought and commitments. To make the issue
simpler, I will consider here how to extend the language C of sorted first order logic
defined earlier to a language C+ with quotation and substitution mechanisms built
in (substitution here meaning substitution into quoted strings).
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1.1 Extending the language of terms
The way quotation was implemented by Godel is not satisfactory for use here, if only
because it is too complex, and too cumbersome; Godel was presenting a proof, not a
facility (and was constrained to presenting it in arithmetic). What is really needed is
a facility that is simple to implement and use, and that is designed to need as little
equipment as possible.
Three of the sorts of C are reserved for use as the sorts of quoted formulae quoted
terms and quoted variables. So if these special sorts are denoted 'qform', 'qterm' and
'qvar', then it is easy to extend the definition of C with the extra clauses in the
definition of Ct
• If A is a formula, then rAn is a term the sort of which is the reserved sort of
quoted formulae.
• If t is a formula, then rt~1 is a term the sort of which is the reserved sort of
quoted terms.
• If v is a variable, then is a term, the sort of which is the reserved sort of
quoted variables.
The question then is: 'how should this be implemented so that the machinery that
has already been built is disrupted as little as possible?'
Remember that a variable is represented in the encoding of C as
ivs = (0,((s,i),'var'))
where s is the sort of the variable, and i is the index, and, importantly, that these
are not constrained to be anything in particular; a function application has a similar
format. In order to maintain consistency with this format, quoted objects are defined
as follows. Given a new constant 'quote', the new terms are defined to have the
format:
rAn = (0, (('qform', 5X),'quote'))
rt~l = (0, (('qterm', S2), 'quote'))
and
rvn = (0, (('qvar', S3), 'quote'))
(where Sx, S2 and S3 are the encodings of A, t and v).
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This approach has a double advantage over Godel's, in that it is, first, very
easy to install as an extension of the implementation of the original language £, and
secondly (and more importantly) the supportingmachinery that has been constructed
for £ (such as substitution) can easily be adapted for use with the extension.
Now the problem of how to modify the definition of £ can be dealt with. In
the definition above, for theories that do not need self reference, the definitions of
the language of terms (£t) and the language of formulae (£) can be kept separate,
since the first does not depend at all on the second. This is no longer true in £+,
the two are defined as a pair, together. This fortunately does not involve dramatic
restructuring of the definition. All that is necessary is that the definition of formulae
be combined into the definition of terms. Once this has been done, it is easy to
extend the definition to deal with quoted terms as well.
Remember that the class of terms, lists of terms and atomic predicates was
defined as a unit, and then the atomic predicates were projected out of this. Instead
of this, the formulae can be constructed at the same time as everything else and
then they can be projected out. This is a simple matter of modifying the rules for
proposition and predicate construction as follows.
Remember from the chapter 'Defining a Language' that the definition of £ (writ¬
ten wffc) is
wffc — ^2{rpredc U absurdsc, propgc U predgc)
so to get the rules for generating formulae in £+ the new rules need to be defined
refwffbasec = tup (a, 'formula')
where a G absurdc
(a,'formula') (6, 'formula')
refwffstepc = —— —
(c, formula J
where (c, a, b) G propgc U predgc
(notice that the base case of atomic predicates has not been defined here; but that
is dealt with in a moment).
In the old definition of terms, the atomic predicates are defined at the same time
as the classes of lists of terms and terms, as
rpredsetcc = Xi(btc U emptytlc, extlc U iermgc U rpredgc)
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where the subsets are labeled as 'rpred', 'terml' or 'term'. These labels can be con¬
veniently recycled for use here, except that the rule for generating atomic predicates
is changed to
(I, 'terml')7 A ^ 7 '
rvredar =
'rpred'), 'formula')
where p £ prldc
(Z,7Tii,p) 6 wtc
Then two entirely new rules need to be defined: a base class of quoted variables and
a new step case that turns formulae into quoted formulae
quotedvariablesc = tup ((0, (('qvar', u), 'quote')), 'term')
where v £ varc
(a;,'formula')
quotedtermqenr =
((0, (('qform', x), 'quote')), 'term')
Then the definition of the class containing formulae, lists of terms, and terms, is






and the class of formulae of C+ is simply the subset of these marked with the label
'formula' on the right
refwffc — tuP a
where (a,'formula') £ refwffsEtcc
1.2 Extending substitution
With the new language defined it is necessary to modify the definition of substitution
in C to take care of this, but this is a trivial matter, since all that is necessary is to
add new base cases for quoted objects, and say substitution does not enter that.
naisubp(t, a, (0, ((6, t), 'quote'))) = (0, ((6, t), 'quote'))
(of course the various theorems about sort preserving properties of substitution have
to be reproven as well). Substitution into quoted formulae is dealt with in the next
section.
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§2 The substitution functions and reflecting up
The next issue is the facilities that have to be supplied so that the special substitution
functions can be defined to work properly with reflection up.
2.1 Defining substitution into quoted terms
A substitution function takes as its arguments a quoted term or formula rA~l, a
quoted variable ru~l, and a term t:
sub(rAn, run, t)
However there is not just one such function (or even two: one for quoted terms and
one for quoted formulae) but an entire class, indexed over the sort of the variable to
be substituted in.
If the identifier for substitution is defined as 'sub', then the general schema of a
substitution application is
f'qform' /(j c, v
'subv ('qform','qvar',s> \ 1' 2' J3/
(where the sort of S3 is s) which in future is written, more readably,
Sub3(S^,S2,S3)
(and even the subscript s may be dropped for the sake of convenience).
However it is still necessary to define the behaviour for each term independently.
Remember from the last chapter that the behaviour was defined in terms of the cases
when the quoted variable did not occur free in the quoted formula (when the result
was an identity substitution), and normal form of a term of a sort otherwise. In the
following we will make use of the notation defined directly for C — the discussion
above and in previous chapters explains how this can be translated into s-expressions
of FSo so nothing is lost, and the exposition is clearer — and in fact we will pro¬
gressively introduce further abbreviations on top this; this merely reflects the way an
application is developed on a machine, where actual structure of the terms is hidden
so as to make the output easier to understand.
Equality statements in the language C are of the form <=>£>^'^(£1,^2) where s is
the sort of both tx and ta (in the rest of this section this will be abbreviated, for the
sake of legibility, to ti — t%).
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Now part of the behaviour of the substitution function can be defined as simply
the encoding of all instances of the basic sequent
r b Sub(rA"\ £) = rAn (SI)
(where A is a formula (term) of C, ivs is a quoted variable of sort s, and it is a term
of sort s, and under the condition that ivs does not occur free in A.
The axioms for substitution of quoted terms are as straightforward, since quoted
objects only ever come in normal form (there is no structure like >- (x), with a frees in
the middle) and so the specification of the appropriate instances of the basic sequent
is
T b sub(rAn, t) = rAn (SQ)
(where A is a formula (term), ivs is a variable, s is in {'qform', 'qterm', 'qvar'} and
£ is a quoted object of sort s). Here the formula (term) A' is A with £ substituted
for {va.
The only other form of substitution is for terms in arithmetic. Here there is one
sort of terms 'nat', one constant, 0, and one function succ(-). The latter two can be
written in C as (O,Zero)f^Nat'0 and (0,'succ')f^at^ (')> and are abbreviated from now
on to zero and succ(-).
Since zero is already in a suitable form (no substitution or normalisation will
change its structure at all) the definition of substitution for it is the same as above
for quoted terms
T b sub(rAn, ri^nat'n, zero) = rA'n (SNb)
where A is a formula (term), and A' is the formula (term) A with zero substituted
through for iv<nat>.
Then, finally, for terms succ(-), i.e., those that are explicitly the successor of
another term:
T b sub(rAn, ri^nat.n, succ(t)) = sub(rAn, r^<natT, £) (SNs)
where A is a formula (term), £ is a term of type 'nat' and A' is A with succ^v<nat>)
substituted through for iVtnat>.
The encodings of the definitions above then give the classes of sequents for sub¬
stitution Sic, SQC, SNt,c and SNsc-
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2.2 The diagonalisation lemma
Given just this facility, it is possible to prove the diagonalisation lemma. If A is a
formula which has only one free variable, and that variable is of sort 'qform', then
there exists another formula B for which it is provable that
b B <-> A(rBn)
I will only give a quick sketch of the proof [47] (a meta-level proof formalised in FS0
is not difficult):
Given a formula A, with only one free variable, define the following
rn = rA(sub<qform'(y,ry~\y)n
B = A(sub<qform>(m, ryn, m)
then
h B <-> A(sub<qform>(m, ryn,m)
<-> A(sub<qform'(rA(sub<qform>(y, ryn, y)"1, ryn,m)
<-» A(rA(sub'qform'(rn, ryn,m)n)
«-► A(rBn)
Substitution and the derivability conditions (which are discussed next) are then
enough between them to prove Lob's theorem for any theory built on these facilities.
2.3 A proof predicate
The next stage of the extension is adding a proof predicate. Defining this is not
difficult: simply take a distinguished predicate labeled with a new constant iprf
which takes one parameter of type 'qform'. This has the form:
<<qform'> / \
'pr/'P \ /
which is abbreviated in future to Pr(-). The rules for this are (as pointed out above)
slightly generalised from what is expected from the derivability conditions.
Implementing Reflection / 145
The rules








(Where t is a term of sort s. Notice how the variable ^vs has been 'recycled').
Conservatively extending the theory
It is now possible to describe the first conservative extension of the theory. Recall
that in §8 of the chapter on declaring a language, the basic theory of the language £
was defined as:
T(R) = X2(basicc, logicalrulesc U (R fl rulebc))
The first stage of the definition for the extended form is then
T+ (R) = T<i{basicc U SRc, logicalrulesc U (D1 c U R) fl rulebc))
where
SRc — (Sic U SQc U SNbc U SNsc U D2c U D3c) H rulebc
However, given that a particular instance R' is a ruleset for a theory that contains
PRA then T+'{R') is a conservative extension of T(R') since it adds only the Lob
derivability conditions and substitution. The next stage, which we hope is non-
conservative, is to take out the derivability conditions, and add the reflection schema.
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Adding reflection
Since it is possible to derive a contradiction using the first derivability condition and
the reflection schema together we must now extend T+ (R) to a theory which makes
the uniform reflection schema available while forbidding application of the derivability
condition. The reflection schema itself is of course an axiom, but it is made available
as a rule with no premises
UniRef r
Th Vivs(Pr(subfAflr.vsflivs))->A(ivs))
and the second stage of the reflection can be defined as:
T+ (R) = I2(T+ (R), logicalrulesc U UniRef c U (72 fT rulebc))
i.e., with the derivability conditions carefully removed.
§3 Conclusion
This has been a short chapter. It has shown how to extend the definition of a language
(specifically the language C) with quotation, substitution facilities, and how a proof
predicate can be defined on top of this. The shortness of the chapter itself is witness
that this is a straightforward operation.
Using Reflection
The work above describes a mechanism for adding quotation and a Lob proof pred¬
icate to a sorted first order theory. This chapter shows this mechanism being used
with the uniform reflection principle for the theory PRA of arithmetic. As defined
earlier, this is the theory of arithmetic with same axioms and language (i.e., only
the functions and predicates: succ(-), +, x and <) as Peano arithmetic but with
induction restricted to -formulae only (defined as the class sigmal c). So, if the
rules for these are defined in a class PRArulesc then we have essentially two theories,
the smaller is a conservative extension of the ordinary theory of PRA
PRAC = T+' {PRArulesc)
and the extended form
PRA+c = T+ (PRArulesc)
with the two connected together by the D1 c rule.
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§1 Course of values induction
It is well known that course of values induction is provable in primitive recursive
arithmetic (there is a proof of a similar theorem for FS0 itself, which is a conservative
extension of PRA, in this thesis). But, while an informal argument is not difficult,
a formal proof which corresponds to that argument is complicated and fiddly. On
the other hand, having extended PRA with a proof predicate and uniform reflection
(giving PRA+), a proof of the same proposition is short and direct.
1.1 Course of values induction
The simplest form of induction is called structural induction, and this is the sort that
is usually supplied as primitive in a theory. For instance, in PRA the induction rule
is:
T h P[zero/x\ A, P b P[succ(x) /x]
T, A b P
(where P is a SJ-formula); i.e., given that a property holds for the base components
of a sort and that, if it holds for the components of a object of a sort it holds for
the object itself, then it holds for all objects of the sort. This is though, is often
not the most directly useful induction rule to have. The induction rule that is more
often appealed to is what is known as 'course of values' induction, which instead of
considering the components of an object, considers the order defined as the transitive
closure of the structural relation. A form of this which is admissible in PRA is the
axiom schema
Va:(Vy(y < x —> A[y/x]) —» A) —» \/xA
(where A is a Sj'-formula in which y does not occur free). This schema is well known to
be admissible in PRA, but, while the proof is not tricky, it requires a lot ofmachinery
(the course of values theorem proven earlier shows the sort of list processing that is
needed in order to build this proof, but they are not available immediately in PRA
instead having to be built using the primitives supplied by basic arithmetic). So a
formal proof that it is the case would be a demanding task. The next section presents
a formal proof of a course of values schema which uses the extensions suggested here
to avoid this machinery and provide a simple meta-theoretic (in the sense of earlier
chapters) proof in the extended system.
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1.2 Formalising the schema
Course of values induction is a schema, not a theorem, so what is needed is a meta-
level proof that it is sound, rather than a proof of a particular theorem at the object
level. The particular statement then is the theorem
Va(a G sigmal c —> Vb(b G sigmal c —> \/x(x G rare —* Vy(y G varc —►
(y,a) G nfic —>• (y,a) G -» (a, a) G nbic ->
(Cow)
x ^ y —> (6, a, y,x) G subinc —>
rh V[x](V[y]([yJ < fx]] -> [&]) -» |aj) -»■ V[x]|a]n G PRA+))))
The class nbic is the class defining the relation between a term and a formula where
the term does not occur bound in the formula — it is defined:
nbic — tup (v, a)
where a = a-cnvp(v,a)
v G varc
a € wffc
This statement of the course of values schema is not particularly clear as it
stands. So from now on, I will work in the language of the declared theory directly
(in the same way as when presenting the prenex normal form theorem in chapter 5).
Rephrased in those terms (Cov) is the statement:
t~PRA+ Vx(Vy(y < x —> 6) —> a) —> Vxa (COV)
given that a and b are Sj-formulae, where y is not equal to x and does not occur free
in a and b = a[x/y], and neither x nor y occur bound in a.
1.3 Formal proof of course of values induction
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Supporting lemmas
The presentation of the proof (as well as the following proofs) makes use of two
lemmas, which we describe here.
The first lemma is:
^FS0Vx(x G varc —> Vy(y € varc —*
\/t(t G termc —» x ^ y —■> (IdSubl)
Va(a G wffc —> naisubp(y,x,a) = naisubF(t,x,naisubF(y,x,a))))))
I.e., that if a variable y has been (naively) substituted through a formula a for a:,
then trying to substitute (naively) something through for x subsequently is going to
be an identity operation. This follows by induction on a (over the structure of wffc).
The second lemma is:
^FS0^x(x G varc —■> Vy(y G varc
\/a(a G wffc (y,a) £ nfic (IdSub2)
naisubp(x,y,naisubF(y,x,a)) = a)))
which follows in the same way as the last, with induction over the structure of a
(though we have to make use of the fact that nfic is a decidable class here in order
to get the induction).
Now we can proceed with the proof of (COV). This depends on the lemma
t-pRA+ Va:(Va:(Vy(y < x -> b) -> a) -> Vy(y <&-+&)) (LlCOv)
as follows, taking care of the same meta-level issues as had to be treated with in the
proof of the prenex normal form theorem. First, (COV) is reduced to
Va:(Vy(y < x —> b) —> a) \~pra+ Vxa
Then cutting in (Llcov) the goal becomes
Va:(Va:(Vy(y < x —> b) —> a) —> Vy(y < x b))
Vx(Vy(y < a: —> 6) —> a)
hPiL4+ a
Using Reflection / 151
Now, observe that the formula
\~PRA+ Vx(Vy(y < x -»■ b) -> a) -> (Vy(y < x -> 6) -> a)
results immediately from the first hypothesis. Thus after a couple of proof steps (and
keeping the original first hypothesis), the goal reduces to
Vx(Vx(Vy(y < x —» b) —» a) —> Vy(y < x —> 6))
Vx(Vy(y < a; —> 6) —* a)
^PiL4+ Vy(y < x -> 6)
Then by substituting x for x in the first hypothesis we get the situation
Vx(Vy(y < x —+ 6) —a) —> Vy(y < x —> b)
Vx(Vy(y < x —> 6) —» a)
Vy(y < x -> 6)
and the goal follows easily.
Now what has to be proven is that
1*rPRA+ Vx(Vx(Vy(y < x -> 6) -» a) -> Vy(y < x -> 6))
Why this particular (sightly unusual) form of the lemma has been chosen is now
clear: it is possible to use UniRef c to reflect down as follows:
\~pra+ Pr(sub(r\/x(\/y(y < x —> b) —> a) —> Vy(y < x —» ft)"1, rxn, x))
and then, since the interior is a member of the class sigmal c, apply induction. This
gives two subgoals: the base case
bpra+ Pr(sub(rVx(Vy(y < x —> b) —» a) —> Vy(y < x —» 6)n, rxn, zero))
and the step case
Pr(sub(rVx(Vy(y < x —» 6) —> a) —> Vy(y < x —> 6)n, rx~1, x))
bpByl+ Pr(sub(rVx(Vy(y < x —■» 6) —» a) —> Vy(y < x —> 6)n, rx"1, succ(x)))
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The base case
This is easy to prove. First, by making use of the rule SNb, which allows us to show
that
sub(rVx(Vy(y < x -> b) —> a) -> Vy(y < x -> 6)n,V, zero)
= r(Vx(Vy(y < x —■> 5) —> a) —> Vy(y < x —» b)[zero /x])n
the goal reduces to
^'PRA+ Pr(r(\/x(\/y(y < x -> b) ->• a) ->• Vy(y < x -> &))[zero/x]n))
Then, making use of the rule D1 c it can be moved into PRA:
bpra (Vx(Vy(y < x -> 6) -*■ a) -+ Vy(y < x -* 6))[zero/x]
and by careful reduction of the substitution this reduces to
\~pra Vx(Vy(y < x —> b) —> a) —► Vy(y < zero —> (d1))
where
bf5o naisubp(zero,x^b) = d'
Then, by eliminating the implication in the goal, and throwing away the resulting
hypothesis, the goal becomes
*rpRA Vy(y < zero -» d'),
And, by removing the universal quantifier by making an identity substitution with y
so that it is possible take advantage of the fact that substitution for an identity is an
identity operation, and then eliminating the implication, the result follows (without
having to worry about the particular structure of d'):
y < zero \~pra t
y < zero bpra d'
bpra V < zero —> d'
bpra Vy(y < zero -> d'),
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The step case
The step case is more tricky. At the moment two different terms are being substituted
in, and before any progress can be made, this has to be reduced to one. However, by
the SNs rule:
sub(rVa:(Vy(y < x —» b) —> a) —■» Vy(y < x —> &)n, rxn, succ(x))
= sub(r(Va:(Vy(y < x —> b) —> a) —> Vy(y < a; —> 6))[succ(a:)/a:]~l, rxn, x)
and this can be used to replace the goal, so that the two instances of the proof pred¬
icate now do have the same term substituted in. Then, using the second derivability
condition, this is can be reduced to a requirement to show that
bpRA+Pr(suKr(^x(yy(y < x h) -*■a) -»■ Vy(y < x -»■b)) -*■
(Vx(Vy(y < x —> b) —» a) —> Vy(y < x —> b))[succ(x)/x]~*, rxn, a:))
Then this reflects up into PRA, using HI c, simply as
bPiL4(Va:(Vy(y < x -> 6) -»■ a) -> Vy(y < x -> 6)) ->
(Va:(Vy(y < a: 6) —> a) —■» Vy(y < x —> 6))[sitcc(a:)/a:]
Again, careful reduction of the consequent of the new goal is needed to get it into a
useful form:
Va;(Vy(y < x —+ b) —> a) —» Vy(y < succ(x) —> d)
(where bi?sD d = naisubp(succ(x), x, 6)) and then making use of IdSubl results in
Vx(Vy(y < a; —> 6) —■» a) —> Vy(y < succ(a:) —> b).
Then, by eliminating the implications, the goal is reduced to
Vy(y < x -> b)
Vx(Vy(y < x b) a)
t-pRA Vy(y < succ(a:) -»• 6).
And, since y does not appear free in the hypothesis list (y does not appear free in a
by the conditions in the theorem), it can be used to remove the universal quantifier
in the consequence, so the goal reduces again to
Vy(y < x -* b)
Va:(Vy(y < x —* b) —» a)
bPRA y < succ(x) -> b.
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Then by eliminating the implication in the goal and then applying the definition
of < to the resulting hypothesis, the problem reduces to analysis by cases since, by
the definition of <, either y < x or y — x.
The first case is proven simply by instantiating the first of the hypotheses (and
making use of the fact that identity substitution is an identity operation) to
y < x —>• b
and the result follows easily.
The second case is when x = y, and the result obtained by first instantiating the
second hypothesis with x to get
Vy(y < x —» b) —» a
then the antecedent of this can be eliminated against the other hypothesis, reducing
the problem to
a, x — y bpra b
and since x = y —> a —* a[x/y], the result follows easily.
1.4 Conclusions
This is a simple example of the sort of advantages a schematic reflexive extension,
supported by a capacity for formal meta-theory, can provide. In actual fact, this
theorem proves more than this, since the requirement that the formula used in the
induction be Sj is not actually used — the entire formula, regardless of its structure
disappears into a quoted term (or a substitution).
§2 A proof of termination of Ackermann's function
The classic example of a function for which there is no proof of termination in PRA
is Ackermann's function. So this is a perfect practical example of the strengthening
of PRA that is supplied by PRA+, and I present here a proof of its termination.
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2.1 Ackermann's function
Ackermann's (also sometimes, more accurately, known as Peter's function) function
is the standard example given of a function that is not primitive recursive (and
therefore, by a theorem of Mine and Parsons [59], not provably computable in PRA).
But it is more general than that: the prototype Ackermann function is an interpreter
for an enumerable class of recursive functions, and is defined as follows. If the set of
functions definable in a theory is enumerable, they can be formed into a list
/»(•),/l (■).•••./»(')./»+l(').-.•
and, using this list, the (proto) Ackermann's function Ackp(•, •) can be defined as
Ackp(i,x) = fi(x)
Then, using a simple diagonalisation argument, it is possible to prove that there is no
function fi(-) on the list that corresponds to Ackp(-, ■) (the fact that all the functions
on the list are unary, while Ackp(-,-) is binary, is not important: i.e., there is no
function on the list such that
fi(2x x 3y) = Ackp(x,y)
either). This result is usually given for PRA, which is one of the weakest theories
for which such a diagonalisation is possible, as an example of a function that is not
primitive recursive. But this is not the only theory where the argument works: it
can also be applied to the functions that can be defined in HA. It is closely related
to the halting problem, the incompleteness theorems, and other results.
The version just described is the 'prototype' version of the function. In most
textbooks it is encountered in a much simpler form specific to PRA, where the
independence properties are not at all obvious, and it is this form that we will now
describe and use.
The first thing to do is define a new predicate in C. This is done simply by
defining a new constant name lack\ using the new predicate Ack(-1, *2, -3) which will
be written in future <acj.'P<' m< ' '2, -3) Then the Ackermann function can
be defined in terms of the three defining conditions
A\
T \~pra Ack(0,y,succ(y))
Using Reflection / 156
A fpRA Ack(x,succ(zero),z)
r Ack(succ(x), zero, z)
(where A C T) and
T \~pra Ack(succ(x),y,w) A \~pra Ack(x,w, z)
A3
E \~pra Ack(succ(x),succ(y),z)
(where F,Ac E). It is possible to show, using a result of Mine and Parsons, that
f-pRA^x\/y3zAck{x, y, z)
However, in the extended theory PRA+ we have:
epra+ Vx\/y3zAck(x,y,z)
2.2 The encoding of Ackermann's function
The method of building in PRA the relation that specifies Ackermann's function is
technical and not really of interest here — the details can be found in any text on
mathematical logic which touches on recursion theory (e.g., [47]). Having decided
to leave out the details of the definition, there is the problem of how to make the
relationship available anyway. The way that this will be done is simply to use the
defining conditions above to extend the theory PRA.
So, if the derivability conditions above are encoded as a set of rules
Ackc = AlC U A2C U A3C
then we define the two theories
PRA[Ack]+' = T+'(PRArulesc U Ackc)
PRA[Ack]+ = T+(PRArulesc U Ackc)
Then the formal statement of the goal in FS0 is:
Efs0 rVxvs\/yvs3zvs Ack(xvs, yvs, zvsY G PRA[Ack}+ AT
(where x, y and £ are all distinct). Or, to adopt usual convention of this thesis and
write this simply in the object language,
EpRA[Ack]+ VxVydz Ack(x, y, z) AT
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2.3 The proof of Ackermann's function
The problem is then to show that At is a theorem. The goal is in a form so that it
is possible to make use of UniRef c immediately, so that the goal becomes
^PRA[Ack}+ Pr(sub(rVy3z Ack{x, y, z)"1, ra;n, a;))
and since the interior of this is quantifier free, it is now possible to apply induction,
reducing the problem to the two subgoals; the base case
I"PRA[Ack]+ Pr(sub(r\/y3z Ack(x, y, z)n, raT, zero))
and the step case
Pr(sub(r\/y3z Ack{x, y, z)n, rxn, x))
^PRA[Ack}+' Pr(sub(r\/y3z Ack(x, y, z)~rx~1, succ(x))).
The base case
The base case is dealt with first. By using the rule SNj, to simplify the substitution,
followed an application of D1 c, the goal becomes
hPRA[Ack}+' Vy3zAck(zero,y,z)
and this is proven simply by applying a right universal rule, to get
hPRA[Ack]+1 3zAck(zero,y,z)
and then z can be instantiated to succ(y), so that an appeal to the definition of A\
is all that is needed to finish off.
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The step case
The step case is slightly more involved, but again the first step is to simplify substi¬
tution in the goal (by removing the succ{-)), to get
Pr(sub(r\/y3z Ack(x, y, z)n, rxn, x))
hPRA[Ack]+' -Pr(sub(r(Vy3z Ack(x, y, z))[succ(x)/xp, rxn, x)).
then D2 and D1 c reduces this to
Vy3zAck(x,y,z) bpRA[Ack]+» Vy3z Ack(succ(x),y,z)
Now the goal is of the right form so that induction is allowed on y (it is quantified
over a Si -formula to give two subgoals: a base case
\/y3z Ack(x, y, z) bPRA^Ack^+t 3z Ack(succ(x), zero, z)
and a step case
\/y3z Ack(x, y, z), 3z Ack(succ(x),y, z) bpRArAck,+i 3z Ack(succ(x), succ(y), z).
The base case is proven by instantiating the y in the hypothesis to succ(zero),
removing the resulting existential (with the new variable z') and then instantiating
the existential in the consequent with z', resulting in
Ack(x, succ(zero), z') bPRA^Acfe]+< Ack(succ(x), zero, z')
which follows by appeal to A2.
The step case is proven as follows: first the existential hypothesis is eliminated,
to get
Vydz Ack(x, y, z), Ack(succ(x),y, z') pRA[Ack]+' Ack(succ(x), succ(y), z)
Then the y and the z in the other hypothesis are eliminated, the y is instantiated to
z\ so that the goal is now
Ack(x, z', z"), Ack(succ(x),y, z') bPRA^Ack^+i 3z Ack(succ(x), succ(y), z).
Finally, the existential in the goal is instantiated to z" and the result follows by
appeal to A3.
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§3 PRA+ contains PA
The two previous described results show that PRA+ is a considerably stronger theory
than PRA. In fact PRA extended with uniform reflection is equal to PA (see, for
example, §2.4.17 of [28], and [50]). The proof is quite easy to formalise using the
derivability conditions, so it is presented as the final example of proof strengthening
in this chapter.
3.1 Coding full induction
A proof that PRA+ is an extension of PA reduces to a proof that induction over
arbitrary formula follows in PRA+. The only version that is available in PRA is
A[0/a:] —* Mx(A —> A[succ(x)/x]) —■> WxA
where A is a Ej -formula. What the next section shows is that it is possible to delete
the side condition on A in the theory PRA+, which is what is required for PA. The
statement of the theorem in FS0 is as follows:
Va(a G wffc -> V6(6 € wffc -> Vc(c G wffc ->
Wx(x G varc —►
(.FI)
(b,a,succ(x),x) G subinc —> (c,a,zero,x) G subinc —>
[c] V|x]([a] [6]) -»VI# € PRA+cM
3.2 Proving the result
As usual, I will use the language of the encoded logic directly, since it is much easier
to follow the derivation then. The result that is to be shown is
bPRA+ c Vx(a —¥ b) —> Va:a (T1/)
(where b = a[succ{x)/x\ and c — a[zero/x\). And the proof follows from the lemma
hpRA+ \/x(c —* Vx(a —> b) —> a) (Llpi)
as follows. First the implications in the goal are eliminated, to get:
c, \/x(a —» b) hPRA+ \/xa. (A1/)
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Then by cutting in (Llpj), instantiating the goal and the lemma with x, and making
use of the fact that a identity substitution is an identity operation, the goal is reduced
to
c, Mx(a —►&),£:—»• \/x(a —> b) —> a \~pra+ a
Then the result follows by eliminating the implications in the lemma against what is
already on the hypothesis list.
This leaves the lemma (Llpi) to be proven. Again it is possible to use UniRef c
to reduce the goal to
bpra Pr(sub(rc —» \/x(a —> b) —> a"1, rxn, x)
Then this allows Si induction, which gives the base case
bpra+ Pr(sub(rc —» Vx(a —» b) —> a"1, rxn, zero)
and the step case
Pr(sub(rc —> \/x(a —> b) —> an, raT, ®))
bpiL4+ Pr(sub(rc —> Va;(a —> 6) —> a-1, ra:~1, succ(a;)))
The base case
The base case is proven as follows. After using the axiom for substituting zero into
a string an application of D1 c moves the goal into PRA as:
bpra (c —> Vx(a —> 6) —¥ a)[zero/x\
which by careful reduction (there are no free variables in zero, so there is no need for
alpha conversion) becomes
bpRA (c' -> Vx(a -» 6) -» a')
(where bpgo naisubp(zero,x,c) = c' and bps„ naisubp(zero,x,a)) = a'), however we
can show that bpso c' — c — a! since bpso c = r[a][zero/s]n = naisubp(zero,x,a)
and by making use of IdSub2, reducing the goal to:
bpRA c —> Mx(a —* b) —* c
and the result follows almost immediately.
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The step case
The step case also proceeds by the use of the rules for substitution into strings.
The first thing that needs to be done is to simplify the terms so that they are both
talking about substituting the same thing into a string. The rule for substitution of
successors, SNs, which says that
sub(rc —> Vx(a —>&)—» an, rx~l, succ(x))
= sub(r(c —> \/x(a —» h) —» a)[succ(x)/x]^, r£n, x)
and that, with D2c, and an application of Die simplifies the problem to
PRA (c —> \/x(a —■» b) —» a) —> (c —> Vx(a —> b) —■» a)[succ(x)/x\.
and by careful reduction the consequent of this can be shown to be equal to
c' —> Va;(a —» b) —» b'
(where bps0 c' — naisubp(succ(x),x,c) and bps0 b' = naisubp(succ(x),x,a)), and
then since it is possible, using IdSubl, to show that \~ps0 c — c' and \~ps0 b — b', can
be rewritten to
c —> Vx(a —> b) —> b
so that the goal becomes
bPRA (c -> Vx(a —> b) —> a) —► (c —> Vx(a —> 6) —»■ 6).
which reduces to
a, Vx(a —>• b) hp/L4 b.
Finally, instantiating the hypothesis with x, using the identity of identity substitution
and eliminating the implication using the a already on the hypothesis list, the result
follows.
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§4 The defined proof predicate in PRA
In the method above for adding a proof predicate Pr(-) to a theory, though Pr(-) is
syntactically an ordinary predicate, it is intended to be equivalent to a Ei-formula
with one free variable. So we need to be careful about what is a permissible in¬
duction. The usual definition of Si formulae for PRA is: arbitrary quantifier free
formula (i.e. possibly with negated sub-formulae) prefixed with existential quanti¬
fiers (compare the case with FSa — a conservative extension of PRA— where the
induction rule is carefully set up so that induction over quantifier free formulae with
negated subformulae is not possible). Now consider the case of a formula with nega¬
tive occurrence of the proof predicate as a subterm; in the extended theory as defined
we would be able to perform an induction, even though in its 'expanded' form the
formula would no longer be Si. So there is a possibility that what is supposed to
be a conservative extension (i.e., without the reflection schema) would actually be
non-conservative.
In the examples here the proof predicate always occurs only positively in for¬
mulae to which induction is applied. This does not dispose of the problem of non-
conservativity, but we point out that any non-conservativity that results if steps are
not taken to prevent induction over negated instances of the predicate, is anyway
going to prove only true sentences.
§5 Conclusions
This chapter has presented some small experiments in what is possible with a theory
that has been extended with a proof predicate defined using only the derivability
conditions. Three results were presented for the theory PRA extended using uni¬
form reflection. First a course of values schema was proven, then the definedness of
Ackermann's function for all inputs, and finally the extended system was shown to
contain PA.
The proofs are not difficult to build, and combine use of the proof predicate with
use of the meta-level facilities that have been discussed earlier, one facility supporting
the other. The examples also show that it is sufficient, at least for a theory such as
PRA for the proof predicate to be defined in this way, answering the question asked
in the last chapter.
Related Work
There has been quite a lot of work done on various aspects of formal meta-theory,
its applications, and theorem proving facilities based on reflection. This chapter
discusses the relationship of that work to this thesis. Related work can be separated
into sections as frameworks, meta-theory, meta-theoretic extension, reflection, and
miscellaneous other work.
§1 Trameworks
Frameworks divide into two contrasting traditions. The older of the two, that to
which FSo belongs, dates back to Post [64]. However it is the newer style, based on
ideas from type theory and lambda calculus, that have more often been used as the
basis for practical machines, and so it is against this other tradition that, if it is used
in practice, FS0 must be measured. Because of this, in this section I give an overview
of work that has been done in type theories, before looking at the Post tradition.
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1.1 Type theoretic frameworks
The commonest approach for framework theories that have been suggested for real
use, has been various systems of typed lambda calculus that have grown out of early
work of Church [15]. Probably the most notable efforts have been AUTOMATH and
the Edinburgh LF.
Automath
The usage of the word 'framework' in work on computer assisted formal reasoning
dates back at least to the AUTOMATH[12] project at Nijmingen, where it was used
to describe the type theories they used to encode formal languages and theories. The
ambition of the project was to develop a general system for encoding proofs which
they did by reducing the problem of proof checking to the problem of type-checking
in a weak type theory, exploiting the facilities of the associated lambda calculus to
make the treatment of bound variables easier. In this they were remarkably successful,
finally managing, as one example, to formalise a complete textbook on analysis [46].
They actually made use of several theories[20], with various different properties of
faithfulness.
The Edinburgh Logical Framework
The Edinburgh LF system[38], [39], was inspired by the AUTOMATH system only,
unlike the AUTOMATH languages, it seeks 'to keep a clear distinction between the
object- and meta-level, and seeks to handle proof checking for a wider class of systems'
§5[39]. The wider class of theories that it can deal with includes Hoare logics, various
lambda calculi (including the LF itself), and modal logics, all of which have been
implemented in it.
One particularly interesting point about the LF is that it is a very weak logic
(proof theoretically equivalent to the simply typed lambda calculus), and not capa¬
ble of the sorts of meta-theoretic extensions that are described in this thesis. This
weakness is deliberate on the part of the designers; it means that the proof theory
is tractable, and so it is possible to develop other sorts of tools for it (such as, for
instance, unification [65]).
There are several weaknesses of the LF that are not the result of tradeoffs against
other advantages somewhere else though. Encoding a modal or temporal logic, for
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instance, is not a particularly simple matter; the construction of a correct encoding
will require a user to have specialist knowledge of type theory and the proof theory
of the logic — and the result will not particularly resemble the normal presentations
of those theories. (E.g., the presentation of 54 in [5] bears little resemblance to what
is found in the standard texts such as [45]). Thus it is not, in general, possible for a
typical user to take a presentation and formalise it in the system.
A second weakness is that some theories encountered in practice just do not
encode very well. For instance it is not at all clear how one would go about encoding
a system such as PRA which has classes of functions with different arities (as it is
presented in [47]) so as to be useable.
Nuprl and, the Calculus of Constructions
The theories of AUTOMATH and the LF are designed as logics in which it is possible
to encode the proofs of a logic effectively. There has also been work on using more
powerful type theories such as the Calculus of Constructions (CC) or intuititionistic
type theory, which are really designed to be 'foundational', in the same manner.
Since LF is a weakening of CC, it is possible to do the same sorts of things in CC.
However it is necessary to take care to ensure that the encoding of a logic is faithful,
because CC is so powerful.
Recently other work has been done by Basin and Howe in [10] on showing that
the particular flavour of ITT used in the Nuprl PDS can be used in the same manner
as LF.
1.2 Post style systems
As was said earlier, these constitute the earliest tradition of investigations into the
idea of an abstract theory for encoding the derivable sentences of a theory, and that
to which FS0 belongs.
The two major presentations are found in Post's work of the first part of this
century [64], and Smullyan's thesis [73], which both use the idea of strings. However
neither of these systems are very 'practical', since strings, while they are a simple
data structure, are not an efficient one to implement. Further, neither of the theories
develop the idea of formal meta-theory. The reason for this is that their designers
were interested in the theory of the language— it never occurred to them that anyone
would be interested actually using a language after it had been declared in the theory.
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The other related work in this area does not explicitly discuss what could be
called frameworks, but is definitely an important influence: Godel's results on the
incompleteness of theories[36]. This shows that a theory like PA (or PRA) can be
used to describe a theory and further, that it is possible to perform substantial meta-
theory in such a system. However Godel's encoding could not, by any stretch of the
imagination, be described as practical, even in comparison to Post and Smullyanb
PX and the 'Theory of symbolic expressions'
As a footnote to this discussion on 'Post style' frameworks we should mention two
other systems than FS0 that are based on ideas taken from Lisp: the PX (Pro¬
gram extractor) system of Hayashi and Nakano [40], and the Theory of symbolic
expressions of Sato [82],
PX is a system based on a constructive theory of Feferman called To. The the¬
ory has the same 'flavour' as FS0; i.e., it is second order, has similar pairing and
projection functions, and a carefully controlled form of comprehension. It is much
more powerful though; Sieg proposes it as a system in which to develop parts of
intuitionitic analysis. Instead of a second order primitive recursive combinator for
instance, it makes the general S and K combinators available, along with compre¬
hension for general first order formulae (with second order parameters). The system
is described in detail in [24],
Hayashi and Nakano propose, and implement, a system amalgamating a logic
developed from To and a dialect of pure Lisp. The result is an untyped theory
specially designed for extracting Lisp programs from proofs via what they call px-
realisability. In their approach they try to separate, as much as possible, the work
of verifying termination of functions from other correctness properties; i.e., they
introduce a form of Markov's principle via a modal operator working as a double
negation connective, that can be eliminated only when it is applied to what they call
rank 0 formulae: those they deem to have no computational content.
Their system is better described as a foundational, rather than a framework,
theory, since it is designed for doing mathematics directly, not for formalising other
theories and then working with them. However, in the same way as Basin and Howe
showed that it is possible to use a 'foundational' theory such as Nuprl as an LF style
framework, it should also be possible to use PX as a F-style framework, using its
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facilities for defining inductively defined classes. In fact in their book they develop
a simple example meta-theorem: a tautology checker for propositional logic. But
this is for propositional logic and does not need a binding mechanism — they do
not discuss further applications, or how the application could be developed. One can
argue against using PX rather than FS0 as a framework in the same way one can
argue against CC rather than LF: it is more complicated than necessary. Of course
one could also reply to this by pointing out that stronger induction arguments are
possible than in FSQ, but since few syntactic arguments (with the obvious exception
of consistency proofs) need this, the extra power does does not, in practice, seem to
be important.
The work of Sato has a different flavour from that of Hayashi and Nakano. In
his work Sato presents a formal theory of s-expressions that is, again, suggestive of
the theory FS0, and argues for this as a general system for finite mathematics — an
area in which he includes formal systems. In fact he explicitly relates his work to
that of Smullyan, and it is very much in that tradition.
However, Sato does not discuss the practical issues related to doing mathematics
or metamathematics in his framework. All the proofs that he presents are informal
proofs about his theory (i.e., the same sort of proofs as Post or Smullyan would
attempt). In fact, it is not clear how one could do general metamathematics (e.g.,
the normalisation theorem described here) in the theory since there is no induction
available over the structure of a declared class. On the other hand, doing mathematics
in a declared theory is clearly possible, and the facilities that he describes would
provide a very powerful tactic language. He does not look at the issues that are raised
by a full implementation of substitution; the substitution facility that he defines does
not treat quantifiers, and so does not have to deal with problems such as, for example,
alpha-conversion.
Perhaps the most interesting part of Sato's work, from the current perspective,
is not so much that he presents a candidate for a framework theory, but that he
uses it to develop a hneta-circular^ description for his theory in the same manner as
McCarthy does for pure lisp in [56]. It would be interesting to see this developed
further either in the direction of self-referential programming languages like Smith's
3-Lisp, or theoretical self-reference such as Godel's work — the paper only goes as
far as arguing that the definition of eval has the required properties.
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§2 Metatheory as an end in itself: The work of Shankar
bl
Shankar's doctoral work [Q%] was a proof, using the Boyer-Moore theorem prover
(.Nqthm), of the Church-Rosser theorem for the lambda-calculus. This is in some
ways comparable with the work described above (the logic of Nqthm is, like FS0,
based on a theory of lists — in fact Feferman has suggested that a reworking of the
same proof would be a good test of how FS0 compares). However the work differs
in other ways; Shankar is interested in how his proof improves understanding of the
original informal proof, not in using it as a tool for reasoning in the lambda calculus.
The most impressive aspect is the scale of the theorem: it is a major result,
and the proofs are long and difficult (the proof that he verifies is by Martin-Lof, and
uses a lot of case analysis, which machines are good at). But while this is the most
impressive, it is not the most relevant part of the work: he has to treat the same
problem of how to handle bound variables as we do. After trying, and failing, to
build the proof using a Church style, he adopted a de Bruijn style which he found
more tractable. Afterwards, he was able to return to his original version and, using
what he had learned, successfully prove parts of that. The same problems with bound
variables were not encountered in the work presented here, and it is not reqally clear
why this is so, but we believe that in part it was because we were able, in a natural
way, to decompose the proof into two pieces, with the problems involving bound
variables removed from the more complex parts of the proof, to be treated separately.
§3 Meta-theoretic extension
The work described in the last section is related, but not maybe the most relevant.
A lot of work done on meta-theory as a tool to an end: to make a theorem proving
system faster, or easier to use. The first paper on this was Davis and Schwartz [21],
but this was speculative; the first practical work was by Boyer and Moore. This has
since been built on by, for instance, workers in the Nuprl group and others.
3.1 Davis and Schwartz
Davis and Schwartz in [21] in 1979 suggested a completely general theorem proving
system based on a powerful set theory, which would have a distinguished subtheory
designed for doing metatheory, and the metatheoretic results could then be exploited
to customise the environment of a PDS to be more suitable for particular purposes.
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They argue, in the same way as here, that a meta-theoretic facility is necessary
for a PDS that is able to follow the development of a proof as a mathematician
would construct it. Further, that current PDSs, on the whole, did not allow the '[...]
strong metamathematical component which is used to expand the rules of proof once
theorems which (informally) justify such expansion have been proved'.
3.2 Meta-theoretic extension of the Boyer-Moore theorem prover
The first practical (and convincing) work done on meta-level extensions to a proof
development system was by Boyer and Moore to their system Nqthm[17] which is a
system for proving statements about a form of Pure Lisp (and therefore resembling,
at least to some extent, FS'„). This work is described at length in [18]. Nqthm relies
heavily on lemmas (these are provided as 'hints' about what is needed in the proof),
rather than a tactic based interface: the user needs to provide a suitable set of these
hints that the system can prove as a preparation for tackling the main theorem. This
approach has been very effective in practice and has been used to generate formal
proofs of very substantial theorems (like the Shankar work described above). The
reason that a meta level facility was added to the logic is related closely to this
approach to automated proof. The lemma mechanism that Nqthm is equipped with
suffers from the typical drawbacks of PDSs (i.e., it does not allow schematic results
to be used); a particular problem in a system so dependent on its lemma mechanism.
The particular example they discuss is the problem of cancelling arbitrary terms in
arithmetic; e.g.,
T\~b + c = q + j + k
T\rb + c + i-\-x = (a-\-i-\-j) + k-\-x
This is an obvious and simple manipulation to do at the meta-level (simply make
bags of each side of the expression, find the intersection, and delete that from both
bags), and it is equally easy, at that level, to state that such a transformation is
truth preserving. On the other hand, there is no way that the general principle can
be stated as a lemma (in a form that the lemma mechanism can record).
This does not render their system unuseable, since it is always possible to identify
the particular instances that are needed, and add them to the list of preparatory
'hints' to be proved individually. But it is certainly a difficulty, since the more
instances that have to be explicitly supplied, the more work is involved for the user
and the less claim there is to be doing automatic theorem proving.
Related Work / 170
To keep the lemma approach uniform, they suggest that it would be possible to
extend the idea, so that instead of storing pieces of text it should be possible to store
whole classes of wffs as lemmas — in other words, to use meta-theorems.
This means that it is necessary to install code so that the class can be recognised,
and this, as they point out immediately, creates a serious problem: modifying the
code of the theorem prover is a dangerous activity which could introduce inconsistency
into the logic—they cite the semantic attachment facility in FOL[79] as a particular
example of a system which runs this risk:
'Perilous acts, while perfectly legitimate in the hands of a careful implemen-
tor, are to be considered illegal in the hands of careless users.'
Conveniently though, Nqthm is itselfwritten in Lisp so the problem is one of avoiding
coding errors in Lisp; a problem that Nqthm is itself a perfect tool for solving.
So that it is possible to exploit the work done in the system to expand the
theory, they do two things. First they define an isomorphism between their brand
of Pure Lisp and a small subset of Interlisp; secondly, they add two new functions
to the logic, FORMP, which is a test for well formedness, and MEANING, which is a
function that takes a wff and an environment and returns the meaning of the wff in
that environment (essentially a parametrised 'eval' function). These allow a user to
prove that a rewrite function preserves meaning. Thus, if a meta level function called
CANCEL is defined, to represent the class of rules of which (1) above is a particular
instance, then if the theorem prover can demonstrate that:
(FORMP X) ->
(MEANING X A) = (MEANING (CANCEL X) A) A (FORMP (CANCEL X))
(where A is an arbitrary environment), then CANCEL translated into Interlisp can then
be installed as a class of lemmas to be applied whenever an equivalence is found.
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3.3 Meta-level facilities in Nuprl
Another substantial piece of work, quite closely related to the work described in
the last section is that of Knoblock with the Nuprl PDS under Constable. This is
documented in [48] and [49]. In fact in the first paper, two methods are described,
but in the later thesis, this has been reduced to one, the other having apparently
been abandoned (according to Howe in the in the first chapter of [44]) because the
proof theory became just too difficult".
The central idea that this work explored was that, since the logic that Nuprl
implements corresponds closely to the lambda calculus, it should, in principle be
possible to replace the informal programming language (meta-language) used for
writing tactics in the system ML with a formal meta-theory which is simply another
copy of the the object-level theory, only (conservatively) extended with facilities for
reasoning about the structures of Nuprl style proofs. This work is described in the
dissertation [49]: he describes his encoding and demonstrates how it is possible to
synthesise tactics similar to those currently written in ML in the Nuprl programming
language. This is, of course, not interesting by itself, since programming in Nuprl
is more tricky than programming in ML, but he also examines the fundamental
advantage of meta-level reasoning: that once a tactic has been formally verified,
there is actually no reason to run it, it is enough to ensure that the 'pre' and 'post'
conditions that define it are satisfied.
One interesting part to this work is that since he is interested in doing away
completely with the ML programming language, he has to consider how to deal with
the inevitable property of most tactics, that not only are they not guaranteed to
succeed, but that intrinsically they cannot be guaranteed to succeed (what he terms
'search' tactics). These can be thought of as corresponding to meta-theorems with
underspecified pre-conditions, or 'modal' meta-theorems, i.e., those that state that
such a such a post condition might hold given such and such a pre-condition. This is
a hard problem, and one that has been barely touched on. His suggestion is rather
ad-hoc, he essentially gives the type of such a tactic as being crossed with a 'fail'
type, so that if it does not succeed, the tactic will return something like the raised
exception of ML. In this case of course, it is necessary actually to run the tactic that
corresponds to the specification, and even the specification type is weak, since it can
be satisfied by a function that always fails; there is no 'whenever possible' connective
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to narrow it down.
Knoblock and Constable also suggest in [48] that it should be possible to get a
partial reflection result for the Nuprl type theory, where reflection up to any particular
universe level holds. This is an ambitious but reasonable result which corresponds to
the results for Peano Arithmetic and Zerinelo-Frasnkel Set Theory: local reflection
for any finitely axiomatisable sub theory of either is provable"1. Howe in his thesis
suggests that this work has been abandoned, due to difficulties in getting formal
proofs of the right results (because of the intractable nature of the proof theory), and
certainly it does not feature in Knoblock's thesis except in the following:
'.. .based on stratified internal evaluation functions. Although it contains
some interesting aspects, it is deemed too complicated and cumbersome for
practical use. [49]'
But, while this work was itself deemed to a dead end, it has laid the foundation for
some of the current work on reflection at Cornell, which is discussed below.
3.4 Meta-level reasoning in the Calculus of Constructions
There has also been some work done in Edinburgh, both positive and negative, in
the area of meta-level extensions to a declared theory by using results about the
meta-theory to extend the object theory; this is documented in [52] and [76].
Pollack has produced in [52], as an example in the Lego system, a proof of the
deduction theorem for a minimal logic declared in CC by using CC as a metalogic.
Interestingly he has provided a proof that—for his formulation of the logic—LF is
too weak to prove it (this is a particular instance of the statement, in [38], that
induction over proofs is impossible in general).
Paul Taylor has also produced a short report [76], which expands this work
with discussions about how to extend an algebraic theory (semi-groups) with new
axiom schemas which correspond to a normal form tactic and an equivalence decision
procedure; but this work has not been developed beyond one short note on a meta-
theorem for algebras (this resembles, to an extent, both the work of Boyer and Moore
described above, and that described below, from [44]).
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§4 Conclusions
The work by Boyer and Moore treats essentially the same idea of meta-theory as a
tool to an end as is discussed in the first part of this thesis. However the approach
that they take is dependent very much on the contingency that the language of their
theorem proving system is a fragment of the implementation language, also, the meta-
level facilities they supply do not provide access to the full proof theory of the system.
The work described here, on the other hand, allows arbitrary object theories, which
can be extended with any result that is provable in primitive recursive arithmetic.
The Knoblock approach is slightly more distant, and complementary: our work
discusses how to go about replacing tactics with meta-theorems, but does not deal
with the sort of tactics with behaviour that cannot be satisfactorily formally specified.
This necessarily includes the sort of powerful search tactics that are used to try to
automate, as opposed to assist, proof construction.
§5 Work on reflection
With the idea of a framework theory in hand, the next step of exploring the possi¬
bilities offered by variations on the idea of reflective extension has been explored by
various workers in the past (the investigations have even spilled over into the area of
programming languages). This next section looks at ideas that are connected with
the idea of reflection as it might be applied to a PDS, while more tangentially related
work is discussed in the following section.
5.1 Weyhrauch's 'Prolegomena' and FOL
Weyhrauch's was one of the earliest investigations into self-reference in a theory and
his ideas are developed in the very influential paper [79]. In this he outlines a PDS
(called FOL) for doing mathematics in an arbitrary first order theory. The discussion
in the paper is divided into two parts. The first outlines a concept of a simulation
structure; this is a way to attach functions and values to symbols in the language, so
that it is possible, instead of reasoning using the rules in the theory, to appeal to the
semantics defined by the code instead. For instance, given a proposition 2 + 3 = 5', it
would be possible to appeal to the rules defining the connective '+', to prove that this
equality is true; but it would also be possible to use the function semantically attached
to to add the values attached to '2' and '3' together directly. This is exactly
Related Work / 174
the sort of meta-level facility discussed in Abrahams' paper on the 'Proofchecker'
program[l]. However, it is also the facility criticised by Boyer and Moore (discussed
above) as dangerous in the hands of 'careless users'.
The second part of the paper is where the concept of two theory reflection rules
are introduced (similar in some ways to the idea of meta-theoretic reasoning discussed
in this thesis)
T hTl A b~t2 Pr(rT bTl Ay
bT2 pryr bTl ay rbTl a
in a theorem proving system as a way to extend its power by shortening proofs, and
so that classes of lemmas (like Boyer and Moore discuss) are possible, instead of just
single instances.
Finally, the concept of self reflection as a possible way to avoid the tower of meta
theories by having a theory declared in the system that is a formal description of the
system itself is introduced. This can raise problems: he points out the possibility of
asking 'embarrassing questions' of the system when it is engaged in self-referential
sorts of reasoning that do not give consistent answers. Interestingly, though, this is
not regarded as a unqualified bug: it is suggested that these facilities will help a user
to deal effectively with the problems that a non-monotonic, or even an inconsistent,
logic might raise. Some of this work was suggested as part of papers that would
appear in the future, but there has been little work published since on the subject.
The GETFOL project
More recently though, FOL has been given a new lease of life in research directed
by Giunchiglia, which merges some of the ideas above, such as using the theorem
prover to extend its own implementation with new code[32], [9], and also explores
ideas in multilanguage systems such as Weyhrauch and Perlis [62], [63], suggest [31]
(the subtitle of this significantly even evokes the subtitles of Perlis' papers on the
subject).
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5.2 Howe's work on reflection
Howe's work is reported initially in [44] where it makes up the third part of his
thesis. Again, it is closely related, as a generalisation, to the work of Boyer and
Moore reported in [18]. However, since he is working in Nuprl, he is able to take
advantage of an enormously more powerful logic. The original reason for the work
was as preparation for formalising Bishop's work on analysis, where a lot of results
of an obviously metatheoretic nature occur. The example he cites is the theorem:
'if f(x) is built only from x, +, x, ... then / is continuous'
which has an obvious meta level character. Essentially, he develops a set of facilities
for reflecting certain classes of algebraic expressions inside the theory and, with this,
it is possible to make use of the same sorts of meta-theoretic results as Boyer and
Moore achieve, only without going out of the logic.
Two functions are defined to enable this to be done
Type G (Ha G Environment ■ (Term(a) —» Set))
and
Val G (Ha G Environment • Tit G Term(a) ■ Type(a)(t))
where Type and Val correspond quite closely to the functions FORMP and MEANING
in the Boyer-Moore work. The first thing to notice is that the versions here have
an extra parameter, the environment, which allows a great deal more flexibility than
in the earlier work, while keeping it as a conservative extension inside one system,
unlike the Boyer-Moore work.
The system works as follows: if the current goal of the system is T b t then
application of a special tactic LiftUsing with an environment a generates a subgoal
Val(a')(T), a' : 53,... b Val(a')(rV)
(where E is the type of environments, and the ellipsis denotes the hypotheses that
show that a' is a well formed extension of a that takes account of the variables in t);
the other (well-formedness) subgoals will have been automatically disposed of. The
second application of Val here reduces to a term equivalent to t, the change is that
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now it is possible to apply functions to rf~l in a way that allows Boyer-Moore style
meta level reasoning, i.e., The proof obligations become
Type(a)(rt'1) = Type(<j)(/(rfn)) in Set
and
Val(c7)(rtn) = Va/(<j)(/(rtn)) in Type(a)(rt~l).
One significant point is the admission, after discussing using Nuprl in a way
similar to LF, that:
'... the reflection mechanism will encompass the quantifier-free portion of
the logic'
in other words there are definite limits to the power that the approach gives.
5.3 Current work on reflection at Cornell
Current work on reflection at Cornell is exploring several directions. One of these is
new work by Howe, which considers how it might be possible to reflect truth inside
type theory. The other direction follows up on the work of Knoblock and Howe
reported in [48], [49] and [44]. The most recent paper is [3] which is a second attempt
to do what was suggested in [48]; i.e. to reflect, conservatively, the structure of Nuprl
in itself.
The result mentioned in [48], that reflection up to some particular universe holds,
is no longer an issue in this paper; instead a quite elegant theory of the structure of
a proof system that uses indexed proof predicates, and this theory is shown to be a
conservative extension of the proof structure of Nuprl.
How it is done
A conservative reflection rule is obtained here, instead of by stratifying the universe
level, by stratifying the applications of the proof predicate. That is, the proof predi¬
cates are indexed over the natural numbers, and recognise only proofs that use proof
predicates with a lower index than themselves. One of the minor points about this
is that, apart from the hypothesis that there is a tactic that justifies the step (the
first on the hypothesis list), there is no restriction on what is an acceptable rule in
the subgoal deductions, i.e., the general form of a reflective inference rule is:
h Pn (r FlhAl rhA £i b Ai ... Tn b An
r b a
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where Pr-j(-) is a proof predicate for proofs which exploit reflection at levels less
than i. It is then possible to prove that this is conservative with respect to the the
unextended theory, by induction on the index of the proof predicate.
Several applications for this facility are mentioned in the paper: the usual speed¬
up effects due to knowing that a tactic will succeed, polymorphism in theorems
that make use of universe types, (interestingly) defining more efficient evaluation
mechanisms for subclasses of expressions, e.g., by detecting when destructive updates
are possible in the evaluation, etc.
5.4 Reflecting truth
Complementary to the notion of reflecting provability, is the notion of reflecting
truth. Several significant papers have been published on this approach, mostly from
a theoretical point of view.
Mendler and Aczel's LTC
In their paper [58], Mendler and Aczel consider several points. The title of the paper
(The notion of Framework and a framework for LTC) would seem to suggest that
it should be discussed above in the section on framework theories. However, they
intend a different interpretation of the word 'framework' that is much closer to what
is described earlier as a foundational theory. They suggest that a PDS should be
developed from the begining with the idea that it should be 'open-ended': new ideas
and new facilities should be easily added to the system.
They propose an example of such a system, based on Aczel's work on Frege
structures [2]. The system is stratified, with the base level containing only predicate
logic and simple ideas of arithmetic. Then each higher level of the system corresponds
to the one below with its semantics reflected into itself. The limit of this is what
they call (in their paper) T4, with language L±\ the base language extended with the
quoted syntax, and particularly the reflection predicates for all the layers of reflection
below it. The major distinction between LTC and what is described in this work
is obviously that they discuss reflecting the semantics of the logic, rather than the
proof theory. But the resulting effect is similar, i.e., a stronger logic developed by
applying a form of self-reference.
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Feferman's work on truth
Feferman has recently published work[26] that stands quite close to that of Mendler
and Aczel above. Unlike his earlier work on proof theoretic reflection principles
and iterated (transfinite) extensions of theories, here he discusses the implications of
reflecting truth, and avoiding progressions of theories.
The paper discusses two general mechanisms for creating the reflective closure
of a theory using a truth predicate, and an unusual notion of a 'schematic theory',
which is used to provide a particularly powerful form of such a closure. The second
half then considers the strength of these extensions. The central result here is that
that the schematic form of the reflective closure of PA is equivalent to the theory
RAr0 of ramified analysis with induction up to To, which is equivalent to predicative
arithmetic. The paper also shows that the sorts of uniform (and therefore also local)
reflection principles discussed above, in the chapter on the theory of reflection are
provable in a logic extended this way.
5.5 Perils' work on quotation
Finally, Perlis' work is also directly relevant: in two articles [62] and [63] he has
looked at what is achieveable in first order logic given quotation facilities and minimal
supporting facilities for substitution and the like. His work is intended as a reply to
Montague [60], who argued that modal logics were necessary in order to deal with
various intensional concepts.
Perlis deals mostly with problems related to first order doxastic and alethic logics
(which makes it in some ways related to Feferman's work), but it also discusses the
implications of machinery similar to what is proposed in previous chapters of this
work, as a way of working with predicates that capture some notion of truth or
belief.
5.6 Conclusion
The work on reflection in formal theories is clearly diverse. The work that is most
closely related to what is described here is perhaps Weyhrauch's in that it discusses
ideas related to both meta-theoretic extension (his notion of two theory reflection)
and reflection in the sense that is discussed here (i.e., reflecting the idea of provability.
However, he is also unconcerned with the soundness of his reflection principles, which
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must count as a weakness, regardless of the gloss that he places on them. The other
work that is clearly closely related is the Feferman approach of reflecting truth, which
uses the same sort of 'style' of approach, though adding a truth predicate where we
add a proof predicate. Feferman's work however is purely theoretical, whereas we are
concerned with the practical issues involved (nevertheless we cannot help but admit
that the results he achieves are dramatic and substantial).
§6 Other forms of meta-level and self-referential reasoning
As well as the work that is described in the sections above there is also a considerable
amount of work that is less closely connected but, none the less, relevant.
6.1 Reflection in Lisp
Possibly the most interesting work that deals directly with the way that self refer¬
ence can be exploited in a programming language, and certainly the most cited and
influential, has been Smith's work on self-reference in (procedural) programming lan¬
guages; specifically the language '3-lisp', which he designed, and which he describes
in great detail, at great length, and with associated metaphysics, in his thesis [70] (a
more concise description can be found in [71]).
Lisp is an unusual language, and one of its facilities from the beginning has been
a facility for primitive self reference, in the form of eval and funcall, which allow
self-referential, and self-modifying, code to be written™. Smith's idea was to extend
these primitive self-referential facilities to be more sensible. For instance, instead of
the the standard notion of how a function application is executed (i.e., LAMBDA) a
function application takes the current environment and continuation as well. Since
these are made explicit in the system, the programmer is able to write functions that
manipulate the environment itself, before passing the result on to an extended version
of EVAL. This gives a programming language that has a great deal of (perhaps too
much?) expressive power, and means that it is possible, in the same way as suggested
in [16], to add various powerful control structures to the language. This could be
considered the equivalent of the speedup results for formal theories. Of course, since
a programming language such as Lisp is already 'Turing complete', extending it in
such a way will not make it stronger in any formal sense. But Smith argues that
once the reflection facilities have been exploited to design the new language facilities,
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programs can be much shorter and more understandable than they otherwise would
be.
A problem with Smith's approach is that perhaps it allows too much flexibility
for a sensible programming language. In the light of this it could be argued that
the logic programming approach is better, in that it places more restraints on what
the programmer can do — whatever search strategy the programmer supplies to the
proof predicate, it has, in the end, to produce a valid derivation; there are very few,
if any, restrictions on what is allowed to a programmer in 3-Lisp.
6.2 Meta-level reasoning in Prolog
Work on meta-level reasoning that sits on the boundary between logic and program¬
ming languages is that by Bowen and Kowalski on how meta-level reasoning can be
exploited in a programming language like Prolog [16]. They consider how to extend
the facilities of a logic programming language by taking the usual language inter¬
preter as the meta-level, and having an object-level interpreter Pr(-i,-2) built on
top of this. This way the object theory can be thought of as the query language for
the data-base that is the Prolog system, while the meta-level is the language used
to 'maintain' or modify the database, and even to modify such things as the search
strategy.
The most interesting thing about their paper though, is the second part, where
they attempt to 'amalgamate' the object and the meta language so that it is possible
to communicate between the meta and object levels freely using rules like those that
Weyhrauch suggests in [79]. Of course, since they are discussing logic programming,
they restrict their theory to to the logic of pure Prolog rather than the whole of first
order logic, and consistency problems are left to the user. The work is clearly related
to, though not worked out in the same datail as, the work of Smith described above,
and could be used for the same effects.
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6.3 Conclusions
The work on reflection in programming languages nicely complements formal work on
reflection. Clearly ideas on self reference in programming languages are being used,
and therefore need to be treated formally. Further, Smith in particular argues (with
convincing examples) that his informal reflection is a powerful way of improving the
expressiveness of a programming language, which supports what is argued here, that
reflection offers powerful ways of extending formal reasoning systems.
Notes
i. In fact, one of the reasons that Feferman gives explicitly in [25] for designing
FS0 in the form he describes it is to provide a tool that would allow a full formal
proof of the second incompleteness theorem in a theory comparable to PRA
ii. It is interesting to note that there is a reference to what became [49] in the
bibliography of [48] as 'Formal Metamathematics and Reflection in Type Theory'
though it was later issued without any reference to reflection in the title.
iii. The result for PA can be found in [28] and for ZF in [60].
iv. This facility is not unique to Lisp; COBOL has also been equipped with a self-
modification facility since its earliest days, and in comparison to that, even the
facilities that the original Lisp 1.5 supplied are by no means primitive. However,
COBOL programmers nowadays are very strongly discouraged from making any
use of even this small facility, which remains in the standard for the sake of
backwards compatibility and is not regarded by most people as A Good Thing
[66].
Conclusions and Further Work
This thesis has presented a series of experiments to assess how practical it is to exploit
meta-level techniques in mechanised formal reasoning. The thesis as a whole can be
divided up into three parts: the experiments in meta-level reasoning, the experiments
in reflection, and an assessment of the theory FS0 in which the experiments were
performed. These can be thought of as a common foundation and two 'annexes'. In
this chapter I will summarise the work and discuss what can be concluded from each
of these three parts. And finally, I consider what further work might be pursued.
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§1 Meta-level reasoning
The purpose of this part was to examine how effective, and how practical, it is
to construct meta-theorems that could be useful in the ordinary process of proof
construction. I present three examples, constructed in different theories. First, the
deduction theorem was proven in a small presentation of propositional logic, from
Shoenfield; secondly, a version of the prenex normal form theorem was proven for a
sequent calculus presentation of sorted first order logic; thirdly, the beta reduction
rule for a presentation of the untyped lambda calculus is replaced with an equivalent
which is explicitly recursive. The first two are the sorts of results that might be
encountered in a logic textbook, while the third is perhaps more directly associated
with practical problems of machine implementation of a theory.
1.1 The experiments
The deduction theorem
As an example of how a meta-level theorem can be used to reduce the amount of
effort needed to construct a proof, the version of the deduction theorem presented
here is by far the most dramatic. The theorem itself admits a simple constant time
transformation of the goal. However if instead of using the theorem, an attempt is
made actually to construct the corresponding proof, then in a reasonable practical in¬
stance literally thousands of proof steps will have to be taken, and the proof will grow
to impractical proportions. Clearly meta-theory provides an enormous advantage in
this case.
The prenex normal form theorem
This is an example of the sort of derived rule that a user might want to prove in
practice: a syntactic transformation of a formula into a canonical form where it can
be manipulated more easily and automatically, in a presentation (sequent calculus)
that is likely to be encountered in practice. Here there is not the same sort of
dramatic speedup over a tactic as in the deduction theorem above supplied, but
still a substantial improvement is possible, since while the operation has the same
complexity, it is by way of direct syntactic transformation, rather than as a side effect
of complicated proof construction. Also, unlike with a tactic, the transformation
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has a formal declarative description which can be used to combine it with other
meta-theorems to construct other larger and more complex meta-theorems, and their
associated functions.
The other feature of this experiment is that it gives an example of reasoning
with formulae that involve bound variables where the binding mechanism is defined
in 'classical' fashion (i.e., with distinctive names). This turns out not to be as difficult
as perhaps might have been expected, although it was necessary to take some care
so that general alpha conversions were not needed in the proof.
Beta reduction
In this experiment a declarative definition of the beta reduction rule for the simple
lambda calculus is shown to be equivalent to a 'procedural' version which is explicitly
recursive. One could think of the original version of the rule as a specification, and
the replacement as an implementation, except that the former is equally useable as a
rule, only it is not in a form where it is automatically disposable by a reasonable mech¬
anism. Replacing it with a version that is explicitly recursive however, means that
the validity of any rule applications become mechanically decidable immediately and
thus much quicker. Since the two rules are extensionally identical though, they can
be used interchangeably: for instance using the original for further meta-reasoning,
but the new version for reasoning in the theory.
The second feature of this experiment is that it uses a 'de Bruijn' style binding
mechanism, which contrasts directly with the version described above. This removes
the problem of having to deal with alpha conversion, which is a possible advantage
at the meta-level, but replaces it with the problem of a syntax that is very difficult
for a human user at the object level.
1.2 Conclusions
Several possible advantages for meta-level reasoning were listed at the beginning of
this thesis, and it is now possible to to make an assessment of how realistic these
claims are in practice.
The first of these claims is that exploiting meta-theory can lead to an improve¬
ment in the usability, or flexibility, of a development system, and certainly the ex¬
ample of the deduction theorem is an example of this. Against the spectacular gains
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here though, there are two possible caveats. It could be argued that Shoenfield's
system is specially designed to be convenient for meta-theory at the cost of being
completely intractable at the object theory, so it shows off this sort of manipulation
to artificial advantage. Further, the meta-theory of propositional logic is particularly
(unusually) simple — for instance it does not have bound variables — and so is not
a good example of the general case. As a counter to this though, it can equally be
pointed out that the definition of SP is easily extended to encompass all of classical
predicate logic, a much more typical system. Then the fact that the raw system is
practically unuseable becomes much less of an issue. Instead it would be possible,
using the basic rules as a very simple foundation, to build different sorts of sets of
rules for particular purposes, as necessary.
The other two experiments do not display the same improvement in performance:
the function that is used to replace the tactic that would otherwise be used is of
the same complexity. However, the replacing of a tactic with a simple syntactic
transformation is a large improvement by itself: the fact that it is no longer necessary
to verify each rule application means that the constant factor in the complexity of the
operation is much reduced. Also these two illustrate well how with a meta-theorem
the specification is made explicit, which helps a user to stay in intellectual control of
the system. This is particularly the case in the example of the beta-reduction rule,
where the declarative version of substitution is available for reasoning with, but for
actually constructing deductions it is possible to use the (proven identical) procedural
version.
§2 Reflection
The second set of experiments concentrate on how work that has been done on
abstracting the behaviour of a Godel style proof predicate can be exploited so that
it is possible to use results in proof theory for extending a theory using reflection
principles. The proof predicate that Godel constructed for his original work is far
too complex to be implemented for an arbitrary extension of primitive recursive
arithmetic, and if this were the only proof predicate available then any results that
involved it would be of purely theoretical interest. However, work has been done by
Lob to abstract the important properties of such a predicate away from particular
instantiations, as a set of derivability conditions.
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First we described how the theory of sorted predicate logic, which was defined
earlier for work on meta-theory, can easily be extended with quotation. Then a
procedure for adding to the theory a predicate with properties based on the Lob
derivability conditions was described. The conditions, as they are presented by Lob,
are not quite adequate for our purposes: we are specifically interested in the possi¬
bilities that might be offered by uniform reflection, and this needs some way to do
substitution into a quoted context. However it was possible to develop a suitable
axiomatisation of substitution, and combine this with a slight extension of the Lob
conditions, and this was used.
The question of whether it is possible to get the same sort of non-conservativity
with this (a priori weaker) extension, than it is with a particular concrete instance
of a proof, is then investigated. The experiments presented are for PRA and show
that, here at least, it is possible to reproduce the non-conservativity results.
2.1 The examples presented
The three examples worked are all for primitive recursive arithmetic (i.e., elementary
arithmetic with Sj-induction).
Course of values induction
The first example presented was a proof of a schema for course of values induction.
Course of values induction over SJ-formulae is already available in PRA but the work
needed to get it is not trivial (though the proof itself is not particularly difficult).
Ackermann's function
Unlike the example above, this was not a proof of a schema, but of a particular theo¬
rem, that Ackermann's function is everywhere defined. A proof of this is interesting
here because it is the classic example of something that is known not to be provable
in PRA.
The full induction schema
The final example presented here is a proof that the full induction schema of PA was
provable in PRA extended with a single instance of the uniform reflection schema.
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2.2 Conclusions
These three examples explore how it is possible to provide a facility for quotation,
and from that, a general facility for using reflection to add reflexive extensions to
a theory. The first and third examples, which describe proofs of schemas, are also
interesting further examples of meta-theoretic reasoning techniques described above.
The point of the examples though, is of course to show that a theory extended in
this way allows some of the same results that a Godel proof predicate would, which
it does. This is an interesting result if it scales up to larger theories. There are
true propositions (without the artificial character of Godel's sentence) that are not
provable in, for instance PA, for instance termination of the Goodstein function, and
there are many proofs that can be shortened directly by the use ofmore powerful proof
principles. This approach would offer a way whereby theories could be extended using
reflection (which is conceptually simple), without having to build the large technical
apparatus that is normally associated with it.
This question is still open, so far as we know: it is not clear that proofs similar
to those here cannot be used with (for instance) a schema for transfinite induction
over eo. However we do not know. Finding out is clearly the next stage of work.
If it does not work, then the question remains of why it works with theories of the
strength of PRA1
§3 FS0
Three distinctively different formal systems have been defined in FS0 in the course of
this work, and this has allowed some practical assessment of how it works in practice,
as opposed to on the page. This assessment should be in the light of the features of
the implementation itself though, so as a preliminary, this is considered.
3.1 The implementation
The implementation of FS0 that was constructed for this work was based on a pre¬
vious theorem proving system intended for a very different theory, and one problem
is the direct result of this: the implementation is slow. This is simply a result of the
fact that the original system was designed to make working directly in a large and
complicated theory easy. The size of FS0, as well as the purposes for which it is in¬
tended, on the other hand, make possible, and argue in favour of, a system optimised
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for speed. Another problem was that as an initial implementation intended only for
particular experiments, the system grew as an accretion of ad hoc patches as the need
for various facilities became clear. In spite of this, though, the implementation was
resilient enough for the purposes of the current experiments, and certainly provided
a great deal of information about what would be needed in a 'production version'.
3.2 Using FS0
Binding mechanisms
The most immediate point about FS0 is that it does not have any facilities for
handling bound variables directly, so any such mechanism has to be defined by the
user. In practice this does not seem to be a problem; two different binding mechanisms
are defined in the examples: a classical system for the language of sorted first order
logic, and a de Bruijn style for the language of the lambda calculus. Since the
binding mechanism has to be explicitly defined, in practice it is certainly going to
be less efficient than what is possible with a framework such as LF, where it comes
built in 'for free'. On the other hand, the fact that the binding mechanism is explicit
means that reasoning with it directly and easily is possible, and this allows for easier
meta-theory. Further, it is, with a little care possible to design a binding mechanism
that can be shared by large collections of theories with languages represented in the
similar manner.
Defining recursively enumberable sets
The purpose of FS0 is to provide a theory for defining formal theories, and the
primary mechanism that it provides for this is a facility for defining recursively enu¬
merable classes. So the ease with which these can be defined is very important if
the system is to be useable. The 'raw' form of FS0, is not very useable, but given
some sensible support software, as is described here, the situation is much improved,
allowing a much clearer, and shorter notation. Given this support, for instance, for¬
malising the theory SP takes only 40 lines from beginning to end (that is, for the
basic theory itself: some further work has to be invested in building lemmas and the
like to make it useable) which is a size comparable to the definition in LF.
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Functions
The primary problem with FS0 in practice is that it is much more dependent on
functions for building the classes that define a theory than was expected. This causes
a problem in two ways. The same criticisms can be made of the function facilities as
for recursively enumerable classes, above. A compiler has been constructed for this
system too, but the problems are more difficult to fix. The problem has two aspects.
First, the basic structures provided by the function definition facilities should
correspond to what is needed in practice, and second, the function mechanism should
be as efficient as possible. The first of these is a problem because the function defi¬
nition mechanism only explicitly allows structural definition on s-expressions, while
in practice function definitions tend to be at least defined on the structure of syntax
encoded as s-expressions, which means course of values recursion on subtrees of the
s-expressions. In fact this is often not really enough: witness the work that had to
be done to construct a function that performed substitution in the beta-reduction
rule, even though it was fairly easy to see that the function defined by the original
equations must be terminating.
Second, since the only form of recursion available works directly on the struc¬
ture of s-expressions, the natural form for the evaluation mechanism for function
applications is very inefficient. This can be improved, to an extent, by having a
lazy evaluation mechanism, but a recursion mechanism that allowed better evalua¬
tion strategies would be a better solution (this need not mean a stronger induction
facility).
Facilities for meta-theory
The proof strength of FS0 is equivalent to PRA. which makes it very weak compared
to some theories which have been implemented on machines in the past. But in
practice there is rarely going to be a need for more than this (one example class of
exceptions is normalisation results for programming languages), and the induction
facilities that are available are designed so as to be very suitable for the sort of
'applied' proof theory (i.e., for the purposes of augmenting the practical performance
of a theorem prover) that is discussed here.
It should also be added here that, while FS0 is a classical theory, in practice it
was never necessary to use the rule of the excluded middle so all the proofs discussed
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are constructive (while this was not exploited here, it is certainly something that
might be made use of in a production system).
Notation
The final aspect of FS0 worth noting is the problem of how to deal with terms in
the encoded language. This has a problem that must be ubiquitous in framework
theories: the natural syntax of encoded formulae in the framework theory usually
bears no resemblance to the original, and is quite unreadable. Fixing this is simply
a matter of providing some way of converting output into something more readable,
but this is a problem that has not been addressed in more than a cursory manner.
§4 Summary
FSo was intended as a practical (as opposed to theoretical) Post style framework, and
initial experience with it suggests that it is effective for that purpose, given that the
implementation used was a prototype. A real 'production quality' implementation
would of course be substantially different in appearance from the basic system, if
only because of experience, but the the basic conception is sound.
The two sets of experiments above indicate that it is practical to exploit various
types of meta-theoretic reasoning principles effectively in formal theorem proving,
and further, that FS0 is a practical foundation for this work.
§5 Further work
A great range of possible further work results from this thesis, so I will outline only
some of them that I have specifically considered pursuing.
5.1 A reimplementation of FS0
As a preamble to any further practical work, it will be necessary to build a new
implementation of FS0 which can incorporate what has been learned in this thesis.
It will also be necessary to take account of the various pieces of further work outlined
below.
In particular, the function definition mechanism needs to be considerably im¬
proved. Since PRA provides enough facilities to build anything that is ever going to
be needed in practice (except interpreters — which can in fact be regarded, in a way,
as reflection principles) ideally the improvements should be conservative, and there
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are several candidate approaches that would satisfy such a requirement and provide
a more efficient evaluation mechanism into the bargain.
5.2 Formal meta-theory
Further work in exploring meta-theory will clearly be of interest. While applied meta-
theory is the area exploited here, Feferman has mentioned some applications of FS0
which he feels would be particularly interesting, and a test of the theory at the same
time.
'a formulation of Godel's 2nd incompleteness theorem which applies to sys¬
tems containing PRA in one way or another... Another candidate is the
Gentzen cut-elimination theorem — or, assuming that — such things as the
Herbrand-Gentzen midsequent theorem, or the interpolation theorem.'
Any of these would be demanding but rewarding results.
5.3 Schematic meta-theorems
The effort of constructing a definition of a theory, and then building theorems for
that particular theory is substantial. However FS0 is a second order theory, and this
provides for the interesting prospect of schematic proofs.
It becomes easy to prove results that are quantified over classes of theories.
For instance, it is possible not only to build a 'skeleton' definition of a class of
theories (such as, first order logic), and then quantify over it, but it is also possible
to prove theorems about that 'skeleton' theory which then apply to any instantiation.
Consider the definition of the language C and the associated theory of predicate logic
that is presented in this thesis. It is possible to imagine proofs of propositions of the
form
VPVa(a £ wffc A a £ P —•> a £ T{R))
which, once proven, would be a result useable with any theory defined as an extension
of sorted first order logic (in other words, a derived rule). This means that it would
be possible to exploit one meta-theoretic result over a variety of theories without
having to redo the work each time.
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5.4 Reflection principles
There are a collection of points that should be investigated here, both theoretical
and practical. The relationship between abstract proof predicates defined by the
derivability conditions on the possibilities for a concrete proof predicate, and concrete
instances of the proof predicate itself is not clear. See work done in Russia [54], which
has only recently been published in English, on investigating the modal interpretation
of provability, which extends Solovay's completeness theorem to the predicate form
of provability logic for instance.
Also, in his recent survey paper on reflection, Feferman's results for reflecting
the truth of propositions instead of provability, suggest that that this would be an
interesting alternative approach (in fact there is an implication in the paper that FS„
would be a suitable vehicle for developing this work in practice).
Appendix: Course of values induction for FS0
In practice, the primitive stepwise induction facility of FS0 is not as useful as
course of values induction on the ordering 'is a subtree of'. So I will present a proof
here of induction for that. The proof is also a nice illustration of how flexible FS0
is, compared to, say, PRA. In fact there are two points worth making: first, because
lists are primitive, the proof is quite easy to build from basic components of the
system, whereas in a system like PRA there would have to be several chapters of
development work first, designing Godel numbering schemes etc. Second, whereas
in a system like PRA course of values induction is a schema, and so is not provable
once and for all as a lemma, in FS0 because it is a second order theory, it is possible
to prove a single lemma quantified over classes.
Most of the proof is trivial, but quite long, compared to the other results here
(even if short compared to the equivalent in PRA), so I will just sketch it.
The first step is to define the partial ordering relation -<, and this is done using
the following definitions
ifF — C[D,V[ki, Ktruei ^121^22]]
orF — C[ifF, P\lt1, Kfrue, ^2]]










Si -< S2 = f^(Si,S2) = true
Then the problem is to show
b VCVx(Vy(y Sx—>yeC)-+x€.C)^> Vx(a; 6 C)
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This reduces quickly to
Vx(Vy(y -< x —> y g C) —u £ C) h Vx(x g C)
Then given the lemma
\/x(\/y(y -< x —» y g C) —»i G C) h Va:Vy(y -< x —> y g C)
the result follows by the usual proof. Thus the problem has been reduced to the
lemma. But the usual proof of the lemma follows by induction on x, which is not
possible here since it is not over a Si formula. It is necessary to find a class C having
the property that
by induction on x. The only problem is, of course, in building the class C'.
The definition of C'
The first stage is the building the class C" which is defined as the class consisting of
the base case
b x g C <-> Vy(y -< x —» y g C). (*)
Then it is possible to prove a modified form of the lemma,
Wx(\/y(y -< x —> y g C) -> i g C) h Vx(x g C')
(0,0) g C"
closed under the rule
(s*,sa)ec" (ss,S4) g c"
((sI,s3),(s„s4),(sa.s4))ec"
s, e c a s4 e c
So C can be defined simply as
xGC'h 3y((y,x)eC")
Now all that is left is to prove (*)
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Right to left
We first show
Vx(x -< y —> x G C) b \/x(x -< y —■> x G C'). (LI)
This is proven by simple induction. Since x -< y is defined to be f^(x,y) = true it
is possible to define the complement, x -/< y as f^(x,y) 7^ true, and make use of the
identity
b (x Ay x G C") <-> (x-f[y\/(x-<yAx£ C')).
it is also possible to construct the comprehension of the right hand side for x, (call it
Co), the goal can be replaced with that, and then it is possible to use induction. In
the base case, 0 G Co since (0,0) G C" and therefore 3y((y, O) G C"). In the step
case, the goal can be reduced to




b (a,b) G C'
which, since a -< y and b -< y by transitivity of -< reduces to
Vx(a; -< y —■> x G C),
a G C, b G C", (a, b) -< y
b (a,6) G C"
Then, by applying the first hypothesis to a and 6, and the definition of C'
o, G C, a G C,
3z((z,a) G C"), 3* ((*,&) G C")
b3z((z,(o,6))GC")
Removing the existentials in the hypothesis list then gives
o G C, 0 G C,
(z',a) G C",(z",b) G C"
b 3z ((2, (a, b)) G C")
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and from the definition of C" it is easy to show that
ct G C, OL G C,
(z',a)eC"),(z",b)eC"
h ((z',a),(z",a),(a,b)) G C"
At this point it is possible to return to the point of this section, which is to prove
the right to left case of (*), i.e, (by the definition of C' and some simplification) that
Vy(y A x -» y g C) h 3z ((z, x) g C)
By cutting in the result of (LI), we have
\/y(y -<x -> y G C),Vy(y -<: x -» y e C') b 3z((z,x) G C")
and, by an a analysis by cases on x = 0 V 3y 3z (x = (y, z)) the result follows easily.
Left to right
Having outlined the sort of techniques that are used, this section will be much shorter.
To recap, the required result is that
b y G C —> \/x(x -< y —> x G C).
This follows from
b y G C" —* \/x(x -< 7r2y —»• a; G C A a: G C')
which follows by induction on the structure of C".
Appendix: the rules of C
r b a
basic where a € T
rh av a-> jl
Yha Ah b
exmid













V-ro where A C T
r h a y b
Yh a Ah b
A-r where T C E
E h a A b
AcE
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Ah B
r h A -> B
>-r where A C {A} U T
ThC AhC
E, A V BhC
V-l where T C {A} U E
Ac{B}UE
AhC
T, A A BhC
A-l where A C {A} U {B} U T
T h A AhC
E, A -»• B h C








3-r where EC A
t G termc
T, A[t/v] h C
A, MvA h C
V-l where T C A
t G termc
r, A[v/v'] h C
A, 3VAhC
3-1 where Fc A
v £ r
Appendix: The construction of crop and liftF
Constructing crop
a solution for crop is slightly tricky, or more accurately, messy. It cannot be defined
easily at the same level of abstraction as above. Instead it is necessary to go inside
the abstract representation of lists to do it. The specific mechanics is as follows, hd,
tl and list allows the use of apparently infinite lists that default to a particular value,
so that a list a = (ai,..., an, an+i, an+2; • • •)> where an+j = o,n, is held in a structure
(■an, (ai,... an+j-1)) where, usually, j = 0. crop should have the behaviour
croF(a,b) = ((on, 6m), ((ai, 61),... (ap-i, 6,-1)))
(p > max(m,n)). So crop is defined to be
croF((x, x'), (y, y')) = ((x, y), croF'(x, y, x',y'))
where crop' has the properties
i < lenp(croF'((x,x'),(y,y'))) -> croF'((x,x'),(y,y'))i = ((x, x')\ (y, y')1) p8
crojF((x,a;'),(y,y'))!
= ((®, y), croF'((x, x'), (y, y'))!
_ f croF'((x,x'),(y,y'))i if i < lenF(croF'((x,x'),(y,y'))) , „





Then p4 can be verified against this as follows
The first case follows trivially, by p8, while the second follows by
i •£ lenF(croF'((x,x'),(y,y')))
i lenp(x')
by transitivity of ft , p6,and p8
= x by D1
The result for (y,y') follows almost identically, and completes the proof.
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Then, if crop' is defined
'( \ A / cr°F"(lenF(iriy),x,y) if lenF(p2x) < lenF(p2y)crop {x,y) yCrop"(lenp(irix),x,y) if lenF(p2x)-ft lenF(p2y)
and
crop"(I, a, b) = map(f)(count(l), (a, b))
where f(x,(y,z)) = (yx,zx)
These can be verified against pQ-p8 as follows. First p6, which is proven by case
analysis on
lenp(x') < lenF(y') V lenp(x') <fi lenF(y')
Assuming the left disjunct, i.e., lenp(x') < lenF(y'), then
lenF(crop'((x,x'),(y,y'))) <jt lenp(x') lenp(x') < lenF(crop'((x,x'),(y,y')))
and
lenF(croF'((x, x'),(y, y')))
= lenF(crop"(lenF(y'), (x, x'), (y, y')))
by the definition of crop' and the hypothesis
= lenF(map( f)(count(lenF(y')), (fx, x'), (y, y'))))
by definition of crop"
= lenp(count(lenp(y'))) 6y D2




which follows from the hypothesis. The other disjunct is much the same, as is the
proof of p7
The verification of p8 can use the same case analysis, so, again first assuming
lenp(x') < lenF(y'), the proof is as follows
i < lenF(crop'((x,x'),(y,y'))) crop'((x,x'),(y,y'))i = ((®, x')\ (y, y')')
can be reduced to
i < lenF(y') -> map(f)(count(lenF(y')),((x,x'),(y,y')))i = ((z, x')*, (y, y')J)
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but
i < lenF(y') -> map{f)(y',((x,x'),(y,y')))i = f(y'it ((&, x'), (y, y')))) by D4
and
lenF(y') = lenp(count(lenF(y'))) by D3
so the problem is reduced to
i < lenF(y') -> f(count(lenF(y'))i,((x,x'),(y,y'))) = ((x, x')\ (y, y')1)
-+ f(i,((x,x'),(y,y'))) = ((x, x')\ (y, y')*)
since by D5, i < y —> count(y)i = i, and this in turn gives
(by the definition of / given in crop"), giving the result.
Constructing liftp
The solution to liftp that satisfies p5 constructed in a way that is very similar to
the solution for subp. liftp is defined as:
liftF(x,y) = liftp' (x,y)°
then p5 follows from
(y,™,j,y') e Wc -»• y' = liftF'(y,w)J
and the rest of the construction follows the proof of subp1, only starting from
7 • r/ /,/< , -N -Nfe /('var',?) if i < khftp (( var = < ;{ , / ,N ; ,J ^ / ( var ,? + j) if i it k
liftp\<f\\M\x)k = ('A', (liftp'(M,x)k+1))
liftp {(fapp', (M, iV)), x)* = ('app', croF(liftF'(M, x), liftF'(N, x))k)
and the function is replaced with
Zwi'fx v = I * lfj K klist \x,y,j) ^ fc
Bibiliography
1. P. Abrahams, Application of Lisp to Checking Mathematical Proofs, in "The Pro¬
gramming Language Lisp: its Operations and Applications", E. Berkeley and D. Bo-
brow eds., M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, (1964).
2. P. Aczel, Frege Structures and the notions of proposition, truth and set, in "The
Kleene Symposium", J. Barwise, H. Keisler and K. Kunen eds., North Holland, Am¬
sterdam, (1978), pages 31-59.
3. S. Allen, R. Constable, D. Howe and W. Aitken, The Semantics of Reflected Proof,
Department of Computer Science (preprint), Cornell University, Ithaca, New York,
(1990).
4. A. Avron, Simple Consequence Relations (ECS-LFCS-87-30), Laboratory for the
Foundations of Computer Science, Department of Computer Science, University of
Edinburgh, (1987).
5. A. Avron, F. Honsell and I. Mason, Using Typed Lambda Calculus to Implement For¬
mal Systems on a Machine (ECS-LFCS-87-31), Laboratory for The Foundations
of Computer Science, Department of Computer Science, University of Edinburgh,
(1987).
6. H. Barendregt, "The Lambda Calculus, Its Syntax and Semantics (revised edition),"
North-Holland, Amsterdam, (1984).
7. D. Basin, Building Problem Solving Environments in Constructive Type Theory (The¬
sis, TR 89-1063), Department of Computer Science, Cornell University, Ithaca, New
York, (December 1989).
8. D. Basin and R. Constable, Metalogical Frameworks, in Proceedings of the Second
Workshop on Logical Frameworks, informal, distributed by e-mail.
9. D. Basin, F. Giunchiglia and P. Traverso, Automating Meta-Theory Creation and
System Extension, in Proceedings of the Second Congress of the Italian Association
for Artificial Intelligence, Springer, Berlin, (October 1991), pages 48-57.
10. D. Basin and D. Howe, Some Normalisation Properties ofMartin-Lof's Type The¬
ory, in Theoretical Aspects of Computer Software, Springer, Berlin, (1991).
11. N. de Bruijn, Lambda Calculus notation with nameless dummies, a tool for automatic
formula manipulation, Indagationes Mathematicae, vol. 34, (1972), pages 381-392.
12. N. de Bruijn, A Survey of the Project AUTOMATH, Its Usage and Some of Its Ex¬
tensions, in "To H. B. Curry: Essays in Combinatory Logic, Lambda Calculus, and
Formalism", J. Seldin and J. Hindley eds., Academic Press, New York, (1980), pages
589-606.
13. A. Bundy, F. van Harmelen, C. Horn and A. Smaill, The Oyster-Clam system, in
10th International Congerence on Automated Deduction (Lecture Notes in Artificial
Intelligence No. 449), Springer, Berlin, (1990).
14. A. Church, "The Calculi of Lambda Conversion," Princeton University Press, Prince¬
ton, (1941).
15. A. Church, A formulation of the simple theory of types, Journal of Symbolic Logic,
vol. 5, (1940), pages 56-68.
16. K. Bowen and R. Kowalski, Amalgamating Language and Metalanguage in Logic
Programming, in "Logic Programming", K. Clark et. al. eds., Academic Press, Lon¬
don, (1982), pages 153-172.
17. R. Boyer and J. Moore, "A Computational Logic," Academic Press, New York,
(1981).
18. R. Boyer and J. Moore, Metafunctions: proving them correct and using them effi¬
ciently as new proof procedures, in "The Correctness Problem in Computer Science",
R. Boyer and J. Moore eds., Academic Press, New York, (1981), pages 103-184.
Bibliography / 203
19. R. Constable et. al., "Implementing Mathematics with the Nuprl Proof Development
System," Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, U.S.A., (1986).
20. D. van Daalen, "The Language Theory of Automath," Technische Hogeschool Eind¬
hoven, Eindhoven, (1980).
21. M. Davis and J. Schwartz, Metamathematical Extensibility for Theorem Verifiers and
Proof Checkers (Courant Computer Science Report No. 12), Courant Institute of
Mathematical Sciences, New York, (1977).
22. A. Ehrenfeucht and J. Mycielski, Abbreviating Proofs by Adding New Axioms, Bul¬
letin of the American Mathematical Society, vol. 77, (1971), pages 366-367.
23. S. Feferman, Transfinite Recursive Progressions of Axiomatic theories, Journal of
Symbolic Logic, vol. 27, (1962), pages 259-316.
24. S. Feferman and W. Sieg, Proof Theoretic Equivalences between Classical and Con¬
structive Theories for Analysis, in "Iterated Inductive Definitions and Subsystems of
Analysis: Recent Proof Theoretic Studies' (Lecture notes in Mathematics, No. 897)",
W. Buchholz, S. Feferman, W. Pohlers and W. Sieg, eds., Springer, Berlin, (1981),
pages 78-142.
25. S. Feferman, Finitary Inductively Presented Logics, in Logic Colloquium '88, North-
Holland, Amsterdam, (1990).
26. S. Feferman, Reflecting on Completeness, Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 56, (1991),
pages 1-49.
27. S. Feferman, Personal Communication, (1991).
28. J. Y. Girard, "Proof Theory and Logical Complexity, Vol. I," Bibliopolis, Naples,
(1987).
29. A. Fraenkel, Y. Bar-Hillel and A. Levy, "Foundations of Set Theory," North-Holland,
Amsterdam, (1973).
30. J. Y. Girard, Y. Lafont and P. Taylor, "Proofs and Types," Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, England, (1989).
31. F. Giunchiglia and L. Serafini, Multilanguage Hierarchical Logics (or: how we can do
without modal logics), Mechanised Reasoning Group, I.R.S.T., Trento, Italy, (unpub¬
lished draft).
32. F. Giunchiglia and P. Traverso, Reflective Reasoning With and Between a Declarative
Metatheory and the Implementation Code, in Proceedings of the Twelfth Interna¬
tional Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, International Joint Conferences on
Artificial Intelligence, Inc., California.
33. M. Gordon, R. Milner and C. Wadsworth, "Edinburgh LCF: a mechanised logic
of Computation (Lecture notes in Computer Science, No. 78)," Springer, Berlin,
(1979).
34. D. Gries, "The Science of Programming," Springer, New York, (1981).
35. K. Godel, Uber die Lange der Beweis, Ergenis eines mathematischer Kolloquiums,
vol. 7, pages 23-24.
36. K. Godel, Uber formal unentscheidbare Satze der Principia Mathematica und Ver-
wandter Systeme, Monatshefte fiir Mathematik und Physik, vol. 38, (1931), pages
173-198.
37. F. van Harmelen, A. Simpson, F. Giunchiglia, L. Serafini and A. Smaill, A discus¬
sion about naming relations (RFL/ViA/I.f/1), Esprit Basic Research Project P3178
Reflect, S.W.I., University of Amsterdam, (July, 1990).
38. R. Harper, F. Honsell and G. Plotkin, A Framework for Defining Logics, in Second
Symposium on Logic in Computer Science, Computer Society Press, (June, 1987).
39. R. Harper, F. Honsell and G. Plotkin, A Framework for Defining Logics, Journal of
the Association for Computing Machinery, (To appear).
Bibliography / 204
40. S. Hayashi and H. Nakano, "PX: A Computational Logic," M.I.T. Press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, (1988).
41. I. Hayes, "Specification Case Studies," Prentice-Hall International, London, (1987).
42. D. Hilbert, Neubegriindung der Mathematik, in "Abhandlungen aus dem mathema-
tischen Seminar der Hamburgischen Universitat, Band I", Universitat Hamburg,
Hamburg, Germany, (1922).
43. D. Hilbert and P. Bernays, "Grundlagen der Mathematik, Bande II," Springer,
Berlin, (1939).
44. D. Howe, Automating Reasoning in an Implementation of Constructive Type Theory
(Thesis, TR 88-925), Department of Computer Science, Cornell University, Ithaca,
New York, (June 1988).
45. G. Hughes and M. Creswell, "An Introduction to Modal Logic," Methuen, New
York, (1968).
46. L. S. Jutting, Checking Landau's Grundlagen in the Automath System (Thesis),
Eindhoven University, Netherlands, (1977).
47. S. Kleene, "Introduction to Metamathematics," North-Holland, Amsterdam, (1952).
48. T. Knoblock and R. Constable, Formalised Metareasoning in Type Theory (TR-
86-742), Department of Computer Science, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York,
(March 1986).
49. T. Knoblock, Metamathematical Extensibility in Type Theory (Thesis, TR-87-892),
Department of Computer Science, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, (December
1987).
50. G. Kreisel and A. Levy, Reflection Principles and their use for establishing the Com¬
plexity of Axiomatic Systems, Zeitschrift Fur Mathematische Logik, und Grundlagen
der Mathematik, vol. 14, (1968), pages 97-142.
51. M. Lob, Solution of a problem of Leon Henkin, Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 20,
(1955), pages 115-118.
52. Z. Luo, R. Pollack and P. Taylor, How to use LEGO (A preliminary User's Manual),
Laboratory for the Foundations of Computer Science, (Unpublished), Department of
Computer Science, University of Edinburgh, (October, 1989).
53. W. McCune, The Otter User's Guide, Argonne National Laboratory, Illinois, (1989).
54. V. McGee, A Survey of Results by Artemov and Vardanyan on the Modal Logic of
Provability, Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 56, (1991), pages 329-332.
55. P. Madden, Automated Program Transformation Through Proof Transformation
(Thesis), Department of Artificial Intelligence, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh,
(1991).
56. Z. Manna, "Mathematical Theory of Computation," McGraw-Hill, Tokyo, (1974).
57. P. Martin-Lof, "Intutitionistic Type Theory," Bibliopolis, Naples, (1984).
58. P. Mendler and P. Aczel, The notion of a Framework and a framework for LTC, in
Third Annual Symposium on Logic in Computer Science, Computer Society Press,
Massachusetts Avenue, Washington D.C., (1988).
59. G. Mine, Quantifier-free and one-quantifier systems, Journal of Soviet Mathematics,
vol. 1, (1973), pages 71-84.
60. R. Montague, Syntactical Treatments of Modality, with Corollaries on Reflexion
Principles and Finite Axiomatisability, Acta Philosophica Fennica, vol. 16, (1963),
pages 153-167.
61. C. Murthy, Extracting Constructive Content in Classical Proofs (Thesis), Depart¬
ment of Computer Science, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, (December 1990).
62. D. Perlis, Languages with Self-Reference I: Foundations (or: We Can Have Every¬
thing in First-Order Logic), Artificial Intelligence, vol. 25, (1985), pages 301-322.
Bibliography / 205
63. D. Perlis, Languages with Self-Reference II: Knowledge, Belief, and Modality, Artifi¬
cial Intelligence, vol. 34, (1988), pages 179-212.
64. E. Post, Formal reductions of the general combinatorial decision problem, American
Journal of Mathematics, vol. 65, (1943), pages 197-214.
65. D. Pym, Proofs, Search and Computation in a General Logic (Thesis: ECS-LFCS-
90-125), Laboratory for the Foundations of Computer Science, Department of Com¬
puter Science, University of Edinburgh, (1990).
66. W. C. Sellar, TEgrot: Oxon: and R. J. Yeatman, Failed M.A. etc. Oxon:, "1066 and
All That: a memorable history of England: comprising all the parts you can remem¬
ber including one hundred and three good things, five bad kings, and two genuine
dates," Methuen, London, (1931).
67. N. Shankar, A Mechanical Proof of the Church-Rosser Theorem, Journal of the Asso¬
ciation for Computing Machinery, vol. 35, (1988), pages 475-522.
68. J. R. Shoenfield, "Mathematical Logic," Addison-Wesley, Reading, Massachusetts,
(1967).
69. A. Simpson, On The Conservativity of Certain Extensions of Arithmetic, Unpub¬
lished, University of Edinburgh, (10 June, 1991).
70. B. Smith, Reflection and Semantics in a Procedural Language (MIT/LCS/TR-272),
Laboratory for Computer Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, (1982).
71. B. Smith, Reflection and Semantics in Lisp (TR ISL-5), Intelligent Systems Labora¬
tory, Xerox PARC, Palo Alto, California, (1983).
72. C. Smorynski, "Self-Reference and Modal Logic," Springer, New York, (1985).
73. R. M. Smullyan, "Theory of Formal Systems," Princeton University Press, Prince¬
ton, New Jersey, (1961).
74. R. Solovay, Provability interpretations of modal logic, Israel Journal of Mathematics,
vol. 25, (1976), pages 287-304.
75. A. Tarski, Pojgcie prawdy w jgtzkach nauk dedukcyjnch, Warsaw, (1933).
76. P. Taylor, Using Constructions as a Metalanguage (ECS-LFCS-88-70), Laboratory
for The Foundations of Computer Science, Department of Computer Science, Uni¬
versity of Edinburgh, (1988).
77. A. Troelstra, "Metamathematical Investigation of Intuitionistic Arithmetic and
Analysis (Lecture Notes in Mathematics No. 344)," Springer, Berlin, (1973).
78. A. Turing, Systems of logic based on ordinals, Proceedings of the London Mathemat¬
ical Society, vol. 45, (1939), pages 161-228.
79. R. Weyhrauch, Prolegomena to a Theory of Mechanised Formal Reasoning, Artificial
Intelligence, vol. 13, (1980), pages 133-170.
80. A. Whitehead and B. Russell, "Principia Mathematica (second edition)," Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, (1925-27).
81. J. McCarthy et. ah, "Lisp 1.5 Programmers Manual (second edition)," M.I.T. Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, (1965).







The theory FS0 4
Structure of thesis 5
The Idea of Meta-level Reasoning 7
Historical background 7
What is a proof development system 8
A more formal notion of a proof development system 13
Meta-theory and frameworks 20
Using a framework 23
Advantages that meta-level reasoning brings 26
Disadvantages of meta-theory 29
Conclusions 31
The theory FS0 as a Logical Framework 34
The theory FS0 34
A formal description of FS0 35
Some initial observations 40
Evaluating expressions 42
Some simple examples of FS0 in use 43
Further observations etc 48
FS0 as a framework 52
An implementation of FS0 52
The implementation of FS0 58
The theory SP in FS0 63
Summary and conclusions 71
Declaring a Language and a Theory 73
The abstract form of a language 73
The syntax of C in FS0 75
Implementing C in FS0 76
Substitution for C 79
The presentation of the theory 88
The implementation of the theory 90
Logical rules 92
The definition of the theory 94
Table of Contents / 207
Summary and conclusions 95
Meta level reasoning and extension 97
Prenex normal form 97
De Bruijn indices for the lambda calculus 110
A recursive solution to substitution in A 115
Conclusion 119
The Idea of Reflection 120
Vocabulary and concepts 121
Work on self reference 122
Developments of the work of Tarski and Godel 124
Analysing the proof predicate 127
The analysis of the Lob conditions 129
Practical implications 130
Implementing an abstract proof predicate 132
Summary and conclusions 135
Implementing Reflection 138
Extending the definition of C, 138
The substitution functions and reflecting up 141
Conclusion 146
Using Reflection 147
Course of values induction 147
A proof of termination of Ackermann's function 154
PRA+ contains PA 158







Work on reflection 173
Other forms of meta-level and self-referential reasoning 179





Table of Contents / '208
Further work 190
Appendices 193
Course of values induction for FS0 193
The rules of £ 197
The construction of crop and liftp 199
Bibliography 202
Table of Contents 206
<&abt mm, ad>! pi)ilofopI)ie,
3urificref unb fcltebfjm,
Unb lctbcr aud> Cl>eologte!
3Durd>aus fhibtert, nut l>etf$em 33emul)n.
3Da flct) tcf> nun, id) armcr Con
Unb bin fo Hug als n?ic junor
